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ABSTRACT
SECONDARY SPECTRUM MARKETS: FROM “NAKED” SPECTRUM TO
VIRTUALIZED COMMODITIES
Marcela M. Go´mez, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2017
The creation of secondary spectrum markets emerged as a means to enable flexible spectrum-
use mechanisms and abandon a rigid spectrum allocation and assignment approach, which
resulted in severe inefficiencies in the use of this resource. At the core of the deployment of
spectrum markets lie the definition of electromagnetic spectrum as a tradeable commodity,
the reallocation of spectrum rights, the creation of incentives for resource owners to lease
or transfer their spectrum holdings and the appropriate regulatory framework to support
and enforce market transactions. It follows that the viability of spectrum markets depends
on technical, economic and regulatory frameworks to render this approach a meaningful
alternative for spectrum allocation and assignment.
In this research work, we explore the conditions associated with spectrum markets via-
bility. For this purpose, we utilize Agent-based Modeling in order to study markets under
different commodity definitions as well as network configurations. These configurations are
gathered in three research stages, which start with the analysis of markets as stand-alone
institutions where electromagnetic frequencies, without any associated infrastructure (i.e.,
“naked” spectrum), are traded. This allows us to explore the degree in which the limitations
in spectrum fungibility impact the trading process and outcome.
In the second stage, we focus on refining the tradeable commodity in such a way that al-
lows to circumvent the physical limitations of spectrum. To this end, we rely on technologies
such as LTE-Advanced and virtualization in order to define a fungible, virtualized spectrum
iv
commodity and explore the benefits that this provides for market deployment.
The final stage aims at extending the range of applicability of virtualized commodities
and providing opportunities that could address current spectrum service and connectivity
requirements. Hence, we explore markets as part of more complex network arrangements,
where we rely on middleman theory, matching markets and simple auctions in order to
enable resource trading. This requires the analysis of multiple factors that impact market
design from the definition of tradeable commodities to the characterization of the role and
objectives of market participants. These factors stem from relevant technical, economics
and regulatory frameworks, which we explore to determine whether our spectrum markets
proposal can be considered as a viable and applicable solution.
v
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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The focus of this dissertation is to investigate the conditions and parameters involved in
the design of secondary spectrum markets, while taking into account the complexity of
electromagnetic spectrum as a commodity, and the regulatory framework needed to enable
them. In this manner, our analysis explores three key axes for the study of spectrum markets:
technology, economics and policy. To the best of our knowledge, there are no working, real-
world examples of secondary spectrum markets. Hence, we have relied on Agent-based
modeling to represent market settings of interest. We have focused on three particular
market scenarios, which have been divided in three research stages.
Stage 1 focuses on analyzing the effects of the lack of spectrum fungibility on market
viability. To this end, we build upon an existing market model [1], which considers three
types of market participants: a) Spectrum License Requesters (SLRs), b) Band Manager
(BM) and c) Spectrum License Holders (SLHs). The commodity available in the market is
defined as spectrum bandwidth units in a specific frequency band. Additionally, we define
alternate technology units (ATs), which are options that SLRs can find outside the market to
fulfill their traffic requirements (i.e., wireline deployments, unlicensed spectrum, infrastruc-
ture enhancements, etc.) For spectrum fungibility considerations, we calculate a capacity
fungibility score, which represents the ratio between the capacity obtained with an available
frequency band, and that obtained with a preferred band. Then, we incorporate this mea-
sure to the market model. The objective is for the interactions among market participants
to reflect their distinct valuation for preferred and available frequency bands.
The market transactions correspond to a Stackelberg auction, where SLRs post their bids
and the BM assigns resources. Market viability is calculated by analyzing the results of our
model simulations according to a set of predefined market viability criteria: 1) probability of
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demand being greater than supply; 2) probability of having empty bid lists; 3) percentage of
resources assigned in the market; 4) average number of alternate technology units per SLR,
and 5) average auction clearing price.
Results from this stage show that as spectrum fungibility decreases, we find fewer scenar-
ios where markets are viable. Markets are viable when we do not face spectrum oversupply
conditions, and this is further accompanied by higher auction clearing prices and a higher
percentage of resources assigned in the market. It is important to note that viable scenar-
ios are those with a larger number of market participants, which is not consistent with the
current structure of the Telecommunications market.
The aforementioned findings point to the need of adding thickness to the market. In this
way, we could develop a market setting that would not only attract a larger number of market
participants (i.e., SLRs), but also provide with commodities that are suitable to a wider range
of buyers. To this end, in Stage 2, we address this issue by adopting a technical definition
of the commodity to trade in the market. Indeed, we no longer focus on trading “naked”
spectrum; instead, we appeal to Virtualization concepts and the opportunities stemming
from LTE-Advanced in order to define a more homogeneous and adaptive spectrum-related
commodity. As such, this commodity stems from the definition of LTE Physical Resource
Blocks (PRBs).
To fully exploit market thickness, we focus on defining a homogeneous commodity. For
this purpose, our commodity to trade is derived from LTE-A bands in the range of 700 MHz.
The choice of AT units is TV white space spectrum in the same frequency range. In this
manner, we create a pseudo-fungibility environment, enabled by technology. Our objective
is to create a marketplace where SLRs can express their spectrum needs in terms of capacity
(in Mbps) instead of bandwidth units of a specific frequency. To enhance resource access,
we consider that available spectrum commodities are pooled, and the resulting common pool
of resources is administered by the Band Manager. Further, the BM is in charge of making
the translation between PRBs and their resulting capacity, before assigning resources in the
market.
The market structure in this stage is fairly similar to that of Stage 1. Hence, we work
with the same market participants; however, we make the necessary adjustments to fit the
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new market commodity. We tested two different scenarios that focused on different access
opportunities to the licensed spectrum auctions. Our results stem from comparing simulation
results to the same viability criteria utilized for Stage 1. We find that when SLRs have the
opportunity to cease utilization of unlicensed spectrum to participate in every market bidding
round, all the tested scenarios are viable. Viability conditions include scenarios with only
a few SLRs, thus pointing to the advantage of developing a more flexible, homogeneous
commodity and marketplace.
Stages 1 and 2, while different in settings and commodity definitions, focus on the anal-
ysis of markets as standalone entities. In this manner, in our third stage, the objective is
to extrapolate the definition of a flexible market commodity to a more complex network
setting, where we could take into account further characteristics that influence market de-
velopment.In Stage 3, we study a network model that utilizes markets for the assignment
of spectrum, but also focuses on the interactions among participants and how these account
toward the final market viability assessment. To provide a solid basis for the development of
the model in this stage, we appealed to the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework, and focused on the interactions between an action situation and the existing
agents, environment and the applicable governance mechanism.
The agents in this model are now 1) Service Providers (previously SLRs), 2) Resource
Providers (previously SLHs), and 3) Virtual Network Builders. Service providers are new
market entrants or existing providers who need to obtain resources in the market to fulfill the
demand of their customers. Resource providers are incumbents who have excess spectrum
resources and have the option of making them available, in a common pool, for subsequent
trade. The VNBs are a new addition to the model, and their characteristics are the result
of adapting middleman theory concepts. As middlemen, the VNBs’ objective is to form
partnerships with existing service providers, learn about their resource needs, and obtain an
appropriate set of resources from the market.
To explore this stage, we have studied two different sets of interactions: a) VNB – SP
interactions and b) VNB – RP interactions. The first set of interactions solve the VNB –
SP partnership forming problem. We address this task by utilizing matching markets theory
and thus basing possible partnerships on the compatibility between SPs(VNBs) choices and
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VNBs(SPs) preferences. Choices refer to the values assigned by SPs and VNBs to parameters
regarding their operations (e.g., demand, reputation) and preferences refer to what SPs and
VNBs are looking for in members of the opposite set.
Once the partnership forming process is over, each VNB learns the demand of its cus-
tomers and the price they are willing to pay for resources. In this way, it can obtain an
appropriate set of resources from the pool by participating in a sealed-bid auction. At the
end of the market transactions, each VNB assigns the obtained resources to its customers
and receives a payment for its resource aggregation services. Note that a VNB will receive a
payment only from customers that received resources. Similarly, RPs obtain their payment
for the resources they assigned. After all payments are made, each entity (i.e., SPs, VNBs
and RPs) have the opportunity to adjust their advertised fees and payments in order to
remain competitive in the market and maximize their surplus.
Results from this stage show that RPs’ participation in the market is always profitable
and that SPs pay their true valuation for spectrum resources. VNBs’ payment analysis
shows that their remunerations are consistent with their reputation. VNBs’ surplus analysis
shows that they are capturing the risk in the market, and that holding a large number
of SP partners may cause them to incur in negative surplus. We also find that VNBs’
activities are crucial for easing congestion in scenarios with a large number of participants.
Indeed, by aggregating the demand of their customers, VNBs provide a better alternative
for managing the geographical demand, and converting it into manageable market demand.
It is important to note that in our model, there is no exchange of information between SPs
and RPs. This factor alleviates information sharing concerns which may discourage entities
from participating in the market.
Overall, the model of Stage 3 constitutes an important alternative for bootstrapping the
spectrum market, and provides a detailed definition of a network where virtualized com-
modities can be traded.
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1.1 CONTRIBUTIONS
The main contribution of this work is that, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study
that takes deeply into account policy, economics and technical frameworks for the analysis
of spectrum markets. This permits to draw market viability conclusions from different
angles, such as the need for and advantages from the definition of a homogeneous, spectrum-
related commodity, and the economic implications of adding a middleman in the market.
In addition, our analysis provides us with opportunities for the applicability of different
governance methods.
In what follows, we list additional contributions that stem from this research work.
• The limitations associated with the lack of spectrum fungibility have been taken into
account when utilizing “naked” spectrum as a market commodity. This analysis has also
been presented as a Conference paper [2] in the Telecommunications Policy Research
Conference in 2013.
• We provide an analysis of the benefits stemming from defining a homogeneous mar-
ket commodity. Spectrum homogeneity is further supported by an existing technical
framework. The work comprising Stage 2 of this dissertation has been presented as a
Conference paper [3] in the Telecommunications Policy Research Conference in 2014.
• A complex, yet adaptive, model has been developed for the analysis of Stage 3. This
model can be modified to account for different market structures, spectrum commodity
definitions and technical scenarios.
• We present a new application of matching markets within the spectrum trading context,
as a mechanism that permits market participants to form partnerships. This partnership-
forming process further helps to explore how parameters advertised by market partici-
pants and their preferences influence their performance and, ultimately, market results.
• We present market alternatives that aim at reducing the burden placed on potential
spectrum buyers at the time of expressing their resource needs. To this end, we assign
the resource seeking and aggregating task to a more specialized entity, which in our study
is represented by the VNB. The specific rules behind the behavior of the VNB are drawn
from middleman theory.
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• We have taken steps towards defining spectrum as a Common Pool Resource. This has
been key to adapt this concept, studied in different spectrum contexts in [4, 5], to a
spectrum trading setting. In turn, this provides us with ample opportunity to more
thoroughly adapt polycentric governance concepts to the model at hand.
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
Secondary Spectrum Markets have been analyzed as an alternative for promoting efficient
use of electromagnetic spectrum. This is evident if we take into account one of the markets’
underlying objectives, which is to assign resources to users who value them most. If this is
achieved, we can ultimately overcome spectrum scarcity and aid in the provision of flexible
spectrum-use mechanisms.
Creating secondary spectrum markets requires defining electromagnetic spectrum as a
tradeable commodity, which does not prove to be a simple task. Spectrum is known by its
physical multidimensionality, which has been key in the advance of communication systems.
However, that same multidimensionality makes it difficult to commodify spectrum. For
instance, given that spectrum varies in frequency, time, space, and several other dimensions
(up to seven as presented by Matheson [6]), we cannot treat it as a fungible commodity. In
other words, we cannot expect all frequency bands to serve the same purposes, nor to be in
equal demand and supply conditions.
Spectrum, although a very valuable resource, is not sufficient for providing telecommu-
nications services. Indeed, these services are the result of complex communication systems
which are defined by enabling technologies as well as applicable economic and policy frame-
works. In consequence, when looking at spectrum in the market context, we need to focus,
not only in its physical multidimensionality, but also on the technical, economic and policy
frameworks surrounding the system for which it is an input.
The goal of our research is to study the creation of secondary spectrum markets that
take into account the aforementioned characteristics, constraints and frameworks. For this
purpose, we have divided our study into three main stages.
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1. In the first stage, we focus on a market mechanism where “naked” spectrum is traded.
This calls for a particular focus on spectrum fungibility and the limitations it poses in
the trading process. In general terms, this stage focuses on market analysis combined
with the physical constraints inherent to electromagnetic spectrum.
2. The second stage aims at finding a spectrum related commodity that could permit to
increase market thickness and hence liquidity. Additionally, our objective is to approach
market settings that are more likely to appear in real-world scenarios. For this purpose, in
addition to performing a market analysis and taking into account the physical constraints
of spectrum, we incorporate an adaptive technology that permits us to explore additional
opportunities.
3. The focus of the third stage is to analyze markets as part of a complex system where tech-
nology, policy and economic concepts guide the opportunities as well as the boundaries
of our design.
Throughout the three research stages our focus is to define the conditions that lead to
market viability i.e., the conditions where markets prove to be a viable solution for efficient
spectrum use. We focus on this particular analysis, given that it permits us to evaluate
various factors that are not only inherent to spectrum as a tradeable commodity, but also
shed light on the three axes we deem essential to explore: technology, policy and economics.
By performing this multidimensional analysis, we can comprehensively evaluate the success
of markets, not only as stand-alone resource allocation mechanisms, but also as entities
that actively react to the network operation and, in turn, provide the network entities with
important information about their performance.
To make the multidimensional analysis of the market possible, we find it suitable to frame
our market design on the recommendations provided by Roth in [7], where he argues that
for successful market design we need to address thickness, congestion, safety and simplicity.
Thickness implies that the market attracts a sufficient number of participants who are willing
to engage in negotiations. Congestion can be a result of market thickness; however, it can
be overcome by providing enough time for participants to transact, or by making these
transactions fast enough so that participants can consider enough possibilities until they
arrive at the most satisfactory ones. Finally, safety and simplicity will encourage users to
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participate in the market instead of transactions outside of it and avoid adopting strategic
behavior that could reduce welfare.
The feasibility of the aforementioned recommendations is tightly linked to the technical,
economic and regulatory characteristics of the entire system. We shall remember that tech-
nology will determine what resources can be shared, how flexible they can be and thus how
they can be transferred to other users. In turn, the underlying policy framework should allow
for new technologies to be deployed and dictate the rules for the sharing process, including
the participants’ allowed behavior or in more general terms, how users are allowed to inter-
act with each other. In consequence, the characteristics derived from technology and policy,
together with the market design guidelines can provide us with a comprehensive framework
to analyze the overall market and network viability. Figure 1 summarizes the links that exist
between markets and the accompanying technical and regulatory frameworks.
In this work, we take into account these links in order to establish the characteristics of
our agents, the workings of the market model and the details of the environment where the
market transactions take place.
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Figure 1: Comprehensive scenario for the analysis of secondary spectrum markets
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3.0 BACKGROUND
Throughout the literature, secondary spectrum markets are analyzed from technical, regu-
latory and economics perspectives. Indeed, these aspects are key to defining the boundaries
for spectrum markets design. The research path that we trace in this dissertation aims at
reaching the point where technology, policy and economics converge, pointing us to feasible
and perhaps successful solutions for the development of secondary spectrum markets. In
sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 , I elaborate on specific works that show the aforementioned ap-
proaches and how these account towards the definition of the core problem addressed in this
dissertation.
In addition to conceptual influence stemming from existing literature, I find it important
to provide background information on the mechanism that we have chosen towards modeling
and analyzing the market scenarios of interest. In this manner, section 3.4 elaborates on
Agent-based modeling and its suitability for this work.
3.1 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
The physical characteristics of electromagnetic spectrum make it a multidimensional re-
source. Various authors have defined multiple levels and dimensions in which spectrum can
vary [6, 8]. For instance, in [6], Matheson and Morris define seven of these dimensions:
frequency, time, three dimensions of location (latitude, longitude and elevation) and two
dimensions of arrival (azimuth and elevation angles). This multidimensionality implies that
spectrum cannot be perfectly substituted by another frequency band, unless both frequencies
share exactly the same characteristics in all possible dimensions.
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Deploying markets in this context would imply that we would require a “one-to-one”
match of demand and supply, or as expressed in [9], “[s]uccessful secondary market transfers
require an alignment of the buyers’ demands for spectrum of a particular dimension with the
willingness of spectrum holders to supply spectrum in the same dimension”. This means that
multiple secondary markets would be required, one for each type of spectrum. Consequently,
the information obtained from one market would not be indicative of the characteristics (e.g.,
market price, supply, demand) of the market for another frequency [10].
To address this issue, the authors in [11] have studied conditions under which spec-
trum is replaceable or fungible. Further, the authors developed fungibility scores, which are
quantitative measures for spectrum fungibility. In this manner, market participants (in our
context) would have a means to assess to what extent the resources available in the market
fit their particular requirements and how to value them. Nevertheless, the assessment on
spectrum fungibility does not relieve the lack of spectrum replaceability; and, in order to de-
ploy secondary spectrum markets, it would be ideal to count on a flexible resource that could
adapt to the needs of various types of market participants. For this purpose, we explore a
relevant technical framework that could help in the definition of a flexible spectrum-related
commodity, while taking into account the physical constraints inherent to electromagnetic
spectrum.
3.1.1 Enabling Technology
Diverse technologies have been deployed with the objective of adding flexibility in the use of
electromagnetic spectrum: spread spectrum mechanisms, multiple-access techniques, super-
cell and mini/micro cell deployments, cellular reuse, directional antennas for spectrum reuse,
software-defined and cognitive radios, among others. These technologies have been key for
enabling multiple spectrum sharing scenarios as they focus on allowing various users to access
spectrum simultaneously and exploiting resources that would be otherwise underutilized.
In the spectrum markets context, we are interested in a technology that could permit
us to create markets, with sufficient supply and demand, where users have multiple options
from which to choose (i.e., thick markets). To this end, we focus on a technical mechanism
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that could allow us to alleviate some of the physical limitations of electromagnetic spectrum
and the impact they have in the definition of spectrum as a commodity. We find promising
opportunities stemming from wireless network and resource virtualization.
Virtualization has been widely studied in the Computer Science context, where it is
defined as “any form of partitioning or combining a set of network resources, and presenting
(abstracting) it to users such that each user, through its set of partitioned or combined
resources has a unique, separate view of the network. Resources can be fundamental (nodes,
links) or derived (topologies), and can be virtualized recursively. Node and link virtualization
involve resource partition/combination/abstraction; and topology virtualization involves new
address spaces” [12]. In the Wireless Network context, virtualization is currently under
exhaustive study which makes it difficult to find a unified definition. Indeed, it is defined
according to the area of application and the scope it covers. Nevertheless, focusing on the
previously presented concept, and adapting it to the definition of wireless resources, we
shall expect that the different components of the network will be partitioned, combined and
abstracted, yielding multiple virtual instances. In turn, each of these virtual instances may
be different from the other, depending on the partition or abstraction to which they belong.
Consequently, with each virtual network, we would have the notion that we are dealing with
a new network, different from the original [12].
One of the major advantages from virtualization is that each virtual instance could
have the ability to operate without being aware of the underlying virtualization process.
In this light, individual virtual networks could be running operator-specific protocols and
architectures, which may differ from one co-existing virtual instance to another [13,14]. For
this to be possible, we require a strict level of isolation among virtual instances, which still
remains a significant challenge for this technology.
On a more practical view, in the same manner as the technologies mentioned at the
beginning of this section, Wireless Network Virtualization (WNV) also promises to pro-
vide spectrum access opportunities to a greater number of users by presenting increased
alternatives for spectrum use, sharing and assignment. Additionally, it is expected that vir-
tualization will allow operators to make changes in their current network (through expansion
or shrinkage), as needed, without incurring in prohibitive costs [14].
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3.1.1.1 Adding resource flexibility through Virtualization In our work, we are
interested in analyzing the opportunities in terms of flexible-use of resources that can be de-
rived from virtualization. Network virtualization in general provides a convenient mechanism
for sharing resources among a wide set of users, while permitting integration with distinct
virtualized substrates [15]. In fact, as pointed out in [13], a fully-virtualized and open in-
frastructure will allow to share infrastructure resources and it will also make it possible for
multiple virtual instances (e.g., Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs)) to deploy dif-
ferent protocol stacks over the same radio resources. Additionally, virtualization promotes
the decoupling of service providers’ functions from those of the infrastructure providers.
This would make it possible to decouple resources from services [16]. It is also important
to note that virtualization can be paired with sophisticated underlying technologies (e.g.,
LTE-Advanced) in order to add granularity in the definition of the fundamental units of
virtualization. In turn, these virtualized units can be allocated via multiple access, multi-
plexing and spectrum slicing techniques [13]. Along these lines, the authors in [13] present
the different degrees of virtualization that can be achieved, and the corresponding levels of
granularity depending on the aspects (i.e., scope and depth, underlying wireless technol-
ogy, and virtualization of the client or infrastructure side of the network) and perspectives
(i.e., flow-based, protocol-based or spectrum-based) of the virtualization process and their
possible combinations.
From the description above, greater levels of flexibility can be reached from deeper levels
of virtualization and its pairing with additional technologies. Indeed, in current literature,
we find various efforts that merge virtualization with the creation of resource pools, with
the objective of increasing efficiency in the utilization of resources and developing cloud-like
environments for spectrum access [17–20]. The particular analogy with the cloud emphasizes
the possibility of creating the illusion of an infinite amount of resources, which are available
on demand, without the need to incur high upfront commitments and where users have the
ability to invest on a short-term basis or as needed [20]. These characteristics open up a
series of opportunities for the deployment of new, service-driven networks, where operators
can obtain resources from the providers that best suit their requirements [20,21].
Resource pooling has the added benefit of reducing scarcity. As mentioned in [22], as
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contributions of spectrum to the pool increase, lower is the probability that a given user,
who has access to the pool, will experience spectrum shortages. Increased spectral efficiency
in resource pooling settings results from the fact that they permit to overlay new radio
systems on existing ones without requiring changes in the licensed system that is currently
in place [18]. Note that higher benefit can be achieved in environments (i.e., geographical
areas) where there is a large number of infrastructure providers (e.g., dense urban areas with
overlapping cellular networks) [16].
Placing the definition of virtualized commodities within the spectrum markets context,
we find that market mechanisms (i.e., auctions) are considered as effective approaches for re-
source assignment [23,24]. Indeed, as pointed out in [21], when combined with virtualization,
we expect auctions to be performed on continuous goods, rather than discrete items; in other
words, spectrum requesters may express their requirements, not in terms of a specific item,
but instead in terms of their particular constraints and conditions. In consequence, spec-
trum requesters can utilize the auctioned resources towards the provision of more specialized
services1.
From a technical perspective, we consider that the flexibility opportunities provided by
virtualization, especially when combined with underlying wireless technologies that further
enhance this flexibility, can represent a significant advantage for developing a spectrum-
related market commodity and framing secondary markets within a plausible, technical en-
vironment.
3.2 ECONOMICS BACKGROUND
3.2.1 Economics perspective on Secondary Spectrum Markets
When secondary markets are deployed, we can ensure that, with changes in demand and
supply, spectrum will migrate to more efficient uses, which include parties outside of the
initial resource allocation (i.e., the primary market) [9]. Note that the prices set through
1A more detailed description of auction mechanisms utilized in the spectrum context is presented in
section 3.2 and chapter 4.
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the market have the ability to capture information regarding demand and supply in such a
way that outperforms the capabilities of a centralized entity [25]. Hence, we expect markets
to reflect the actual interaction of buyers and sellers and thus more accurately portray the
valuation of resources.
Defining spectrum markets requires us to analyze what are the costs associated with this
activity. In [26] the author points out that the success of a secondary spectrum market de-
pends on choosing a trading mechanism that minimizes the transaction costs and maximizes
the traders’ surplus2. Transaction costs may stem from diverse factors. For instance, these
can be the result of laying out the ground for the trading activities; the time and efforts
spent on negotiating in order to reach an agreement between the market participants; carry-
ing out enforcement and administrative processes, among others [25, 27]. Additionally, it is
important to consider that transaction costs are proportional to the number of participating
entities [8].
An additional factor that is tightly linked to cost generation is the presence of exter-
nalities. Indeed, some economic activities generate incidental benefits (external economies)
or harm (external diseconomies) to third parties for whom these benefits/harms are not
intended. In this light, the total costs and/or benefits resulting from the economic ac-
tivity do not match the costs incurred or the benefit obtained by the primary (intended)
actors [8, 27, 28]. In this context, we refer to transaction costs as the costs that a market
participant needs to incur in order to negotiate with other participants to alleviate the exter-
nalities (i.e., compensate others for the effects of unintended consequences) or to internalize
these external costs.
As Coase states, “[o]nce the legal rights of the parties are established, negotiation is
possible to modify the arrangements envisaged in the legal ruling, if the likelihood of being
able to do so makes it worthwhile to incur in the costs involved in negotiation” [29]. In
this manner, if it is possible to reach better outcomes through negotiation, the involved
parties may start the negotiation process. Nevertheless, the costs of these negotiations
should be lower than the benefit that can be obtained from the rights granted to the users.
2The Oxford Dictionary defines surplus as: “an excess of income or assets over expenditure or liabilities
in a given period, typically a fiscal year”.
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Consequently, each of the parties will be willing to invest in further negotiations as long as
this represents a positive revenue or explicit benefit.
In a majority of cases, market mechanisms in the form of auctions are utilized for the
assignment of spectrum related resources. In fact, the first efforts for the deployment of
spectrum markets took place in the 1990s with the adoption of auction mechanisms for the
assignment of spectrum licenses [30]. Nowadays, there is vast work in terms of auction and
mechanism design which allows to define different types of auctions for different types of
resources.
Markets are not confined to auction design. In fact, Roth defines two extremes in which
markets can fall: commodity and matching markets [31]. In commodity markets, there is
no differentiation among resources and a participant’s acquisition capabilities are given by
whether they can afford resources or not. On the other hand, “a market involves matching
whenever price isn’t the only determinant of who gets what.” [31]. The classical work
on matching markets was developed around the college admissions and marriage stability
problems [32]. In this work, a deferred acceptance algorithm is utilized to match students
with colleges and women with men. Matching markets were further utilized for the “match”
process for medical students who were entering their residency stage and for matching kidney
donors with patients in need of a transplant [31, 33]. The study of matching markets has
been expanded to a significant number of applications, which include monetary exchanges,
and the ability for one-to-many and many-to many matches [34–36]. In [31], Roth asserts
that auctions can be regarded as matching markets where sellers are matched with those
buyers who most value what is being sold. Also, according to Roth, one of the benefits
of auctions is their signaling capabilities. Consequently, in auctions “the high bid not only
signals how goods should be allocated but also pays the seller of the goods” [31].
We make special emphasis on auctions in the context of matching markets because match-
ing makes the markets more expressive or “personal”. Indeed, matching markets are those
where “prices don’t do all the work, and in which you care whom you deal with”. [31]. This is
key for the type of spectrum market analysis that we aim at developing in this dissertation.
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3.2.2 Market Design
In this section we present important factors that lead to successful market design. According
to Roth [7],“[t]o work well, marketplaces have to provide thickness, i.e., they need to attract
a large enough proportion of the potential participants in the market; they have to overcome
the congestion that thickness can bring, by making it possible to consider enough alternative
transactions to arrive at good ones; and they need to make it safe and sufficiently simple
to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting outside of the market, or having to
engage in costly and risky strategic behavior.”
For thickness to be addressed, participants should be ready to transact with one another.
A well-known example of a thick market is the Amazon marketplace, where there are many
participants who are ready to participate in many different types of transactions. Further-
more, this thickness results in more sellers being attracted by all the potential buyers and
more buyers coming to this marketplace due to the increasing variety of sellers [31].
Overcoming congestion requires providing participants with enough time or with fast-
enough transactions to consider sufficient alternative transactions in the market before ar-
riving at those that are satisfactory [7]. Congestion becomes a salient problem in markets
where the transactions are heterogeneous and the offers are particular to specific areas (i.e.,
cannot be made to the entire market). In congested markets, participants may react in ways
that damage other market properties. For example, to avoid congestion participants may
try to gain time by starting their transactions before others. This would lead to a series of
thinner markets happening at various times, rather than one single, thick market [7].
There are two important factors that may deter bidder entry to an auction: risks and
unmanageable complexity [7]. If it is too risky to participate in the market, “individual
participants may try to manage their risk in ways that damage the market as a whole” (e.g.,
employers making exploding offers before applicants can assess the market, one party trying
to prevent their trading counterparts from receiving other offers, etc.). In the second case,
when markets are excessively complex, participants are not able to formulate the bids and
assess their opportunities at each market stage, thus slowing the auction [7].
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3.3 POLICY BACKGROUND
3.3.1 Allowing the creation of Secondary Spectrum Markets
The barriers to the use of spectrum inherited from legacy spectrum management and reg-
ulatory methods led to the artificial scarcity of this resource. In the particular case of the
U.S., the initial regulatory approach adopted by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) did not allow for significant modifications on the resource use prescribed by the spec-
trum license. In addition, regulation limited the license transferability, which translated in
reduced opportunities for profitable license resale [28]. Hence, the inefficiency in resource
utilization, and the resulting scarcity, encouraged regulators (e.g., the FCC3) to deploy policy
mechanisms which target at providing opportunities for flexible spectrum use.
Flexible use mechanisms are comprised within two poles: exclusive-use and commons
approaches. These two approaches aim at granting users sufficient autonomy to choose the
uses and services to be provided with spectrum, the technology appropriate to the spectrum
environment and the right to transfer, lease or subdivide spectrum rights [37]. Elaborating
on the latter, we could take advantage of secondary markets in order to negotiate the transfer
of resources (or rights to use them) from one user to another. In fact, in areas where scarcity
is the rule and spectrum is subject to competing demands, market approaches would be
especially suitable for assigning this resource to its highest valued uses (and users).
In a continuous effort to provide users with multiple flexibility approaches, regulators
worked toward enhancing the opportunities for deploying secondary markets in spectrum.
In the “Second Report and Order for Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum through Elimina-
tion of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets” [38], the Commission modified
the rules for leasing spectrum, which provided licensees with further opportunities to coop-
eratively share their resources through market mechanisms. The leasing arrangements could
comprise any amount of spectrum within the geographical area assigned to the licensee and
any period within the term of the license [37]. Two secondary market configurations were
proposed: spectrum manager leasing and de facto transfer lease. The difference between
3In this document we refer to the Federal Communications Commission interchangeably as the FCC and
the Commission.
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these configurations lies “on the scope of the rights and responsibilities to be assumed by
the lessee” [37]. This maintained a record of the accountability for the use of spectrum. In
this manner, at the core of spectrum markets configurations, we have users negotiating for
spectrum access or usage rights, and achieving mutually agreeable terms.
The Spectrum Policy Task Force (SPTF) was confident that secondary markets would
present the opportunities for encouraging spectrum users to employ and develop novel tech-
nologies (e.g., opportunistic access technologies), find ways to reduce transaction costs and
ultimately achieve efficient spectrum usage. As pointed out by the FCC, the purpose of
secondary markets has not been to replace the existing spectrum allocation process; instead,
it is considered that “...a robust and effective secondary market for spectrum usage rights
could help alleviate spectrum shortages by making unused or underutilized spectrum held
by existing licensees more readily available to other users and uses and help to promote the
development of new spectrum efficient technologies”.4 Additionally, in his statement regard-
ing secondary markets, Professor Cramton stated that “secondary markets are essential for
the efficient and intensive use of spectrum. Secondary markets identify gains from trade that
are unrealized by the primary market which in this case is the FCC spectrum auctions.”5 As
expressed by Coase, in [29], when resources are assigned administratively, agencies do not
possess all the information that is relevant for the business owners who will be making use
of those resources. Consequently, the success of spectrum markets is derived from the imme-
diate knowledge of the market participants in terms of what resources are more appropriate
for their services and the valuation they have for them [28].
The FCC, in its Policy Statement from December 2000, presented five essential elements
for a market system to operate effectively:
• Clearly defined economic rights
• Full information on prices and products available to all participants
• Mechanisms for bringing buyers and sellers together so that transactions take place with
minimum administrative costs and delays
4Federal Communications Commission Policy Statement in the Matter of Principles for Promoting the
Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the Development of Secondary Markets. p. 1.
5Professor Peter Cramton Statement at the Secondary Market Forum of the Federal Communications
Commission. May 31, 2000.
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• Easy entry and exit to/from the market by both, buyers and sellers.
• Effective competition, with many buyers and sellers.
According to Coase and Hazlett, the creation and enforcement of property rights was
necessary and sufficient for economic development [29, 39]. Indeed, when trading spectrum,
it is impossible to transfer or lease the actual frequency bands; instead, we trade rights
over the available resources. Consequently, rights need to be properly defined [28, 29] and
once these are established, negotiations are likely to take place and modify the arrangements
dictated by the regulatory frameworks, as long as the benefits derived from the modification
of rules outweigh the costs inherent to the actual negotiation processes [29].
In the following section we explore more deeply spectrum rights and the relevant enforce-
ment and governance systems.
3.3.2 Spectrum Rights and Governance systems
“When property rights are well defined and transferable in the absence of transaction costs,
all government allocations of property rights are equally efficient, because interested parties
will bargain privately to correct any externalities.” [40]
Spectrum rights are a key aspect that defines what can be done with spectrum resources.
Even if incumbents obtain licenses directly from the FCC, they are subject to the regulatory
framework applicable to those licenses in order to deploy certain types of services and to
subdivide, transfer or lease their current assets. For instance, in [31], Roth presents an
interesting analogy: “you may own the land on which your home is built, but local zoning
laws may prevent you from selling food or opening a nightclub there.” In the same manner,
spectrum licensees are still subject to the rules deployed by the FCC in order to define
resource usage boundaries.
The flexible-use policy framework presented in the previous subsection provides spectrum
licensees with less strict boundaries for the use of the licenses that they have been granted [9].
However, as Coase suggested, sufficient property rights in spectrum should be created, so
that after being sold to private owners, they could, in turn, freely buy, sell and lease their
own resources [25,29]. Cui et al. [41] have pointed out that in sharing environments, we are
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not dealing with the transfer of individual rights. Instead, bundles of rights are transferred
among the sharing parties, which can define usage protocols and procedures across multiple
dimensions.
In all cases, the boundaries of the transferred rights should be enforced in order to
remain meaningful [10,25]. In this light, we find conservative and flexible approaches, which
limit or enhance the rights transferred to the different users. For instance, when there are
federal constraints at stake, exclusion zones could be defined in order to limit the access
of commercial spectrum users [42]. Nonetheless, every type of enforcement has its costs;
consequently, the higher the value of the protected resources, the higher the cost that resource
owners are willing to incur for enforcement purposes [42].
In the specific spectrum sharing arrangement that we study, we find it suitable to explore
an alternative type of governance in order to define the rights that should be shared and
how to enforce them. We define this governance process in the following section.
3.3.2.1 Polycentric Governance and Common-pool Resources According to [43],
“[c]ommon-pool resources are systems that generate finite quantities of resource units so that
one person’s use does subtract from the quantity of resource units available to others. Most
common-pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors can simultaneously use the
resource system and efforts to exclude potential beneficiaries are costly.”
In a spectrum trading environment, where it is likely to find multiple buyers and sellers
opting for a common set of resources, we can expect electromagnetic spectrum to match
this definition of common-pool resources. This is especially true if we take into account
its high subtractability of use and the difficulty to exclude arbitrary users from accessing
it6 [44]. As a consequence, we might expect collective-action problems to occur. Accord-
ing to Ostrom [43], an important way to deal with these collective-action problems is to
adopt a polycentric approach through the development of systems of governmental and non-
governmental organizations working at multiple scales. Indeed, polycentric systems can be
defined as “the organization of small-, medium-, and large-scale democratic units that each
6See [44] for a detailed definition of spectrum as a common pool resource. In this work, the authors point
out that the subtractability and excludability characteristics of spectrum are mainly associated with the
underlying technology, which provides different alternatives for spectrum use and access.
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may exercise considerable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed
scope of authority for a specified geographical area” [45].
By applying polycentric governance concepts, we avoid the mistake of designing systems
with one single point of failure. Indeed, we can take the polycentric approach as a means for
different entities in the network to learn from local knowledge, obtain feedback from their
own local policy changes and learn from the experience of other parallel units. In this way,
we can create a system that is responsive to the environment threats at multiple scales, thus
being able to compensate the failure of some units with the successful response of others [45].
It is important to note that there is a level of redundancy added in the network, which is
actually an alternative for keeping systems running under the presence of external or internal
malfunctions [45].
Ostrom has developed eight design principles for systems that operate under the concep-
tion of common-pool resources and polycentric governance [43,46]:
1. Clear definition of group boundaries.
2. Match the rules that govern the use of common goods to local needs and conditions.
3. Ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying them.
4. Make sure that the rule-making rights of the community members are respected by
external authorities.
5. Develop a system to monitor members’ behavior, which should be carried out by the
community members.
6. Use graduated sanctions for rule violators.
7. Provide accessible and low-cost mechanisms for dispute resolution.
8. The responsibility for governance of the common resources should be built in nested tiers,
from the lowest level up to the whole interconnected system.
In [47], Agrawal has synthesized the facilitating conditions identified by Ostrom and
other authors, thus providing a more comprehensive approach. These facilitating conditions
have been further adapted to a spectrum sharing approach in [44].
23
3.4 MODELING BACKGROUND
In general terms, models permit us to work with representations of the real-world. Indeed,
a model is a “simplification of the real world and does not contain all of the details and
inconsistencies that are present in the real world” [48,49].
Given that secondary spectrum markets have not yet emerged in the real world, modeling
appears as a suitable tool for their representation. Due to the nature of spectrum markets,
it is necessary to utilize a modeling tool that permits to capture the interactions among
market participants and their approach toward the available resources. In turn, individual
interactions can be analyzed from a global perspective, thus permitting to assess the results
obtained. For this purpose, we present agent-based modeling as an appropriate tool for
modeling and analysis of spectrum markets.
3.4.1 Agent-based Modeling
According to Wilensky et al. [49], “[a]gent-based modeling is a form of computational mod-
eling whereby a phenomenon is modeled in terms of agents and their interactions”. Agent-
based modeling (ABM) parts from the premise that most world phenomena can be modeled
through agents, an environment and the corresponding agent-agent and agent-environment
interactions.
Generally, agent-based models have been utilized in social and natural sciences to study
phenomenons such as the spread of diseases, traffic patterns, social interactions and peer-
influence, among others7. In the Economics domain, we find Agent-based Computational
Economics (ACE), a branch of ABM in which agents “can be represented as interacting goal-
directed entities, strategically aware of both competitive and cooperative possibilities with
other agents” [50]. This is possible due to the autonomy that characterizes ABM agents.
More recently, we have evidenced a widespread adoption of ACE for modeling electricity
markets that adapt to the electricity industry restructuring process [51].
In general terms, ABM relies on the modeling of agents, their interactions and the en-
7These are just a few examples extracted from the model library of the ABM tool: NetLogo. Information
on NetLogo can be found at https://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/docs/
24
vironment where they exist. In what follows, we provide a brief definition of each of these
entities and their role in an agent-based model.
3.4.1.1 Agents constitute the basic unit of ABM. They are mainly defined by their
properties (i.e., characteristics or behavior) and their actions.
Agents can be mobile, stationary or connecting agents. The latter refer to agents that
link two or more agents and can be utilized to represent relationships between the agents they
connect [49]. The characteristics chosen for each of the agents depend on the role they play
within the modeled environment. In this light, agents attend to different levels of granularity,
which define their complexity. Indeed, an agent’s granularity represents the “fundamental
level of interaction” that is applicable to the phenomenon we are modeling [49].
A key factor that differentiates agent-based from other modeling approaches is the fact
that ABM agents can be designed with relatively more autonomy [50]. As stated by S.
Franklin [52], “[a]n autonomous agent is a system situated within and part of an environment
that senses the environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and as
to effect what it senses in the future.” We can thus refer to agents as goal-oriented and
adaptive entities. Agents are goal oriented in that they seek to maximize their payoff or
utility, and they are adaptive in that they have the ability to learn which actions to take in
order to maximize their payoffs and achieve their goals [53].
3.4.1.2 Environment The modeling environment refers to the general conditions, or
the habitat, surrounding the model agents. Given that this is the “area” where agents exist
and interact, the environment does influence the decisions of an agent. In turn, agents’
decisions and actions also affect their environment [49].
3.4.1.3 Interactions Agent interactions may refer to their relationship with other agents
or to self-interactions. In this way, an agent does not only have the capabilities to interact
with others, but it is also able to update its behavior according to its own experience [49].
In the particular case of ACE, events are driven by the interaction of agents, after a set
of initial conditions have been specified. In this manner, ACE relies on the outcome from
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agents’ interactions in order to determine whether the system reaches an equilibrium state
over time [50]
3.4.1.4 Model Analysis Agent-based modeling attends to general modeling analysis
approaches. Indeed, agent-based models are subject to sensitivity analyses, validation and
replication techniques. These features permit us to study the impact of varying model
parameters in the results obtained; how the model agents and environment resemble real-
world scenarios; if the results correspond to scenarios that are likely to emerge in the real
world and finally; whether the results obtained are actually due to the interaction of agents
instead of possible mistakes or oversights in the execution of the model.
3.4.2 Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE)
As previously mentioned, the specific branch of ABM that deals with economics research
is Agent-based Computational Economics, ACE. This modeling technique has appeared
as a response to the limitations presented by traditional economic modeling methods. The
latter make it difficult, or impossible, to model factors that are characteristic of economies in
general, such as imperfect competition, strategic behavior, asymmetric information, multiple
equilibria, among others [50, 53]. Hence, according to Tesfatsion [54], ACE permits the
“modeling of economic systems as locally-constructive sequential games.” In this way, ACE
permits to model economic processes as “open-ended dynamic systems of interacting agents”.
The author in [54] has defined a set of modeling principles that frame ACE. These
principles suggest that users of these methods can explore how changes in initial conditions
may affect the outcomes in dynamic systems. Note that ACE relies on agents’ definition,
scope, their adjustment to local conditions and does not regard the modeler as an active
participant while the model is executed. In fact, modelers are deemed observers, analyzers
and reporters of the model outcome.
The objectives behind ACE are classified within four axes [53,54]:
• Empirical understanding: seeks causal explanations to global regularities and analyzes
how these result from agents’ interactions at a micro-scale.
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• Normative design: is concerned with models that capture properties of a system designed
with a particular objective in mind. As the model develops, the modeler can observe
whether the outcomes are efficient, fair and orderly in spite of agents’ behavior.
• Qualitative design and theory generation: create phase portraits or representations of
possible state trajectories starting from all possible initial states. This permits to “find
necessary conditions for global regularities to evolve” [53].
• Methodological advancement: improve existing tools and develop new ones that permit
the advancement of ACE-based research. This includes the development of “program-
ming, visualization and empirical validation tools” [54].
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4.0 RELATED WORK
In this chapter we provide an overview of the research that has been done regarding the
development of spectrum trading mechanisms. To better explain the different factors that
play significant roles in spectrum trading, we have divided this chapter in three sections:
trading mechanisms, trading environment, and trading beyond spectrum. We conclude this
chapter by presenting a summary of certain constraints, challenges and benefits that seem
to prevail across the literature.
4.1 SPECTRUM TRADING MECHANISMS
According to Cramton [30], auctions are considered transparent mechanisms for the assign-
ment of spectrum licenses. By utilizing auctions, all parties are aware of the identity of
the auction winners and why they obtained the resources. Furthermore, when auctions are
properly designed, there is a salient tendency for resources to be assigned to the parties that
value them most, in addition to the fact that regulatory entities may obtain their expected
revenues from this process.
Auctions have been utilized in various spectrum and wireless resource sharing (and trad-
ing) scenarios. Generally, auctions are utilized for resource allocation and price discovery
purposes and the type of auctions chosen depends on the complexity of the frameworks
that are analyzed. Indeed, we find applications of uniform pricing auctions [55], reverse
auctions [56]; combinatorial (and reverse combinatorial) auctions [57, 58]; sequential auc-
tions [59], double auctions [60], among others. Additional combinations of auction types
include the clock-proxy auction [61], which is an approximation mechanism for solving com-
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binatorial auctions, and the quantized-bid proportional auction [62], which has been applied
in a spectrum “micro-trading” environment. The utilization of different types of auctions
responds to the important constraints that should be taken into account for auction design.
The authors in [63] provide an overview of these constraints, which include the winner’s
curse, collusion, the complexity of solving the actual auction problem, among others.
Combinatorial auctions have been chosen by a large number of researchers given the
opportunities that they present for resource assignment. Nevertheless, their complexity
has led to modifications of this type of auctions, which make their solution manageable.
These modifications include the pairing of combinatorial auctions with other types of auction
mechanisms or the simplification of the process to choose the appropriate set of resources
[57,58,61,64]. For instance, as presented in [57], participants can utilize their local decision-
making capabilities in order to choose the optimal set of resources before placing their bids.
Taking a step further in auction design, in [65], Forde et al. elaborate on the parameters
that make current auctions inflexible, or what they refer to as auctions that manage spectrum
into scarcity. Further, the authors propose a combinatorial clock auction mechanism where
participants can post “expressive bids” that allow them to bid for what they really need
instead of opting for a limited set of resources.
Broader applications of game theory are also found in the spectrum trading context.
These methods aim at further modeling the behavior and strategies of the market partici-
pants. These can be used to improve bidding strategies and adapt them to the particular
environment where trading takes place. [62,66–68].
4.2 SPECTRUM TRADING ENVIRONMENT
We find a comprehensive and detailed approach on a novel mechanism for the utilization
and assignment of virtualized wireless resources in [19]. In this work, the authors propose
the creation of service-driven networks where resources belonging to existing providers or
incumbents are pooled and offered to new service providers through an intermediate entity
(e.g., broker or middleman). The authors envision the utilization of combinatorial auctions
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for the allocation of resources, which are aggregated according to the particular requirements
of the services covered by each new provider.
In [62], the authors develop a spectrum “micro-trading”1 approach as a means to en-
able spectrum trading on a micro-scale in “at least three-dimensions: micro-spatial, micro-
temporal and micro-frequency scales”. For this purpose, the authors consider auctions with
short spectrum lease durations (i.e., 15 minutes). This permits to account for the mobile
operators’ fast changing demand throughout the day. For the actual development of this
approach, the authors utilize a simulation study and present results which demonstrate the
performance and viability of a spectrum micro-trading market which could be used to im-
prove the spectrum utilization and performance of mobile operators. The following metrics
are utilized for evaluating the viability of markets in the spectrum micro-trading scenario:
liquidity, trading volume, spectrum price, profitability, blocking ratio, spectrum allocation
efficiency, spectrum allocation delay, interference temperature, user experience and social
welfare.2
The commodity traded in the aforementioned environment responds to the spectrum
micro-trading pixelation model introduced in [69,70]. This approach permits to define spec-
trum in terms of pixels, each of them having three dimensions: micro-space, micro-frequency
and micro-temporal. Evidently, the minimum tradeable unit is one pixel. Given this gen-
eralized commodity definition, the authors do not consider it necessary to make an explicit
differentiation on the underlying frequency band; however, pixels are differentiated in terms
of the physical characteristics of the environment where they are defined. To test the model
proposed in [69], the authors implemented a simulator based on multi-agent reinforcement
learning and focus on the trading of TV white space (TVWS) spectrum.
El-Refaey et al., in [55], utilize the aforementioned spectrum commodity definition in
order to develop an auction mechanism for the assignment of time-frequency units in a
cloud-based network. Similarly, this trading environment contemplates the utilization of a
mediator or broker, which is in charge of handling the auction stage. The computational
1Micro-trading is defined as “the possibility to trade spectrum resources on the micro-scale in one or more
of the spatial, temporal, or frequency dimensions” [62].
2As pointed out by the authors, these evaluation metrics have been defined in the EC project QoSMOS
[69].
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complexity of this auction is reduced by performing a location checking process, in which the
location of the available time-frequency units is contrasted to the location of those requesting
these units. In this way, the set of resources offered to a given buyer is restricted to those
that match its location.
In [71] and [72], the authors utilize resource pooling and trading in order to achieve
more efficient utilization of optical network resources. Additionally, these mechanisms are
applied to a virtualized network environment, where the physical network provider (carrier)
is in charge of mapping virtual nodes to physical optical nodes and virtual links to physical
optical paths in order to assign resources to the different users, or virtual optical network
(VON) providers. In both works, the authors rely on a Stackelberg game for evaluating the
proposed mechanism.
In [73], the authors point out important factors, from an economics and engineering
perspective, that would motivate and constrain the development of spectrum markets. The
model they propose is a two-tiered market, where “the upper tier consists of spectrum own-
ers that trade spectrum assets analogous to land rights, and the lower tier consists of spot
markets for limited-duration rentals of spectrum assets from owners at particular locations”.
In terms of the tradeable commodity, from a technical perspective, the authors propose the
definition of an adaptive power mask that could vary according to time, space or frequency.
From an economics perspective, the authors emphasize on the need for an appropriate defi-
nition of property rights, which should be clear and easily enforceable, transparent, flexible
and it should also facilitate efficient allocations.
In [63], the authors focus on the creation of a spectrum broker as the central entity for
the development of spectrum markets in TV white spaces (TVWS). The responsibilities of
the broker include: “planing the possible broad uses of the available spectrum in the TVWS;
packaging the spectrum for short-term disposal through trading mechanisms; serving the
broker’s customers with spectrum-leasing contracts; and acting as the port of call to handle
interference caused by its customers to the primary DTV systems or between its customers
themselves”. To fulfill its duties, the broker acts under two different modes: merchant
and auction, which depend on the level of resource supply and demand in the market. In
this light, the authors consider an analysis of opportunity costs for spectrum trading and
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calculation of reserve prices that could accompany the broker’s operational modes.3
In [74], the authors analyze the competition in secondary spectrum markets from the
perspective of resource providers instead of the requesters. The particular environment
where trading takes place is a private commons setting. To this end, the authors take a
game theoretic approach where they identify the market equilibrium prices. Their analysis
shows that providing secondary access represents an immediate revenue for the providers
which can be contrasted to its opportunity cost due to the primary revenue that is lost.
Additionally, the authors conclude that the market equilibrium prices in the studied setting
point to a price war won by the resource providers with the lowest break-even prices.
Gao et al. [75] consider short-term secondary spectrum trading between one seller and
multiple buyers. The authors study a hybrid spectrum market with guaranteed contracts,
i.e., futures market, and spot transactions, i.e., spot market, where the goal is to maximize
the expected profit of the spectrum seller under stochastic network information. Their
results show that when information is symmetric, the optimal solution corresponds to a
perfect price discrimination mechanism. When information is asymmetric, the authors utilize
an “integrated contract and auction design –ContrAuction”, which permits them to derive
an optimal ContrAuction mechanism that maximizes the seller’s profit with and without
efficiency constraints.
Zhu et al. [76] present a market scenario with two different stages: one between primary
users or spectrum holders and brokers and a second one between secondary service providers
and secondary users. The authors call the first a primary market and refer to the latter as a
secondary market. The authors focus on the selection of the appropriate secondary provider
by the secondary users. “The objective of this service selection is to maximize the individual
satisfaction (i.e., utility) jointly considering performance and cost”. The selection process
starts with the secondary users randomly choosing a service provider. Nevertheless, each
secondary user is able to refine their selection based on the price and observed quality of
service. The process is modeled through game theory, which permits to manage the lack of
complete information available to the secondary users.
3This model has been tested in a practical setting in the city of Munich, Germany, where the authors
have been able to test the feasibility of their proposal.
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4.3 TRADING ENVIRONMENTS BEYOND SPECTRUM
It is important to point out additional applications of auctions and trading mechanisms,
which are relevant to our area of study, even though they do not deal with spectrum-related
resources. These applications are comprised by the development of cloud and electricity
markets.
As the authors in [77–81] point out, the utilization of auctions in the Cloud business
is rather novel. The cloud market model generally involves interested parties adopting a
“fixed pay-as-you-go pricing plan wherein the consumer is charged the amount of time a
VM instance was used at a fixed rate” [77]. Cloud providers have realized that the level of
unassigned resources is significant, partly because of the conception that the cloud provides
an infinite amount of resources, and partly because reports point out that only a small
fraction of physical resources are indeed assigned [77,82]. This has prompted big companies
such as Amazon, with their EC2 system to adopt auctions for developing a spot market to
sell their spare capacity [83].
In the Amazon case, the company establishes a spot price, which fluctuates according to
changes in supply and demand for spot instances. Buyers advertise their bids for a Virtual
Machine instance hour to Amazon Wireless Services (AWS). Subsequently, AWS determines
the market-wide spot price and grants access to users with bids above this price. When the
bid of a user falls below the current spot price, the user is given warning so that they can
either re-adjust their bid or be aware that their service will terminate [77,83].
The Amazon example has inspired researchers to investigate the development of auction-
like mechanisms for cloud services. In the same manner as with the spectrum case, auctions
attend to objectives such as bid truthfulness and expressiveness4 and system characteristics
such as providers’ profit maximization or social-welfare. Additionally, authors have realized
the need to develop an ontology that could help consumers better define and express their
business needs, as well as helping providers diversify their service and resource offerings [78].
This effort aligns with the support system that Amazon has put in place in order to help users
4We refer to bid expressiveness as the possibility to auction for a wide-variety of resource sets, which
adapt to particular user needs. This aligns with the definition presented in [65].
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choose competitive bids, however, in [78], the authors aim at making support compatible
with multiple systems, not only that of Amazon.
In summary, the overall objective of adding new market mechanisms to the Cloud is to
adopt dynamic pricing methods that help optimize the profits of cloud providers and simplify
the service choice process for the customers, thus allowing them to find the option that best
suits their needs.
In the electricity domain, the U.S. industry has been undergoing substantial changes
in structure and architecture. The goal has been to shift towards competitive markets,
where prices are derived from supply and demand forces rather than the exercise of market
power [51].
There is a significant line of research which focuses on the utilization of Agent-based
modeling to design electricity markets. The main reason behind using ABM is that these
tools allow for the modeling of restructured electricity systems “as commercial networks of
strategically interacting traders and regulatory agencies learning to operate through time
over realistically rendered transmission grids” [51].
An important survey which points to the different approaches that have been explored
using ABM is presented in [53]. The authors emphasize on the vast methods adopted to
simulate electricity markets. In this way, they focus on presenting shortcomings of salient
proposals and the open issues that remain to be addressed by ACE researchers. For the
evaluation of the proposed alternatives, the authors focus on four broad aspects: agent
learning behavior, market dynamics and complexity, model calibration and validation, and
model description and publication. The authors emphasize on the need of establishing unified
guidelines for model evaluation as well as on the need to address trading strategies (e.g.,
bilateral trading) that would be more realistic and adaptive to the electricity field.
As an important step toward advancing the ABM-oriented research, Tesfatsion [51] offers
a wide overview of current and past work on electricity markets. Simulation add-ons and
tools have been developed that adjust to the specific requirements of electric markets. This
is to point out that ABM has been indeed successful for modeling market mechanisms where
the central commodities are complex physical and technical resources.
Regarding specific market strategies, electricity markets operate under an open access
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market model, where energy is priced (differently) at every time and location [84]. At the
core of the electricity market model, we have forward auctions and real-time auctions. In
the forward transactions, participants are able to plan ahead and lock in prices according to
their needs. In turn, real-time markets permit to send appropriate price signals to manage
congestion efficiently in the short-term [84]. Given that prices are particular to each period
and location, this type of pricing is called locational marginal pricing in the real-time market.
With high transparency, we do not only achieve efficient short run decisions but it also
provides us with valuable market information for long-term planning and future market
investments [84].
These types of markets are relevant to our study in that we are interested in the short-
term allocation of resources, which change in price and availability depending on the time of
day and the geographical location. An important difference between the electricity domain
and the wireless communications environment is that “[e]lectricity markets have large ‘lumpy’
resources that are expensive to turn on and limited in the speed with which they can make
adjustments. In contrast, wireless network elements are fast to respond and are efficiently
controlled with marginal prices” [84]. In the Cloud domain, virtualization is in a far more
advanced stage than in the case of wireless networks. This eases several constraints at the
moment of defining the appropriate commodity to trade.
4.4 SUMMARY
At the core of the definition and design of spectrum trading approaches we find vast ap-
plications of game theory, especially represented by auctions. Multiple authors focus on
this particular mechanism due to the transparency and efficiency in the resulting assign-
ment of resources. Nevertheless, finding an appropriate auction design is not a trivial task.
Each studied scenario calls for modifications, enhancements and combinations of auction
mechanisms in order to find the solution that best fits each approach.
Finding the appropriate resource allocation mechanism is not the only concern when ad-
dressing the development of secondary markets for spectrum. Among the salient constraints,
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we find in the literature a common concern in terms of the definition of spectrum as a trade-
able commodity and the duration of the lease obtained in the market. These factors influence
the incentives that users have to participate in the market and the resulting efficiency of the
market assignment of resources.
The authors in the aforementioned works have developed different methods to define the
tradeable commodity in terms of the main axes in which spectrum varies: time, frequency and
space. Along these lines, we find the definition of adaptive power spectral masks [67, 73];
bandwidth units defined in micro-space, micro-time and micro-frequency scales [62], also
referred to as “pixels” [69].
Regarding lease duration, it is a general agreement that leases should be flexible and
short-enough to capture the traffic variation and thus requirements of spectrum buyers. In
this way, we observe markets with leases lasting periods as short as 15 minutes [62] and those
which capture day-long durations (i.e., 8 hours) [63]. Nevertheless, this does not eliminate
the need for lease scalability, which would permit to adapt to a broader range spectrum
user’s needs and services.
For developing spectrum markets that adapt to next-generation systems, we can borrow
from experiences in the Cloud and electricity markets. Although differences remain among
the tradeable resources, modeling techniques and advancements can serve to add a new
perspective to the spectrum problem.
To conclude this literature review, it is important to point out the benefits of the de-
velopment of secondary spectrum markets that seem to prevail in spite of the complexity of
their design.
• Through secondary spectrum markets, spectrum ownership could be separated from the
provision of wireless services, thus lowering entry barriers and facilitating the diversifi-
cation of services [62,73].
• Secondary markets lower the resource prices and open the market to small players, which
may ultimately result in social benefits [63].
• By increasing the amount of available spectrum, spectrum markets would motivate the
deployment of different types of radio systems, some of which may operate at lower
spectral efficiencies [73].
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• Secondary markets provide greater economic efficiency, given that trade would only occur
when the buyer values the spectrum more than the current owner [73,85].
• Market forces enhance the efficiency in resource management and use, even in constrained
settings [86] by allocating spectrum fairly. In addition, it is more responsive to changes
in spectrum demand over time [55].
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5.0 MOTIVATION
There are multiple aspects that have motivated this work. On one hand, there is the curiosity
to merge engineering concepts with more pragmatic ones such as economics and policy. On
the other hand, there is the desire to provide more meaningful, comprehensive solutions to
problems that for a long time have been considered from a one-dimensional point of view.
In other words, I have been interested on the study of spectrum markets beyond the optimal
resource allocation perspective, hence delving into additional factors that influence the final
success of these markets.
If we take a look at markets in practice, there are markets that are necessary from
a human and social perspective; markets that become a necessity as generations change
and markets that simply never take off. There is a rationale behind the workings of these
markets which stem from how the products are manufactured or defined, how these resources
are valued and priced, and also from the regulation affecting those markets. In addition,
markets depend on the feedback from the environment where they operate. This is why
some products that may be very successful in Eastern countries may not be well received in
the Western world.
These thoughts have prompted me to take into account considerations from three impor-
tant contexts into my study of spectrum markets. These contexts, which I refer to as research
axes, are: technology, economics and regulation. From the background information and the
literature review presented in the previous chapters, we find that significant contributions
have been made for an efficient use of spectrum resources from a technical, regulatory and
economics perspective. Indeed, secondary spectrum markets are a good example of spectrum
sharing mechanisms where these three axes have a significant impact. On their own, studies
in these individual aspects permit us to assess the constraints we may face toward developing
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spectrum markets and ways in which we may overcome them. Nevertheless, when looking at
the big picture, additional concerns emerge, which result from the combination of multiple
factors. Indeed, in these emerging concerns we may find the reason why secondary markets
for spectrum have not been adopted in practice.
In this manner, this research work aims at presenting an alternative to spectrum markets
where factors stemming from technology, policy and economics are taken into account. I
consider that such an approach is of critical importance, given that technical improvements
can remain far from being realizable if there is not a policy configuration supporting them.
In turn, technology may fail to be adopted if its economic sustainability is not verified.
The converse is true as well, given that economic and regulatory efforts may fail to be
adopted if these are not paired with feasible technical counterparts. In consequence, I expect
the research methods and approaches presented in this work to be useful for assessing the
conditions that lead to the creation of viable, and feasible, secondary markets for spectrum.
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6.0 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The focus of this dissertation is to find the conditions that lead to viable outcomes in
secondary spectrum markets. To date, we find works that adapt market mechanisms for the
assignment of spectrum related resources; we find policies that guide the spectrum sharing
process, and we also find technologies that enable users to share, lease or trade their resources.
Evidently, each of this approaches correspond to larger areas of study, namely economics,
policy and technology. These three topics, when independently addressed, provide us with
significant insights on spectrum sharing opportunities. Nevertheless, we consider that a
comprehensive analysis that combines the three axes can provide a more realistic approach
towards defining whether a suggested market approach is adopted and how successful it can
be.
We illustrate this point in this dissertation by analyzing markets at different stages.
Indeed, each stage leads to the next with a specific question that drives its research framework
and settings. In this manner, the broader questions that guide this research work are:
• What is the appropriate commodity to trade?
• What incentivizes users to participate in a secondary spectrum market?
• What makes a secondary spectrum market viable?
In an attempt to find answers to such broad questions as those previously presented, we
have thought of three main axes that we can explore in order to address them. Indeed, those
broad questions can be converted in the following:
• (Technology) What is physically feasible with the resources?
• (Economics) How can we successfully negotiate for resource access?
• (Policy) What are we allowed to do with the resources?
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In turn, we can still work on the questions above in order to restrict our focus to more
specific areas that can provide us with the information that we need for determining whether
markets are viable. The following sections present the specific questions that frame our
research work.
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The questions included in this section correspond to a broad area of impact of the research
we propose. In the upcoming sections, we will highlight the subset of questions that most
adapt to the research covered in this dissertation and the corresponding hypotheses.
Q1. When are markets for “naked” spectrum viable?
Q1.1 What is the impact of fungibility limitations on spectrum markets’ viability?
Q1.2 How does the valuation of resources change when the traded commodities are not
perfect substitutes (i.e., perfectly fungible)?
Q2. What is the appropriate technical framework that will lead to successful spectrum trad-
ing?
Q2.1 Can we apply virtualization concepts to define the resources shared in the network?
Q2.2 What are the benefits from adding virtualization to the definition of spectrum related
commodities?
Q2.2.1 Does virtualization provide flexibility to define the spectrum related com-
modities?
Q2.3 How does the valuation of resources change when considering their virtualized coun-
terparts?
Q3. What is the role of markets in a complex system?
Q3.1 Where are negotiations likely to take place?
Q3.2 How can markets provide feedback for the system?
Q3.3 How does participants’ behavior (e.g., risk averseness, competitiveness) influence the
outcome on the negotiation process?
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Q3.4 Does the negotiation mechanism provide users with incentives to engage in this type
of sharing?
Q3.5 Is the VNB (i.e., a middleman) necessary for achieving system stability?
Q3.6 How do costs influence the outcome of negotiations in this network?
[Q3.6.1] Influence of transaction costs
[Q3.6.2] Influence of opportunity costs
[Q3.6.3] Influence of agency costs
Q4. Define the policy framework for the network model we study
Q4.1 How does this model fit within the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD)
framework?
Q4.2 What types of rights are granted to users in the modeled network?
[Q4.2.1] How are rights defined?
[Q4.2.2] What rights are shared in the pool?
Q4.3 Is polycentric governance a suitable policy framework for the modeled network?
Q4.4 After polycentric governance methods, when is external regulatory intervention nec-
essary (i.e., global regulators intervening instead of local regulators)?
Q5. Identify parameters for successful market design
Q5.1 Assessing market thickness
[Q5.1.1] When does the number of participants (i.e., RPs and SPs) increase?
[Q5.1.2] When does the resource supply increase?
Q5.2 Assessing market congestion
[Q5.2.1] How many participants obtained resources from the market?
[Q5.2.2] How many VNBs were able to serve their customers?
[Q5.2.3] How many resources were assigned from the pool?
Q5.3 Assessing market safety
[Q5.3.1] Penalty history
[Q5.3.1.1] How high are the penalties assigned?
[Q5.3.1.2] How many users have been penalized?
[Q5.3.1.3] How many times have users been penalized?
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6.2 RESEARCH SETTINGS
The research stages presented in this dissertation show three different avenues that can be
explored in order to define market viability.
In stage 1 and 2, the analysis is centered in the performance of the market mechanism
that is used to transfer resources from resource buyers to sellers.
The difference between these two stages lies mainly on the definition of the commodity
to trade.
In stage 1, “naked” spectrum is the traded commodity. This calls for an analysis of
the fungibility limitations among the existing and required electromagnetic frequencies. In
general terms, the settings of stage 1 focus on market analysis and the physical constraints
of electromagnetic spectrum.
In stage 2, we work toward defining a different market commodity, which can be more
favorable from the market participants perspective and from a market design perspective.
In fact, by exploring opportunities provided by LTE-A and Wireless Network Virtualization,
we expect to find a means to design thicker markets while providing users with a more
manageable commodity. In this light, in stage 2 we focus on market analysis, the physical
constraints of spectrum and adapting an appropriate technical framework.
In stage 3 we take a bigger leap and our focus shifts from an entirely market-oriented
perspective to the analysis of markets as part of more complex communications systems.
We still consider wireless network virtualization for the definition of the traded commodi-
ties; however, we take into account additional economic and policy concepts that shed light
on the interactions of users, the market design rules and the boundaries for resource use
and allocation. In particular, we adapt matching markets design and concepts to create
more expressive market transactions. Additionally, we explore the literature on polycentric
governance to create a system that can be adaptive to local conditions.
For illustration purposes, the research settings have been categorized according to gen-
eral parameters of interest. Each research stage addresses these parameters from multiple
perspectives, relevant to the problem studied in each stage. The particular parameters,
perspectives and corresponding stages are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Research Settings
Parameter Type Stage
Network Type
Stand-alone markets 1,2
Service-driven network 3
Market Commodity
“Naked” spectrum 1
Virtualized commodities 2,3
Market Mechanism
Stackelberg Auctions 1,2
Matching Markets 3
Resource Valuation
Based on fungibility level 1
Based on capacity comparability 2
Based on compatibility with service
provided
3
Technical Settings
Technology-independent 1
Wireless network Virtualization within
LTE-A boundaries
2
Virtualization with resource pooling 3
Policy Settings
Fixed rules provided by the regulator 1,2
Polycentric Governance Framework 3
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We have formulated a set of hypotheses that aim at evaluating factors relevant to the
research questions from section 6.1 that will be addressed in this dissertation work. In each
stage we aim at exploring factors that are associated with the set of hypotheses we have
developed in order to shed light onto the research questions presented in section 6.1.
6.3 HYPOTHESES
We have formulated the following hypotheses as a means to evaluate criteria relevant to the
research questions that were previously presented.
H1. Lower fungibility scores negatively impact the auction cutoff price in the market.
H2. The percentage of resources assigned attends to the demand and supply conditions rather
than the actual fungibility level of resources.
H3. When the market commodities are homogeneous, through virtualization mechanisms,
the availability of alternate technology units positively impacts the market demand.
H4. When market commodities are homogeneous, resource assignment is proportional to
users’ willingness to pay and supply conditions.
H5. The amount invested by the RPs depends on the uncertainty over the future price of
resources in the system.
H6. The value of an RP’s option to invest depends on the current and expected valuation of
resources and the cost of investment.
H7. The investment level of the RPs is directly proportional to the amount of resources
available in the market.
H8. SPs and VNBs utilize public and private information to formulate their preferences.
H9. Establishing matching preferences in terms of joint surplus increases the amount of al-
lowable matches.
H10. The cost of penalties have an impact on a user’s (good/bad) behavior.
H11. Historical data on resource prices help reduce uncertainty for investments in the system.
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H12. System stability increases the amount of resources shared by RPs in the system (i.e.,
RPs can generate additional resources by investment in their current infrastructure or
short selling resources.)
H13. The reputation of middlemen is directly proportional to the total number of matches of
a VNB, and to the payment obtained from resource aggregation services.
H14. SPs that assign higher weights to the matching parameters perform better in terms
of percentage of matched SPs, demand obtained from the market, and surplus, than
those assigning lower weights. In the same way, VNBs that assign higher weights to the
matching parameters perform better in terms fo percentage of matched VNBs, payment
received, and surplus than those with lower weights.
The questions and hypotheses that will be explored in this dissertation work are sum-
marized in Table (2). Note that some of the research questions are addressed through the
framework that has been considered for the design of each stage, while other questions are
explored through the experiments designed to test the aforementioned hypotheses.
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Table 2: Correspondence among research stages, hypotheses and research questions
Proposed Research Research Questions
Stage 1 Q1
H1 - H2 Q1.1, Q1.2
Stage 2 - 3 Q2, Q2.1
H3 Q2.2
H4 Q2.3
Stage 3 Q3, Q3.1
H4, H13 Q3.2
H7 Q3.3
H9 Q5.1
H14 Q5.2
Stage 3 Q4.1, Q4.2
Stage 1 - 3 Q5.1, Q5.2
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7.0 SPECTRUM TRADING SCENARIOS
In this chapter, we provide a thorough description of the three spectrum trading scenarios
that we study in this work. We refer to these scenarios as Stages I, II and III. The differences
among these stages lie on the environment where markets are analyzed, the definition of the
market participants, but most importantly on the definition of the commodity central to the
market, or commodity to trade.
As a means to frame each of these stages within the broader scope of this research work,
we also emphasize on the hypotheses that are relevant to each stage.
7.1 STAGE I
The focus of Stage I is to study the effect of the lack of spectrum fungibility on market
viability. For this purpose we work with an existing spectrum trading model SPECTRAD,
which was developed by Caicedo et al. in [1,87], and we follow the calculations of spectrum
fungibility presented by Weiss et al. in [11]. Our work in this stage aims at adapting
the measures of spectrum fungibility to SPECTRAD, so that the market interactions of
the participants would reflect the level of comparability between preferred and available
frequency bands.
7.1.1 General Description
7.1.1.1 Fungibility Measures The work presented in [11] aims at providing a quanti-
tative measure for spectrum comparability and replaceability. These calculations take into
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account multiple dimensions in which spectrum can vary e.g., space, time, technology, regu-
lation. This led the authors to present two metrics for spectrum fungibility: a probabilistic
and a distance score. The probabilistic score represents the fraction of a given characteristic
(e.g., coverage) obtained when utilizing an available frequency instead of the preferred one.
The distance score represents the Euclidean distance between the results obtained with two
different frequencies for the same metric (e.g., coverage). It follows that a probability score
of 1 and a distance score of 0 correspond to ideal fungibility conditions. Equations (7.1) and
(7.2) are utilized for the calculation of probabilistic and distance scores, respectively. Note
that we refer to the preferred frequency parameters as f1(d1) and to the available frequency
parameters as f2(d2).
Probabilistic Score = min
(
f1
f2
, 1
)
(7.1)
Distance Score =
max((d1 − d2), 0)
d1
(7.2)
These scores could represent a useful means to determine the probability of success of a given
transaction, when preferred frequencies are replaced by those that are available. Hence, we
follow the definition of fungibility scores presented in [11] and calculate specific scores that
would be applicable to a market scenario. Indeed, we focus on two important metrics:
coverage and capacity. In this way we expect to determine the bandwidth needed with
an available frequency to match the performance (i.e., coverage and capacity) of another,
available frequency.
For calculating the coverage fungibility score, we utilize the link budget formula (7.3),
where Pr is the received power, Pt is the transmitted power, Gt and Gr are the transmit-
ter and receiver gains, respectively and Lp is the path loss. In order to capture various
parameters relevant to the areas where the frequencies would operate, we rely on empiri-
cal propagation models for path loss calculations, such as Okumura – Hata and COST 231
Walfisch–Ikegami.
Pr = Pt(dBm) +Gt(dB) +Gr(dB)− Lp(dB) (7.3)
If we work with a minimum allowed received power, we can determine the maximum
distance at which this power can be achieved. This translates into the coverage attained
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with a particular frequency, which further provides us with the metric for calculating our
probabilistic and distance scores. Along these lines, the coverage scores permit us to compare
the maximum coverage obtained with the preferred frequency f1 and an available frequency
f2.
A similar process can be utilized to calculate the capacity fungibility scores. In this
case, we utilize the Shannon–Hartley Information Capacity theorem (7.4), which permits to
determine the maximum rate achievable (C) in a given channel, with a particular bandwidth
(B), and under the presence of noise.
C = B log2(1 + SNR) (7.4)
The signal to noise ratio (SNR) in this formula is defined as follows: the signal value cor-
responds to the power received at a specific distance (e.g., fixed distance from the transmitter
or cell–edge); the noise power was estimated using (7.5) or its equivalent (7.6), where F is
the noise figure of the receiver, k is the Boltzmann’s constant, T is the reference temperature
of 290 K and B is the considered bandwidth.
N = FkTB (7.5)
= F (dB) + k(dBm/Hz/K) + T (dBm) +B(dBm) (7.6)
With the aforementioned formulas, we can determine the bandwidth that f2 requires
in order to achieve the same capacity reached with f1. Additionally, if we consider both
frequencies, f1 and f2, operating with the same bandwidth, we can obtain a measure of
their comparability or replaceability. In this way, when adapted to a market scenario, the
fungibility scores allow the market participants to place a cap on their valuation of an existing
resource, when it is not exactly their preferred one.
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7.1.1.2 Market Model As previously mentioned, we adapt the trading model presented
in [87], SPECTRAD, to an imperfect fungibility scenario. Nevertheless, to maintain a basis
for evaluating the results obtained with the new market setting, we make changes only where
necessary and where the lack of spectrum fungibility applies. In what follows, we describe
the general characteristics of the market type, the participants, the traded commodity and
its valuation, and the market transactions.
• Market Type: We focus on an spectrum exchange with Band Manager (BM) func-
tionality. In this scenario, the BM is in charge of auctioning and assigning its spectrum
holdings. Note that these spectrum holdings correspond to the resources made avail-
able by current spectrum license holders (SLH). The BM we consider is in charge of
granting authorizations to the spectrum buyers or spectrum license requesters (SLRs) to
access the spectrum; however, it is not in charge of configuring the buyers’ equipment
for spectrum use.
• Market Participants: The main participants in this market scenario are the Band
Manager and the Spectrum License Requesters. Note that we do not focus on the process
in which the BM obtains the resources from the Spectrum License Holders. In this way,
an SLH is a passive user and does not actively affect the operations of the market.
The objective of the SLRs is to obtain resources in the market to fulfill their traffic
demand. Evidently, depending on the service they provide, SLRs will have a specific
preference for the frequency band they seek. As a consequence, the frequency available
in the market (i.e., in the BM holdings) may not be the same as their preferred frequency.
• Traded Commodity: In the same way as the original SPECTRAD model, the basic
trading units are spectrum bandwidth units (BBUs). In [87], these are defined as 200KHz
bandwidth units of spectrum in the 1900 MHz band. Throughout our Stage I study, this
frequency corresponds to the available frequency band.
• Spectrum Valuation: An SLR values the BM holdings in the measure that they
compare to its preferred frequency. In this way, we assume that the maximum value that
an SLR is willing to pay for an available frequency is limited by the degree in which
it can replace the exact frequency the SLR needs. This means that we can utilize the
calculated fungibility scores to limit the maximum amount that every SLR is willing to
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pay.
It is important to note that an SLR can opt for alternate technologies (ATs) to fulfill
their traffic requirements. ATs are also considered in the original SPECTRAD model and
these represent technical alternatives (e.g., wireline deployments, unlicensed spectrum, in-
frastructure enhancements, among others) that could permit an SLR to fulfill its demand
when spectrum is not available. This would be the case when there are no resources available
in the market or when the bids of the SLR are not competitive enough. We assume that AT
units provide the same performance as the BBUs of an SLR’s preferred frequency. Thus,
the maximum amount that an SLR is willing to pay for a BBU in the market corresponds
to the amount that it would pay for an AT unit. Equation (7.7) expresses this relationship,
where numBBUs and numATs represent the required number of BBUs and ATs respectively
and LimitPricePerBBU and LimitPricePerAT correspond to the maximum price to pay for
either BBUs or ATs.
(numBBUs)(LimitPricePerBBU) = (numATs)(LimitPricePerAT) (7.7)
In turn, numBBUs and numATs can be defined through (7.8) and (7.9).
numBBUs =
trafficToServe
capacityPerBBU
(7.8)
numATs =
trafficToServe
capacityPerAT
(7.9)
It follows that the maximum price to pay can be defined as (7.10), which in turn can be
expressed in terms of the corresponding fungibility score (7.11).
LimitPricePerBBU =
capacityPerBBU
capacityPerAT
× PricePerAT (7.10)
LimitPricePerBBU = FungScore× PricePerAT (7.11)
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• Market Transactions: We utilize the Stackelberg auction model for the market trans-
actions.1 In general terms, each SLR will post a bid in each bidding round for the amount
of resources it requires. Bids are sorted in descending order and at the end of each bid-
ding round, the cutoff price of the auction is set as the last bid to receive resources (when
the demand is greater than the supply), or as the reserve price or minimum cutoff price
(when the supply is greater than the demand). The cutoff price is then announced and,
subsequently, each SLR adjusts its price in order to remain competitive in the market.
Evidently, their price adjustments are limited by (7.11). At the end of the auction, the
SLRs whose bids were above the cut-off receive the corresponding number of BBUs. The
SLRs that did not obtain enough resources from the auction have the option to utilize
AT units to fulfill their demand.
7.1.2 Hypotheses
H1. Lower fungibility scores negatively impact the auction cutoff price in the market.
H2. The percentage of resources assigned attends to the demand and supply conditions rather
than the actual fungibility level of resources.
7.2 STAGE II
In the second research stage, our goal is to define a new commodity to trade in the market.
In consequence, the commodity that we consider for the new market model is no longer
naked spectrum; instead, we look for a spectrum-related commodity that could permit to
add thickness to the market. For this purpose, we are interested in a mechanism that allows
us to circumvent some of the physical constraints inherent to spectrum, thus presenting
the market participants with a more manageable method to evaluate the suitability of the
available resources.
1This is consistent with the auction model utilized for the Spectrum Exchange with BM functionality
portion of the original SPECTRAD model.
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7.2.1 General Description
We take advantage of current resource utilization technologies in order to explore further sce-
narios where markets can be viable. We center our attention on two technical alternatives:
virtualization and the LTE-Advanced standard. These technologies enable more efficient
resource-use methods, which are appropriate for creating enhanced spectrum sharing sce-
narios. Our particular approach is to pair the definitions of virtualization with the concept
of resource pooling. In this way, we envision a pool of spectrum-related resources at the
center of the market, which can be accessed by the different market participants (or SLRs).
Note that one of our objectives is to provide the SLRs with the opportunity of expressing
their requirements, not in terms of an specific frequency band and its bandwidth, but instead
in terms of the capacity (in Mbps) that they require to serve their customers. For this
approach to be successful, we require the process to be seamless to the SLRs, which means
that they are not aware of the exact resources they are using, nor the specific physical
characteristics. Virtualization comes into play in the creation of this seamless environment,
or in other words, in the translation of physical electromagnetic spectrum into capacity as a
commodity.
To perform this virtualization process, we appeal to the opportunities presented by LTE-
Advanced. This is a mature technology which focuses on providing flexible spectrum alloca-
tion mechanisms in order to reach higher speeds and efficiency in the utilization of resources.
In order to define our market commodity, we focus on the basic element for radio resource al-
location of LTE, which is the Physical Resource Block (PRB). The PRBs are sets of resource
elements defined in time and frequency, which are used for uplink and downlink transmis-
sions. For transmission, the PRBs are aggregated in sub-frames and frames. A sub-frame is
a 1 millisecond unit, which is formed by two PRBs and a frame corresponds to a 10 millisec-
ond unit composed by twenty PRBs. In frequency, one PRB corresponds to 12 subcarriers
of 15KHz each, totaling 180 KHz per PRB [88].
For resource allocation purposes, the LTE standard [89] dictates the number of resource
blocks that can be assigned and the capacity that can be obtained. In Table 3, we include
the parameters that are considered in the standard for downlink transmission. These data
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Table 3: LTE Parameters for Downlink Transmission
Number of Resource Blocks 6 15 25 50 75 100
Number of Occupied Subcarriers 72 180 300 600 900 1200
Transmission Bandwidth [MHz] 1.4 3 5 10 15 20
Occupied Bandwidth [MHz] 1.1 2.7 4.5 9.0 13.5 18.0
Guardband [MHz] 0.32 0.3 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
permit us to establish a direct link between the number of PRBs and their associated capac-
ity. Taking these factors into account, we find that the resource definition and aggregation
properties of LTE are a significant addition to the virtualization process that we devise.
Indeed, by means of the LTE standard, we can establish the translation between capacity
and physical spectrum resources that we seek. As a result, we can define the commodity to
trade in terms of the LTE resource allocation units.
7.2.1.1 Market Model Our focus in this second stage is to capture the improvement
that can be reached when we define a more flexible, spectrum-related commodity. In this
light, we maintained the general characteristics of the market model from the first stage
intact, except for the modifications necessary to adapt the new market commodity.
New market commodity: The commodities in the market can be defined as virtualized
resources that are aggregated in a pool and which now constitute the BM holdings. As
previously explained, for the virtualization process, we rely on the mapping between PRBs
and bandwidth offered by LTE and their further translation into capacity (in Mbps). To
this end, we utilize expressions (7.4) and (7.5) to calculate the capacity that can be achieved
with the bandwidth aggregated through LTE PRBs.2 Given this commodity definition, we
expect the SLRs to express their market demand in terms of the capacity they require to
2In expression (7.4), the signal value is calculated through the COST 231 Walfisch-Ikegami model, utilizing
the LTE frequencies relevant to this experiment.
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fulfill their customers’ requirements. In this way, the BM would be in charge of performing
the PRB – capacity mapping, so that the process becomes entirely transparent from the
SLRs’ perspective.
There are multiple LTE frequencies defined by the standard; however, in this stage we
choose those frequencies that allow us to create a pseudo perfect fungibility environment.3
In this way, the pooled resources correspond to PRBs from the following LTE bands: 13
(746 MHz - 756 MHz); 14 (758 MHz - 768 MHz) and 17 (734 MHz - 746 MHz). Following
the details presented in Table 3, these three 10 MHz-bands provide us with a minimum of
6 PRBs and a maximum of 50 PRBs per band. Considering carrier aggregation properties,
the pooled assets would range from 18 PRBs to 150 PRBs. To further comply with the
LTE standard, we propose the leasing time for these commodities as the duration of an LTE
frame i.e., 10 milliseconds.
It is important to remember that the setting of this research stage aims at creating a
homogeneous commodity through virtualization. In this way, part of this effort is to find an
AT unit which would also adapt to the homogeneous scenario. Hence, we define the alternate
technology units (ATs) as unlicensed TV White Space (TVWS) spectrum in the 700 MHz
band.
7.2.2 Hypotheses
H3. When the market commodities are homogeneous, through virtualization mechanisms,
the availability of alternate technology units positively impacts the market demand.
H4. When market commodities are homogeneous, resource assignment is proportional to
users’ willingness to pay and supply conditions.
3This perfect fungibility scenario relies on our assumption that LTE-A capable devices should be able to
tune to multiple LTE-A frequencies. In addition, to further enable fungibility, we have chosen frequencies
that are rather similar in range.
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7.3 STAGE III
In the third stage of this dissertation, we are interested in studying the performance of the
overall system where markets are deployed. We find it valuable to place this market model
within a broader framework that permits to take a more comprehensive view of the entire
system. We do this by situating our study, model and tests within the Institutional Analysis
and Development (IAD) framework.
Presenting the model in this manner allows us to place the problem within a broader
context, which also points to possible future directions and applications.
In what follows, we introduce key elements of the IAD framework and how these apply
to the specific context of our study.
7.3.1 Framework Overview
We follow guidelines and concepts presented in the Institutional Analysis and Development
(IAD) framework literature. Figure 2 summarizes the general components of the network
we analyze from the IAD perspective. This framework is of particular interest given that
it takes into account the interplay of the multiple agents and entities in the system. This
implies that the actions of each one of them impacts the system performance; but, at the
same time, feedback is provided from current outcomes, which may influence subsequent
operations.
7.3.2 Agents
We have three main types of agents in Stage III, which in turn constitute the participants
in the market designed for this section of our study.
• Resource Providers (RPs): RPs are current spectrum license holders and/or infras-
tructure owners. After serving their customers’ needs, these users have excess resources
which they may share in the system. In this way, the RPs are making their resources
available in the pool so that these could serve the traffic demand of new entrants to the
system or providers who lack enough resources to fulfill their demand. We expect the RPs
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Figure 2: Components of the network from an IAD Framework perspective
to require a remuneration for the resources they are sharing. To this end, they should
announce their reserve price (i.e., minimum accepted price) for the shared resources. Any
price below the minimum would signify a loss to the RP.
• Service Providers (SPs): SPs are new market entrants or existing users who do
not possess enough resources to fulfill the demand generated by their customers (i.e.,
end users). Each SP aims at providing a specific type of service which has particular
requirements in terms of resource quality, amount and availability. For example, SPs
may focus on providing voice, data or video services and their resource demand will
attend to the particular characteristics of those services. However, we aim at simplifying
this process by allowing the SPs to express their demand in general terms, leaving the
complex task of finding the matching resources to an intermediate entity known as Virtual
Network Builder.
• Virtual Network Builders (VNBs): This entity acts as a broker or middleman who
is in charge of aggregating resources from the pool and assigning them to the SPs who
are requesting them. Indeed, the VNBs deal with the complexity of analyzing the pooled
resources and assembling them in a manner that satisfies the SPs’ requirements.
As a middleman, the VNB has several functions in general settings, which are illustrated
in [90]. Indeed, the author classifies middlemen within six categories. In what follows
we explain the categories that are relevant to the VNB.
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– Bridge: Reduces the “physical, social, or temporal distance” between buyers and
sellers. In this way, this type of middleman is able to find opportunities between two
disconnected sets of participants.
– Insulator: Limits the information flow between buyers and sellers, or in this partic-
ular case between RPs and SPs.
– Certifier: Provides value for both, buyers and sellers, by screening available options,
scouting for the requirements of buyers and endorsing its findings through their own
reputation. In this manner, the middleman reduces the asymmetry of information
between buyers and sellers.
– Enforcer: Makes sure that the buyers and sellers (i.e., RPs and SPs) are not failing
to provide the service or utilize the resources as convened.
– Risk bearer: Reduces uncertainty for both negotiating parties. In fact, “[b]y building
diversified portfolios, [these middlemen] are better able to weather volatility than
their trading partners” [90].
In the particular case of resource access, a middleman can minimize the intellectual
barriers posed by the knowledge required in order to successfully obtain resources from
an auction.
In this light, a VNB fulfills middleman duties that correspond to the transactions and
negotiations it performs with the RPs and SPs. The particular activities and parameters
that are relevant to the VNBs are more thoroughly explained through their interactions
in the system, which are defined in section 7.3.4.
7.3.3 Resources and Environment
The resources defined in the two previous stages shed light on the type of commodity that
could be suitable for the new market analysis. Indeed, in the second stage we defined a
perfectly fungible, virtualized commodity, which is bounded within a specific frequency range.
In this section we assume the existence of virtualized commodities that can be translated
into specific throughput requirements. In this way, this commodity can be defined as the
commodities of stage II or as the result of more complex virtualization processes. The
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resource pooling approach still applies to the scenario we investigate in this stage.
For the pooled resources to be assigned to their new users, i.e., service providers, it is
important that their characteristics are announced. For instance, for resource aggregation
purposes, a VNB needs to know what are the main physical characteristics (e.g., frequency,
time and bandwidth available), the technical characteristics (e.g., how the resource can be
sliced for virtualization purposes and compatible technologies) and regulatory characteristics
(e.g., maximum allowed power, leasing time). In this way, a VNB can choose more accurately
the resources that are useful for its customers and this can also represent a better means to
place an appropriate valuation for the available resources.
The environment where this system is deployed corresponds to a medium-sized, semi
urban area, where we can find more than one resource provider and where there would be
significant interest for various SPs to participate. Nevertheless, our system can be decom-
posed and applied to reduced areas within a city. For instance, we can have VNBs operating
at neighborhood-level, thus permitting providers to share resources according to the needs
of particular areas within a city. Additionally, a smaller scope reduces the uncertainty over
resource availability and suitability.
7.3.4 Interactions
For the proposed service-driven network model to be viable, we require interactions among
the different participants so that the available resources can be transferred from RPs to SPs
with the intervention of the VNB. In this dissertation, we utilize markets for the resource
negotiation and allocation process.
Placing markets within this system permits us to explore parameters such as the par-
ticipants’ behavior, the rationale behind the prices they pay and the profit they seek, their
incentives to participate, among others. Overall, markets allow us to study the interactions
among participants and to learn about the conditions that lead to viability or failure.
It is important to mention that these behaviors, characteristics and interactions are
tightly linked to the environment where the markets are placed. In turn, the environment is
framed within regulatory and technical parameters which delineate the feasible (and practi-
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Figure 3: General Market Model
cal) boundaries we face. Exploring markets within these boundaries will allow us to provide
insights not only on the market viability outcomes, but also in the general regulatory and
technical approaches that surround this system. Ultimately, this will provide us with a com-
prehensive view on the feasibility of our proposal. This results in an “information cycle”,
where the market outcomes serve to adjust network and participants parameters and these
adjustments influence the market results.
Figure 3 shows the different entities that are part of the service-driven network, the
information they provide to each other and the interactions (i.e., negotiations) that take
place among them.
Along these lines, there are two important instances where markets are analyzed in
our virtualized network: VNB–SP negotiations and VNB–RP negotiations. The applicable
negotiation mechanisms should adapt to the characteristics, needs and objectives of the
participants in each specific scenario, therefore, the market mechanisms used to allocate
resources in each of these instances need not be equal.
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We have approached VNB–SP negotiations as a matching market that creates partner-
ships between VNBs and SPs. This permits us to capture the preferences and objectives
that these two entities have when they participate in the market, the need for a middleman
that eases the market transactions for SPs, and the SPs’ valuation for this type of service.
The specific approach we have taken towards developing this matching process is presented
in section 8.3.1.
VNB–RP negotiations are regarded as a regular market process where supply and demand
levels determine the price to pay for resources. Behind market demand we find the matching
market between VNBs and SPs. In turn, the market supply is determined by the level of
participation of RPs. In this way, behind the market setting of the VNB–RP interactions,
there is also a set of RP characteristics that are important to take into account. In section
8.3.3, we present the specifics of the supply side of the market and the subsequent interactions
that determine the final assignment of resources in the market.
7.3.5 Action Situation
Action situations are defined as “the social spaces where individuals interact, exchange goods
and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight (among the many things that
individuals do in action situations)” [91]. An action situation is additionally defined as the
component where “individuals (acting on their own or as agents of organizations) observe
information, select actions, engage in patterns of interaction, and realize outcomes from their
interaction” [92]. In this section we focus on describing the action situation that corresponds
to our analysis.
In [91], Ostrom points out that the structure of an action situation can be defined by
the following set of variables.
1. The set of actors – Who and how many individuals withdraw resource units from this
resource system?
2. The specific positions that will be filled by participants – What positions exist?
3. The set of allowable actions and their linkage to outcomes - Which types of harvesting
technologies are used?
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4. The potential outcomes that are linked to sequences of actions – What geographic region
and what events in that region are affected by participants in these positions? What
chain of events links actions to outcomes?
5. The level of control each participant has over choice – Do appropriators take the above
actions on their own initiative, or do they confer with others?
6. The information available to participants about the structure of the action situation
– How much information do appropriators have about the condition of the resource
itself, about other appropriators’ cost and benefit functions and about how their actions
cumulate into joint outcomes?
7. The costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes – How costly are various actions
to each type of appropriator, and what kinds of benefits can be achieved as a result of
various group outcomes?
Consequently, in the network we analyze, we can briefly define the action situation as
follows:
• Actors: We have three types of actors in this network: resource owners or providers
(RPs), resource aggregators or virtual network builders (VNBs) and resource buyers or
service providers (SPs).
• Positions: The positions of the different actors are derived from the set of rights that
are assigned to each of them. The specific types of rights will be explained in section
7.3.6.
• Set of allowable actions: By means of wireless network virtualization, RPs make their
resources available in the pool. Virtual Network Builders can aggregate resources from
the pool and, in turn, SPs can access the resources offered by the VNB with which they
are associated. It is thus implied that SPs cannot access directly the resources from the
pool.
• Potential Outcomes: These are the result of the interactions that take place among
the actors in the network. For instance, some of these outcomes will be a consequence of
the matching process between VNBs and SPs and from the auction for the assignment
of pooled resources. We mention some of them in what follows:
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1. SPs form a partnership with the VNB they prefer.
2. VNBs are able to aggregate their preferred set of resources from the pool, via com-
petitive bidding.
3. RPs receive a compensation for the resources that they shared in the pool.
4. SPs obtain the resources that they need for providing their specific service from their
partner VNB.
5. VNBs obtain a compensation for their aggregation activities.
6. End users obtain the service they contracted from the SP.
7. Resources are more efficiently utilized in the area of study.
8. RPs obtain a compensation (profit) for resources that would otherwise remain unuti-
lized.
9. SPs can obtain resources through more economical, and accessible methods.
• Level of control over choice: RPs should be allowed, by regulation, to share their
resources in the pool. The partnership formed by SPs and VNBs depends on their
preference over members of the opposite set, which is formed by individual weights and
valuations of each entity.
• Information available: the information available in the system will depend on the part
of the system we are analyzing.
The RPs have information on the actual amount of resources that they have available
for sharing. Additionally, they know what is the minimum payment they should receive
in order for the sharing process to be profitable for them.
The VNBs have information about the characteristics of the resources that are available
in the pool, such as reserve price, resource type, among others. In this way, they can opt
for their preferred (and suitable resources). In turn, their set of preferred resources will
attend to the requirements of their SP customers. This means that they will also have
information on the SPs’ resource preferences.
The SPs will have information about the price that the VNBs are charging for their
resource aggregation services. They know what is their actual demand (from the number
of end users they should serve) and the specific details of their business model and service
to provide. The latter are key to establish their valuation for the resources offered by
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the VNB.
• Costs and benefits: The costs can be associated with participation in the matching
process to form a partnership with the preferred VNB and SP. Additionally, we should
take into account the resource aggregation costs and opportunity costs of sharing re-
sources and participating in the system.
The payoffs are defined in terms of the surplus of the partnership i.e., the surplus that
can be gained aggregating the gain/loss of both members of the partnership instead of
individual surplus.
7.3.6 Rules, Rights and Governance
The aforementioned characteristics define the initial action situation of the network that we
study. It is important to note that the values and parameters associated to these working
components of the action situation respond to an applicable set of rules. In [92], the author
defines boundary, authority, aggregation, scope, information, and payoff rules.
An important factor that we need to take into account in any sharing process is the def-
inition of the appropriate bundle of rights that is assigned to each member of the network.
In [92], the author points out that “property rights determine which actors have been au-
thorized to carry out which actions with respect to a specified good or service”. Along these
lines, the available property rights are defined in terms of which actors are allowed to access,
withdraw, manage, exclude or alienate either resources, rights or other actors. The following
positions are then defined, which account for specific bundles of the aforementioned rights:
• Authorized Entrant, who has only access rights.
• Authorized User, who has access and withdrawal rights.
• Claimant, who has access, withdrawal and management rights.
• Proprietor, who has all previously mentioned rights except alienation.
• Owner, whose bundle includes every right previously mentioned.
From these definitions, we can initially consider SPs as authorized users, VNBs as proprietors
and RPs as owners.
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Together with the definition of the appropriate rules, the property rights define the action
situation that applies to the network we study. It is important to note that the aforemen-
tioned rules and rights should be defined through an appropriate governance process. Given
the nature of the system we analyze, we find polycentric governance as a suitable mechanism
for addressing the collective action problems that may arise. This area has been broadly
explored by Elinor Ostrom and her fellow researchers at Indiana University Bloomington4.
A key factor in our analysis of this system is feedback. Similar to what is presented in [91]
the definition of the action situation receives inputs from the governance system, the actors
and the resource system. At the same time, the interactions and outcomes that take place
within the action situation, can generate feedback that will serve to update the behavior of
the actors, the governance system, and resource provision and management mechanisms.
7.3.7 Hypotheses
H7. The investment level of the RPs is directly proportional to the amount of resources
available in the market.
H9. Establishing matching preferences in terms of joint surplus increases the amount of al-
lowable matches.
H13. The reputation of middlemen is directly proportional to the total number of matches of
a VNB, and to the payment obtained from resource aggregation services.
H14. SPs that assign higher weights to the matching parameters perform better in terms
of percentage of matched SPs, demand obtained from the market, and surplus, than
those assigning lower weights. In the same way, VNBs that assign higher weights to the
matching parameters perform better in terms fo percentage of matched VNBs, payment
received, and surplus than those with lower weights.
4Please refer to https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu for detailed information on the research work
that has been done by the Ostrom Workshop.
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8.0 MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
In chapter 7, we provided a broad overview of the workings of each of the market stages we
analyze in this study. In this chapter, we delve into the particulars of the modeling process
of each stage by elaborating on the parameters utilized, working assumptions and scope.
These modeling considerations will lead us to the results presented in chapter 9.
8.1 STAGE I
8.1.1 Fungibility Scores
In order to calculate the relevant fungibility scores, we have implemented MATLAB code.
Our code utilizes Okumura–Hata, COST231–Hata and Walfish Ikegami empirical propaga-
tion models, depending on the applicable distance and frequency ranges. For subsequent
adaptability of these scores to our market model, we have focused on the calculation of
capacity fungibility scores. Hence, we calculate scores that compare the achievable capac-
ity with two different frequencies: the available frequency and the preferred one. Table 5
presents the parameters utilized for the calculations of these scores.
8.1.2 Market Model
In this stage, we rely on the Agent-based model utilized for building the first version of a
spectrum trading model, named SPECTRAD, which was introduced in [1,87]. SPECTRAD
was developed using Java and REPAST Simphony, an agent-based modeling platform that
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works with the Eclipse Integrated Development Environment.1 For determining market
viability, we follow the criteria defined in [1,87], which represent conditions associated with
market liquidity. We briefly define these criteria in what follows.
• Probability of empty bid list: This results from comparing the number of market
runs in which no SLRs post bids for the available resources to the total number of market
runs. This situation results from resource prices being above the SLRs’ willingness to pay,
from available resources not being suitable to the SLRs’ demand or from the SLRs relying
entirely on AT units for their traffic. In this way, when the value of this probability is
too high, it represents an adverse condition for market liquidity.
• Probability of demand greater than supply: This condition results from the situa-
tion where the resource requirements of the SLRs are larger than the amount of resources
available in the BM holdings. This situation calls for a competitive bidding in order to
obtain resources from the market; hence, the cutoff price reflects the interaction of the
market participants (i.e., their bid adjustments) and, consequently, their willingness to
pay. On the other hand, when the demand is not greater than the supply, every bidder
obtains the requested resources and pays the minimum price established by the BM (i.e.,
the BM’s reserve price). As a result, we would expect that in scenarios where the demand
is greater than the supply, the resources are assigned to the users who value them most
(or those who are willing to pay more to obtain them). Consequently, higher values of
this probability positively contribute toward market viability as they represent a high
interest of the participants to obtain resources from the market.
• Average cutoff price: As previously mentioned, the cutoff price in the auction will
be determined by the existing level of demand and supply and, in consequence, by the
interactions of the SLRs. Note that no cutoff price could be lower than the BM’s reserve
price; however, it could rise according to the level of competitiveness in the market and
the willingness to pay of the SLRs interested in the resources. In this way, a positive
market outcome shows cutoff prices that are well above the minimum established by the
BM.
1See https://eclipse.org for full information on this IDE.
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• Average number of AT units per SLR: If SLRs are actively obtaining their spectrum
requirements from the market, we assume that they have a low incentive to obtain AT
units outside of the market. In this light, when the SLRs keep their AT holdings low,
we have a positive condition for market liquidity.
• Percentage of assigned bandwidth units: As a measure of efficiency, it would be
desired for the majority of the BM holdings to be assigned once the bidding rounds end.
In this way, a high percentage of assigned BBUs implies active participation of the SLRs
in the market, which is positive for its viability.
Based on the aforementioned criteria, we assess overall market viability by defining
pass/fail thresholds and scores for each criterion. To define the thresholds, we evaluate
the data obtained from our model simulations and determine patterns and trends that are
associated with market success. In this way, the thresholds are the resulting breaking points
in the data. In absence of these breaking points, we utilize parameters that would correspond
to ideal performance. The scores have been defined in [1] according to the market impact
of each viability criterion. In this model, we follow these choices as we aim at utilizing the
original SPECTRAD model as our basis for comparison.
An overall market score can be obtained by adding all the individual scores. Conse-
quently, market scenarios will be considered viable when their score is greater than zero.
Table 4 presents the scores applicable to this stage.
8.1.3 Experiments
Our experiments aim at capturing market viability conditions when different levels of spec-
trum supply, spectrum valuation and fungibility are considered.
• The level of spectrum supply is defined by R, in equation (8.1). R takes into account
the ratio of resources available in the market (numBBUs) to the number of market
participants (numSLRs). In this way, lower values of R (e.g., 5, 10) render spectrum
undersupply conditions, whereas higher values of R (e.g., 20, 25) represent spectrum
oversupply.
R =
numBBUs
numSLRs
(8.1)
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Table 4: Viability Criteria and Corresponding Market Scores
Viability Criteria
Criteria Score Pass / Fail
P1 - Bid List Empty 1 / -1
P2 - Demand Greater than Supply 1 / -1
P3 - Cutoff Price 0 / -1
P4 - Percentage of Assigned BBUs 1 / -1
P5 - Number of ATs per User 0 / -1
• SLRs are configured with different levels of resource valuation: low, medium and high.
This will determine the maximum amount that they are willing to pay for an AT, and
thus for a BBU in the market. We shall also remember that this value will be further
limited by the applicable fungibility score. In order to capture a worst-case scenario, we
consider the case where all users have a low valuation for the available resources.
• Finally, the fungibility score we calculate represents the physical difference between fre-
quencies. However, for users to be able to utilize a frequency different than their preferred
one, they may incur in additional costs associated with equipment compliance, quality of
service, among others. For this reason, we consider the calculated fungibility score and
two lower values, A and B in order to account for the additional costs:
Calculated fungibility score =
capacityPerBBU
capacityPerAT
(8.2)
Value A ∼ 0.8× Calculated fungibility score (8.3)
Value B ∼ 0.4× Calculated fungibility score (8.4)
Table 6 summarizes the general market parameters to be considered in these experiments.
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Table 5: Reference parameters for the calculation of fungibility scores in Stage I
Fungibility Score Parameters
Parameter Reference Value
Preferred Frequencies
700, 1000, 1500, 1700,
1900 and 2000 MHz
Available Frequency 1900 MHz
Reference Bandwidth 200 KHz
Distance from transmitter 1 Km
Transmitted Power 1mW
Minimum Required
Received Power
-80 dBm
Base Station Height 50 m
Geographic Environment Medium / Small city
Mobile Antenna Height 1 m
Noise Figure 0 dB
Width of road 20 m
Building separation 40 m
Building Height 15 m
Phi 90
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Table 6: Market model parameters of Stage I
Market Model Parameters
Market Type
Band Manager
Exchange-based market
Number of Market
Participants
numSLRs = {4, 5, 6, 10, 20, 50}
Distribution of Users’
Spectrum Valuation
All users have low valuation
for the available spectrum
Available Spectrum
Calculated using (8.1), where
R = {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}
Fungibility level FungScore = {Calculated score, 0.25, 0.15}
Mean traffic demand 4.0 Mbps
Traffic inter arrival time
Uniformly distributed between 10 and 25
simulation time units
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Table 7: Viability Criteria and Market Scores for Stage II
Viability Criteria
Criteria
Score
Pass / Fail
P1 - Bid List Empty 1 / -1
P2 - Demand greater than Supply 1 / -1
P3 - Cutoff Price 0 / -1
P4 - Percentage of Assigned BBUs 1 / -1
P5 - Number of ATs per User 0 / -1
8.2 STAGE II
8.2.1 Market Model
In stage II, the model is very similar to that of stage I (see section 8.1). The modeling
tool and simulation environment are still ABM and Repast Simphony, respectively. There
are only certain variations in the model, which account for adapting the new virtualized
commodity, as defined in 7.2.1.1 to the market.
As a result of our choice of market commodities and alternate technology units (ATs),
we are now working on a pseudo-fungibility environment that can be found in real-world
scenarios. As such, we deal with a homogeneous commodity, which does not require the
fungibility considerations that were key for the previous stage.
For viability evaluation, we utilize the same criteria as the original model of SPECTRAD
and the first stage of this work (section 8.1). The applicable scores for this stage are presented
in Table 7.
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8.2.2 Experiments
To test the success of this virtualized setting, we propose two simulation scenarios, which
focus on the unlicensed spectrum usage period:
1. We follow the same AT units duration that was presented in the original version of
SPECTRAD: a random period, uniformly distributed between 90 and 110 simulation
time units.
2. We consider that the unlicensed spectrum usage time will be the same as the duration
of the licensed spectrum lease (i.e., 10 milliseconds).
The objective of the second scenario is to account for possible degradation of service relative
to the use of unlicensed spectrum and to permit the SLRs to enter the market once a new
bidding round starts.
In each of these scenarios, we test the same resource undersupply and oversupply condi-
tions that are defined through R in equation (8.1). Nevertheless, in this stage the amount of
resources available (i.e., numBBUs) is restricted by the LTE standard parameters. In this
way, for the values defined by (8.1) that do not match an LTE value, we choose the closest
allowable amount of PRBs.
To take into account the SLRs’ resource valuation we analyze scenarios where one-third
of users belongs to each, high, medium and low, licensed spectrum valuation levels. Never-
theless, when comparing licensed vs. unlicensed spectrum, the SLRs should take into account
the possible difference in resource quality. In this way, their valuation for the AT units or
unlicensed TVWS spectrum will be inversely proportional to their licensed spectrum valua-
tion. Table 8 summarizes the parameters that we consider appropriate for the simulations
in this stage and their corresponding values.
8.3 STAGE III
The model we utilize for this section has been entirely developed for this dissertation. In
this way, this section includes all the details regarding the implementation of this model and
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Table 8: General Parameters for the model of Stage II
General Second Stage Model Parameters
PRBs occupied bandwidth [MHz]
Based on the three available
10MHz LTE Bands: [1.08, 2.7, 4.5, 9]
Using carrier aggregation, we can obtain up to 27 MHz.
Traffic capacity of a PRB [Mbps]
Calculated using (7.4) and the standard
specified bandwidth.
Min = 4.06 Mbps - Max = 15.5 Mbps
Traffic capacity of a TVWS
bandwidth unit [Mbps]
1. 18 Mbps – Calculated for a bandwidth of
180 KHz with a 700 MHz band
PRBs lease time
10 simulation time units (represent the
10 millisecond duration of an LTE frame)
Duration of unlicensed spectrum usage
Case 1: uniformly distributed between
90 and 110 simulation time units
Case 2: 10 simulation time units
Number of spectrum users numSLRs = {4, 5, 6, 10, 20}
Mean traffic demand 4.0 Mbps
Mean traffic inter arrival time
Uniformly distributed between
10 and 25 simulation time units
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its two interaction instances: VNB – SP and VNB – RP negotiations.
Although the scope of the market analysis in this stage is greater than that of the previous
stages, the entities or agents participating in this model maintain similar characteristics in
terms of their behavior and what they seek from the market. Indeed, Service Providers
(SPs) correspond to the Spectrum License Requesters (SLRs) from Stages 1 and 2. Similarly,
Resource Providers (RPs) correspond to Spectrum License Holders (SLHs) in Stages 1 and
2. Note that in Stage 3, RPs become active participants in the system and their actions will
influence the final market outcome.
For the study of the network and market settings of Stage 3, we have also developed an
Agent-based Model. Due to the nature of the data that we aim at generating and the level
of detail we utilize for defining our agents, we deem more appropriate to utilize a tool with
different computational capabilities, such as MATLAB.
As presented in this section, there is a significant number of parameters, and their cor-
responding levels, that come into play. To maintain the tractability of the problem we
analyze, we have utilized uniform distributions for assigning SPs, VNBs and RPs to dif-
ferent risk profiles and valuation levels. The same reasoning supports the definition of the
thresholds we utilize for differentiating between low/averse, medium/neutral, and high/taker
valuation/risk levels, respectively. This approach has allowed us to focus our attention on
how the model works, as a whole. Future work on this stage includes modifications to these
distributions in order to determine their effect on our results.
This section has been divided into two main subsections: VNB–SP negotiations and
VNB–RP negotiations. VNB–SP negotiations account for the matching and partnership
forming process between these two entities. VNB–RP negotiations refer to the actual market
transactions that lead to the assignment of spectrum-related resources.
8.3.1 VNB – SP negotiations
Matching markets are at the core of the VNB–SP negotiations. Matching markets are
a vast research area, applied to various lines of investigation and which has been mainly
led by the Nobel Laureate, Alvin E. Roth. Initial proposals on matching processes are
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represented by the work of Gale and Shapley, which present a solution based on marriage
and college admission problems [32]. Since the appearance of this work in the 1960s, the
research of matching markets has widely expanded, covering issues such as matching medical
students with residency positions, students with public schools, and dealing with life-or-death
situations such as matching organ donors with recipients.
Matching markets are of interest in this specific part of our work because we aim at
building a more expressive system for matching resource buyers, sellers and intermediaries.
In this way, we utilize matching markets to form partnerships between VNBs and SPs,
mimicking our real-life interactions with middlemen. These interactions are generally based
on the reputation of middlemen and how much we trust them. For partnerships to form,
we rely on an underlying set of preferences we design according to our expectations (e.g.,
ease of interaction, middlemen expertise and accuracy) and our own known information (e.g.,
budget, willingness to pay, valuation of resources to obtain, risk perspective). In this setting,
matching represents an economic construct rather than a technical one. Hence, this fulfills
partnership forming purposes outside of technical resource or operation compatibility.
From the previous description, we can infer that for matches to form, we need to have
a clear definition of preferences and be aware of the individual limitations. Consequently,
in what follows, we present the specific details of how a matching mechanism has been
implemented for the market model we devise.
Let S = {s1, s2, ...sn} be the set of n participating SPs and B = {b1, b2, ...bm} the set of
m participating VNBs.
Each of the agents in S and B are assigned a risk profile, which guides the values they
assign to their own parameters and the preferences they express with regards to the members
of the other set. For this purpose, we assign to all s ∈ S and all b ∈ B, a risk value defined
as rv = U(0, 2). In this way, the variable rv can take a uniformly distributed integer in the
range [0,2]. Consequently, the risk profile of si and bj is assigned as follows:
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riskProfile(rv) =

averse if rv = 0
neutral if rv = 1
taker if rv = 2
(8.5)
8.3.1.1 Configuring real and advertised SPs’ and VNBs’ prices and fees In this
subsection we explore how SPs and VNBs define the real and advertised values of the fees
they are willing to pay and expecting to receive, respectively.
Service Providers: Each SP has a real and an advertised value that indicates its
willingness to pay for the service of a VNB. The real valuation of an SP can be translated
into a measure of how interested is an SP in transacting with a VNB. To capture this, we
assign a level of valuation for each SP in the system, vli, which is a uniformly distributed
integer in the range [0,2].
vli = U(0, 2) ∀i ∈ S
In this way, the valuation level of si is finally assigned as follows:
valuationLevel(vli) =

low if vli = 0
medium if vli = 1
high if vli = 2
(8.6)
We assume that there is a minimum price (reserve price) advertised in the system for the
revenue expected by a VNB and also a maximum, general, price that any VNB can charge.
In this way, we work with a range of prices, pi, chosen by si according to its valuation level
vli. The ranges we have defined are included in Table 9.
These ranges represent the real price that each SP is willing to pay for VNB services.
The limits utilized for price assignment are the following:
pmin = 25 (8.7)
pmax = 100 (8.8)
pmed =
pmax + (2× pmin)
3
(8.9)
ph =
(2× pmax) + pmin
3
(8.10)
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Table 9: VNB price range according to valuation level
Valuation Level
(vli)
Price Assigned
0 pi = U(pmin, pmed)
1 pi = U(pmed, ph)
2 pi = U(ph, pmax)
The advertised price of each SP, on the other hand, depends on its risk profile. As such,
these prices will include a level of shading, which is consistent with the risk a given SP is
willing to take. Table 10 shows the three levels of price shading that have been defined.
Taking into account the price shading levels in Table 10, the advertised prices are defined
in (8.11), and these apply for all i ∈ S
advPricei = (1− dr)× pi (8.11)
.
Note that dr represents the price shading applicable to si, according to its own risk level.
To handle the creation of preference sets, the particular price advertised by si is mapped
to a price level, as shown in Table 11.
Table 10: Percentage of price shading according to each SP’s risk level
Risk Level Price Shading
Averse dr = dA = U(0, 0.05)
Neutral dr = dN = U(0.05, 0.10)
Taker dr = dP = U(0.10, 0.15)
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Table 11: Price levels assigned according to range of prices advertised by si
Price Level Price Advertised
0 pmed > advPricei ≥ pmin
1 ph > advPricei ≥ pmed
2 pmax > advPricei ≥ ph
Virtual Network Builders: In the same manner as the SP, each VNB also defines
two types of fees: real and advertised. The real fee it can charge depends on its quality or
reputation. To bootstrap the market, the quality level of VNB bj, qlj, is randomly assigned
(8.12); however, we expect to incorporate a reputation building mechanism based on the
performance history of bj.
qlj = U(0, 2) (8.12)
In this way, the final quality, qj, of bj is given by 8.13. It is expected that a higher
quality VNB can charge higher fees for its services. The actual values assigned according to
the quality level are included in Table 12. Note that these constitute the real fees a VNB
requires as a payment.
qj(qlj) =

low if qlj = 0
medium if qlj = 1
high if qlj = 2
(8.13)
The limits utilized for the fees assigned are defined as follows:
fmin = 25 (8.14)
fmax = 100 (8.15)
fmed =
fmax + (2× fmin
3
) (8.16)
fh =
(2× fmax) + fmin
3
(8.17)
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Table 12: Real fee of a VNB according to its quality (or reputation) level.
Quality Level Real fee of bj
0 fj = U(fmin, fmed)
1 fj = U(fmed, fh)
2 fj = U(fh, fmax)
In a similar manner as the price shading performed by the SPs, the VNBs’ advertised
fees are set according to the risk level of each VNB. In this way, the advertised fees include
a percentage increase on a VNBs real fee. The percentage increase is presented in Table 13.
Following the percentage of price shading shown in Table 13, the price advertised,
advFeej, by bj is given by (8.18)
advFeej = (1 + ir)× fj (8.18)
We also assign price levels to each VNB according to the range of the advertised price,
advFeej, as shown in Table 14.
Table 13: Percentage of fee increase according to each VNB’s risk profile
Risk Level % of Fee Increase
Averse ir = iA = U(0, 0.05)
Neutral ir = iN = U(0.05, 0.10)
Taker ir = iP = U(0.10, 0.15)
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Table 14: VNBs’ fee level according to the range of the advertised fees
Price Level Price Advertised
0 fmed > advFeej ≥ fmin
1 fh > advFeej ≥ fmed
2 fmax > advFeej ≥ fh
8.3.1.2 Service Providers’ Demand Each end user in the system is randomly set as
a customer of one of the existing Service Providers. For this purpose, each end user will be
assigned a uniformly distributed random integer between 1 and the number of SPs. This
number will correspond to the ID of the SP that will be serving this particular end user. In
consequence, the traffic that each SP needs to serve will be the aggregate of the demand of
its end users. This is defined in (8.19), where Ti is the total traffic of si, uij is the j-th user
of si, and tij is uij’s individual traffic.
Ti =
p∑
j=1
tij (8.19)
The actual traffic of each end user is defined as an exponentially distributed random
number with mean tm. In current tests of the model, I use the value tm = 4.0Mbps
SPs’ Demand Calculation: The demand is calculated by comparing the coverable
traffic with the traffic to serve. The coverable traffic of si, Tci, is defined in (8.20), where
rsci is the amount of resources already available to si and C is the capacity per resource.
Tci = rsci × C (8.20)
If the coverable traffic, Tci is greater than the traffic to serve, the demand of si is zero.
Otherwise, the resource demand of si is given by (8.21) and the throughput demand of si is
given by (8.22).
di =
dTi − Tcie
C
(8.21)
di = dTi − Tcie (8.22)
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Table 15: SPs’ demand levels according to the range of their demand value
Demand Level Demand Ranges
0 0 ≤ di < dmed
1 dmed ≤ di < dh
2 dh ≤ di < dmax
In order to form the preference vector, I have also classified the actual demand values
into three demand levels. These levels are defined in (8.23 – 8.26). Note that the maximum
total demand or dmax considers the case where an SP needs to serve all the end users in the
area, i.e., o end users, and each end user has a traffic demand equal to the average tm. Table
15 further illustrates how the demand of si is classified into multiple levels.
dmin = 0 (8.23)
dmax = o× tm (8.24)
dmed =
dmax + (2× dmin)
3
(8.25)
dh =
(2× dmax) + dmin
3
(8.26)
8.3.1.3 Choices and Preferences of VNBs and SPs This model considers a set of
choice and preference parameters for si and bj, for all i ∈ S and j ∈ B, respectively. It is
important to clarify that choices refer to the set of parameters that are particular to the
workings of each VNB or SP. These entities decide on what level/value to assign to each
choice parameter according to their risk profile or their individual settings. Subsequently,
these become parameters advertised (perhaps after being shaded) in the matching process.
Conversely, preferences refer to the set of parameters that VNBs and SPs observe in the
members of the opposing set. In other words, the preferences have to do with the individual
analysis of a VNB(SP) regarding the choice parameters of a given SP(VNB). In what follows,
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I refer to how these choices have been assigned and how they account toward defining the
final set of preferences of SPs and VNBs.
8.3.1.4 Choices of SPs The two following parameters are considered for the choices of
the Service Providers:
• Price: defined according to the advertised price levels presented in Table 11.
• Demand: defined according to the demand levels included in Table 15.
These parameters take integer values between 0 and 2, which stand for low, medium and
high levels, respectively. In order to manage these parameters, I have represented the value
level associated with each parameter as a 1 × 3 vector where the kth element can take a
value of 0 or 1, depending on whether the value corresponds to a low, medium or high level
(8.27). These vectors are pvi and dvi for price value and demand value, respectively.
level vector = [l,m, h] (8.27)
low level = level0 = [1, 0, 0] (8.28)
medium level = level1 = [0, 1, 0] (8.29)
high level = level2 = [0, 0, 1] (8.30)
8.3.1.5 Choices of VNBs In a similar manner to the case of the SPs, the following
choice parameters have been considered as relevant for the matching process between VNBs
and SPs:
• Quality: As previously presented, the quality level or reputation is randomly assigned
to each VNB in the initialization process.
• Fees: The fee level of each VNB is defined according to Table 14.
These parameters take integer values between 0 and 2, which stand for low, medium
and high levels. These levels are also expressed as vectors, qvj and fvj for quality and fees,
respectively (8.27).
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Table 16: SP preference vectors according to risk level
Risk level of si
Reputation/Quality Preference
of si
Price Preference
of si
Averse qpi = [0, 0, 1] ppi = [0, 0, 1]
Neutral qpi = [0, 1, 1] ppi = [0, 1, 1]
Taker qpi = [1, 1, 1] ppi = [1, 1, 1]
8.3.1.6 Preferences of SPs SPs express their preferences regarding the following pa-
rameters (or choices) of VNBs:
• VNB reputation or quality2
• VNB advertised fee
These preferences are expressed as vectors, which represent the preference for a low,
medium or high value for each of the aforementioned parameters. Further, these preferences
are linked to the risk profile of each SP, which justifies the preference level. In this manner,
the quality preference vector (qpi) and the fee preference vector (ppi), are represented as
1 × 3 vectors, where the kth element can take either value of 0 or 1. The kth element is
equal to 1 if si prefers that value level for a particular parameter. This is further illustrated
in Table 16.
8.3.1.7 Preferences of VNBs A VNB expresses its preferences regarding the following
SP values:
• SPs’ advertised price
• SPs’ demand level
In the same manner as the SPs’ case, the values to these parameters are assigned according
to the risk level of each VNB. The vector corresponding to each preference is presented in
2We refer to reputation and quality interchangeably throughout the document, regarding this specific
characteristic of the VNBs.
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Table 17.
Table 17: VNBs’ preference vectors according to their risk level
Risk level of bj
Price Preference
of bj
Demand Preference
of bj
Averse ppj = [1, 0, 0] dpj = [1, 0, 0]
Neutral ppj = [1, 1, 0] dpj = [1, 1, 0]
Taker ppj = [1, 1, 1] dpj = [1, 1, 1]
8.3.1.8 Comparing Choices and Preferences In order to create the final preference
vectors of each SP and VNB, I create a matrix for each of their preference parameters. In
the case of the SPs, the ijth matrix element is the result of multiplying the preference vector
of si times the transpose of the corresponding value vector of bj. Qs corresponds to the
reputation (or quality) preference matrix (8.31) and Rs corresponds to the price preference
matrix (8.32)
Qs(i, j) = qpi × qvTj (8.31)
Rs(i, j) = ppi × pvTj (8.32)
For the VNBs, the ijth elements of the preference matrices take into account the pref-
erences of each VNB and the values assigned to the corresponding parameter by the SP. Db
corresponds to the demand preference matrix (8.33), and Rb represents the price preference
matrix (8.34).
Db(i, j) = dvi × dpTj (8.33)
Rb(i, j) = pvi × ppTj (8.34)
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Table 18: Weights assigned to SPs’ and VNBs’ preference parameters
Quality / Demand Price(VNB) / Price(SP)
H H
H L
L H
L L
8.3.1.9 SPs’ and VNBs’ utility The next step is to define the utility of each SP
and VNB. The idea behind defining this utility is for the SPs(VNBs) to find a subset of
VNBs(SPs) that would be part of their final preference set. Once a preference set is defined,
we can then proceed to apply the deferred acceptance algorithm for matching, which will be
explained in section 8.3.2.
To this end, I propose to define weights that each SP and VNB can give to the different
parameters that are being considered. These weights are defined as uniformly distributed
random numbers within a specific range set by expressions (8.35) and (8.36). This definition
has been arbitrarily chosen to avoid increased complexity stemming from different weight
distributions.
Wh = U(0.6, 1) (8.35)
Wl = U(0.1, 0.5) (8.36)
Given that each SP and VNB takes into account two parameters for their preferences, we
have a final set of four different combinations of weights and parameters, as shown in Table
18. The actual fashion in which an SP and a VNB choose the weight to assign is defined in
the experiment design section 8.3.6.
The individual utility of SPs and VNBs, i.e., the utility of a matching between si and bj,
is given by (8.37) and (8.38), where wq and wp are the weights assigned by si to the quality
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and price factors, and wd and wp are the weights assigned by bj to the demand and price
factors.
Us(i, j) = wq ×Qs(i, j) + wp ×Rs(i, j) (8.37)
Ub(i, j) = wd ×Db(i, j) + wp ×Rb(i, j) (8.38)
We also obtain a matrix A, where the ijth element corresponds to the joint utility derived
from the partnership between si and bj (8.39).
A(i, j) = Us(i, j) + Ub(i, j) (8.39)
The values in the individual and joint utility matrices are utilized for creating the final
preference vectors of si and bj. Given the aforementioned calculation of utilities and the value
that weights can take, the maximum individual utility of si or bj is 2, while the minimum
individual utility is 0.2. In the case of joint utility, the maximum value is 4 and the minimum
is 0.4.
These values are utilized to rank each member of the opposite group and choose those
that will be part of the final preference vector. I assume that an SP and a VNB having the
lowest score for their partnership should not be included in each other’s preference vector. In
this way, there should be a minimum allowed threshold (between 0.4 and 4) that represents
an acceptable partnership. For our working model purposes, we have assumed this acceptable
threshold to be the middle point in the joint utility range, namely 1.83.
8.3.2 Matching SPs and VNBs
The subset of feasible, or acceptable, partnerships corresponds to the preference vectors of
si and bj. As pointed out by Roth in [93], regarding the marriage problem posed by Gale
and Shapley [32], “[p]references can be represented as rank order lists of the form P (mi) =
w3, w2, ...mi , denoting that man mi’s first choice is w3, his second choice w2[w3 >mi w2]
3Other values for the acceptable threshold have been analyzed, and the corresponding results are included
in section 10.2
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and so on, until at some point he prefers to remain unmatched (i.e., matched to himself).”
The same applies to the problem at hand. In this case, the preference vector of si and
bj will contain a subset of members of the opposite set with whom it is possible to form a
partnership (8.40) (8.41). These subsets, or preference vectors are sorted in descending order
of preference.
P (si) = bk, bl, bm, ..., si (8.40)
P (bj) = so, sp, sq, ..., bj (8.41)
The matching between SPs and VNBs is implemented utilizing the deferred acceptance
algorithm for the many-to-one matching case. This means that a VNB can form a partnership
with n SPs, where n = VNBs quota or partnership size; while an SP can only form a
partnership with one VNB. The value of n has been set to m i.e., the total number of SPs
in the network4.
In [93] Roth presents the description of the deferred acceptance algorithm as it would
be applied to the Gale and Shapley’s marriage problem. In what follows, we adapt this
definition to fit the problem we explore.
• Step 1a. Each SP, si, proposes a partnership to the first choice in its preference vector
(if it is not empty).
• Step 1b. Each VNB, bj, rejects any unacceptable proposals and, in case there are multiple
acceptable proposals, bj holds the n most preferred ones and rejects all others.
• Step ka. Any SP rejected at step k-1 makes a new proposal to the next VNB in the
preference vector, which has not rejected it. (If no more acceptable proposals remain,
the SP makes no further proposals).
• Step kb. Each VNB holds its most preferred, acceptable proposals to date and rejects
the rest.
• The algorithm stops when no further proposals are made. Then we match each VNB to
the SPs (if any) whose proposals it is currently holding.
4This value was assigned as a means to establish uniformity among the VNBs in the network and avoid
forcing a specific market structure. Nevertheless, it can be adjusted to fit scenarios of interest
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The outcome of this matching game is a matching µ : S ∪B → S ∪B such that b = µ(s)
if and only if µ(b) = s. For all s and b, either µ(s) is in B or µ(s) = s; and, either µ(b) is
in S or µ(b) = b. This means that the outcome matches SPs with VNBs, or to themselves,
and if s is matched to b, then b is matched to s [93].
It is important to note that we consider the case in which the SPs propose a partnership
first, which leads to an SP-optimal matching, µS [93]. For the actual implementation of this
algorithm in the model, we have also followed important considerations presented in [94],
[32], [35].
Once the matching process is over and we obtain the final matching µ, each VNB learns
which are its customers and each SP will learn the ID of the VNB with whom it will be
working. The following step consists of the matched SPs communicating their demand and
resource price parameters to their VNB partners. As a result, the matched SPs’ demand
now constitutes the market demand, which should be obtained from the pool.
8.3.2.1 Market Demand As previously mentioned, the market demand consists of the
throughput needed by the matched SPs. Let’s refer to the set of SPs matched with bj as
MSj = {ms1j,ms2j, ...,msnj}. In turn, we can refer to these SPs as VNB bj’s customers. In
this manner, each VNB should gather information about the actual resource demand of each
of its customers and the maximum price they are willing pay for these resources5. Demand
includes the quantity (in Mbps) and the type of resources required. In this model I assume
that SPs can be divided in two types, regarding the services they offer to their customers.
In this way, resources of type 1 are those utilized to provide video streaming services and
resources of type 2 are those required for low throughput, bursty traffic such as Internet of
Things applications.
The price that SPs will pay for resources is consistent with si’s valuation level, vli, and
it is defined in Table 19. In this way, this valuation level is associated with the fee an SP is
willing to pay for VNB services and the maximum amount to pay per resource unit.
The limits utilized for resource price assignment are shown in (8.42,8.43,8.44,8.45). These
5Note that there is a difference between the VNB fee and the resource price. The first is intended to
cover the cost incurred by each VNB in obtaining the resources from the pool, while the latter corresponds
to the valuation that each SP has for the spectrum resources.
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Table 19: VNB price range according to valuation level
Valuation Level
(vli)
Resource Price Assigned
0 rscpi = U(rscpmin, rscpmed)
1 rscpi = U(rscpmed, rscph)
2 rscpi = U(rscph, rscpmax)
values represent monetary units.
rscpmin = 3 (8.42)
rscpmax = 10 (8.43)
rscpmed =
pmax + (2× pmin)
3
(8.44)
rscph =
(2× pmax) + pmin
3
(8.45)
It follows that each VNB bj creates a demand inventory (quantity and price) per resource
type and it looks for the corresponding type of resources in the common pool.
8.3.3 VNB – RP negotiations
After the market demand is defined through the matching market, the VNBs need to find
the appropriate set of resources from the pool. As mentioned in previous sections, the pool
of resources is populated with the excess spectrum belonging to existing incumbents in the
area, which we refer to as Resource Providers (RPs). The VNBs bring to this side of the
market the resource demand and pricing information that they learned from their partnering
SPs. Note that, for market transactions, the VNBs utilize the exact information provided
by their SP partners (i.e., they do not seek an additional profit). Figure 4 depicts these
interactions.
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Figure 4: General overview of the transactions that lead to the VNB–RP negotiations
There are various aspects that drive the amount of resources shared by the RPs in
the pool (i.e., the market supply), and their reserve price. In this section, we delve into
these details and the approach we have taken towards modeling them. Note that the main
characteristics of the VNBs have been already presented in subsection 8.3.1. For this reason,
this section focuses on the description of the RPs and the subsequent market interaction.
We represent the set of RPs as RP = {rp1, rp2, ..., rpn}. In the same manner as the
VNBs and SPs, an RP, rpk has a risk profile that will dictate its choices regarding the
amount of resources to offer and the corresponding reserve prices. For this purpose, I assign
to every rp ∈ RP a risk value defined as rv = U(0, 2). In consequence, rpk receives a risk
profile according to (8.5).
The RPs in this model, and the resources they possess, are differentiated in terms of the
service they provide to their end users. For ease of representation in the model, I assume
that RPs are divided into providers of resources for video streaming and IoT, or type 1 and
type 2, respectively.
8.3.3.1 Managing the Resources of the RPs In the same manner as the SPs, RPs
have a set of end users, whose demand they need to serve. Let URk = {ur1k, ur2k, ..., urqk}
be the set of q end users of resource provider rpk. The resulting demand that rpk needs to
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cover is given by (8.46), where TRk represents the total traffic of rpk, tjk is the traffic of end
user urjk, and urjk is the j-th user of rpk
TRk =
q∑
j=1
tjk (8.46)
Every RP has a given amount of existing resources or holdings, Hk, each providing a
throughput x. In this way, the coverable traffic of rpk is given by TCk in (8.47).
TCk = Hk × x (8.47)
In order to determine the amount of resources that rpk will make available in the pool,
it must compare the traffic coverable with its current holdings to TRk. We refer to rpk’s
resources available for pooling as offer, Ok, which is given by (8.48). As expected, the offer
of each RP results from subtracting the traffic required, TRk, from the coverable traffic,
TCk. Given that Ok corresponds to the entire amount of rpk’s resources that are available
for pooling, I will refer to this value as the real offer of rpk.
Ok = TCk − TRk (8.48)
As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the risk profile of rpk defines the final
amount of resources that it will offer for pooling. The underlying assumption is that the
more prone to risk rpk is, the greater amount of resources it will pool. In other words, the
risk profile of rpk dictates whether this RP shares 100% of Ok or a smaller fraction of it. It
follows that the final market offer (i.e., resources pooled by rpk) is given by (8.49), where
MOk is the market offer, Ok is the real offer of rpk and pmk is the fraction of resources
shared by rpk. pmk is a function of the risk profile of rpk and it is defined in (8.50).
MOk = pmk ×Ok (8.49)
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Table 20: Market offer of each RP as a fraction of real offer
Risk Level Market Offer
Averse MOk = U(0.7, 0.8)×Ok
Neutral MOk = U(0.8, 0.9)×Ok
Taker MOk = U(0.9, 1)×Ok
pmk(rvk) =

U(0.9, 1) if rvk = 0
U(0.8, 0.9) if rvk = 1
U(0.7, 0.8) if rvk = 2
(8.50)
A more complete translation of this assumption is presented in Table 20.
8.3.3.2 Resource Prices Each RP has a real reserve price, pk, for the resources it offers.
Due to their risk profile, RPs may shade their real price and advertise a different, higher,
price in the market. The percentage increase of rpk, ik, is given by (8.51).
ik(rvk) =

ik = U(0.1, 0.15) if rvk = 0
ik = U(0.05, 0.1) if rvk = 1
ik = U(0, 0.05) if rvk = 2
(8.51)
In this way, the advertised price, pak of rpk is given by (8.52).
pak = (1 + ik)× pk (8.52)
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8.3.3.3 Market Supply The supply in the market model is given by the resources that
have been pooled by the RPs. For this purpose, we work with a pool construct that contains
the amount of available resources, the minimum price to ask for them, their type, and their
owner. After this process, the pool is ready for the VNB to find the resources that match
the type, quantity and price requirements of its customers. In other words, the system is
ready for transferring resources from RPs to VNBs, and subsequently to SPs.
8.3.4 VNB - RP Market
The actual market transactions that permit VNBs to obtain resources from the pool are
modeled via a simple market setting. The idea behind this market model is to match supply
and demand and find a resulting market clearing price (i.e., cutoff price) through a sealed-bid
auction.
To model this market, we first divide the supply and demand according to the type
of resources. In this manner, we will have the following demand and supply sets: Dt =
{dt1, dt2, ..., dtl}, Ot = {ot1, ot2, ..., otv} where the subindex t stands for type, which can be 1
or 2, and l and v are the total number of demand requests and supply offers, respectively.
Each member of the demand and supply sets is associated with either a bid price or an
offer (reserve) price, respectively. We arrange the demand-bid pairs (i.e., bids (bp) associated
with Dt) in descending order, and the supply-offer pairs (i.e., offers (op) associated with Ot)
in ascending order. Then, we aggregate the demand values as the price decreases. Similarly,
we aggregate the supply values as the price increases. This is presented in Tables 21 and 22
The clearing price results from the last point in which oti ≥ dti and bpti ≥ opti. A
graphical representation is included in figure 5. The bold line area shows the region where
supply and demand intersect. The prices associated with this demand constitute the market
clearing price (cutoff price).
After this market interaction, each VNB receives its set of resources with prices above
the clearing price. We have modeled this market as a one-time interaction; hence, resources
are assigned after a single bidding round. Additionally, we assume that the market trans-
actions for both types of resources are independent from each other, thus they take place
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Table 21: Market demand as a function of price. Note that the bid values are sorted in
descending order
Demand Bids
dt1 bpt1
dt1 + dt2 bpt2
... ...∑l
i=1(dti) bptl
Table 22: Market offer as a function of price. Note that the offer values are sorted in
ascending order
Supply Offer
ot1 opt1
ot1 + ot2 opt2
... ...∑v
i=1(oti) optv
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Figure 5: Scheme of the market between VNBs and RPs
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simultaneously.
8.3.5 Resource Assignment and Price Adjustment
Once it has received the resources with the most competitive prices, a VNB assigns the
obtained resources to the corresponding SPs. At the same time, the VNB reveals the cutoff
price to its customers. SPs then calculate the total amount they need to pay for resources
(8.53), and the corresponding surplus. As shown in (8.54), an SP’s surplus results from
the difference between the price it is willing topay for resources, rscpi, and the cutoff price,
multiplied by si’s demand.
RscPaymentsp = cutoffprice× di (8.53)
RscSurplussp = (rscpi − pcutoff )× di (8.54)
The cutoff price information also allows SPs to adjust their advertised price advPricei for
subsequent market participation. Indeed, an SP has the option of increasing the advertised
price if it did not obtain resources from the market, or reducing the advertised price in case
its surplus is negative.
There is an additional payment that the SP needs to consider: VNB payment. The rule
for this payment is as follows: an SP pays its VNB partner for its services only if the VNB
obtained the SP’s (partial or full) demand. Given that in our matching model we consider
allowable matches based on the joint utility between SPs and VNBs, the final payment that
bj receives from si is the average fee advertised by said SP and VNB (8.55). This permits
to adjust possible individual losses resulting from the joint utility model.
paymentij =
advFeej + advFeei
2
(8.55)
Both, SPs and VNBs, can calculate the surplus stemming from this payment. It results
from the difference between the real fees they are willing to pay/accept (i.e., pi and fj) and
the final payment they make/receive (i.e., paymentij). Expressions (8.56) and (8.57) show
these surplus calculations for SPs and VNBs, respectively. Learning whether this surplus is
98
positive or negative allows both, SPs and VNBs, to adjust their advertised fees for subsequent
participation in this market. Evidently, if the surplus is negative, SP(VNB) fees should be
reduced(increased) and vice versa.
FeeSurplussi = pi − paymentij (8.56)
FeeSurplusbj = fj − paymentij (8.57)
On the RP side, each RP that assigned resources will receive the corresponding remu-
neration. Evidently, this remuneration will correspond to the fraction of resources assigned,
pmok. This payment is made by the SPs through the VNB and the total amount received
by rpk is given by (8.58). The surplus from this transaction corresponds to the difference
between rpk’s real reserve price and the market cutoff price and it is given by (8.59).
paymentk = cutoffprice× pmok (8.58)
surplusk = (pk − pcutoff )× pmok (8.59)
In this model we assume that RPs decide at each instance whether it is convenient for
them to participate. In this light, the payment and surplus information serve each RP to
make this decision. For instance, a negative surplus could be an indicator to either adjust
the advertised prices for subsequent interactions or to leave the market.
It is important to note that throughout these interactions, only VNBs know the SPs’
demand and their bids. Additionally, the VNBs do not communicate to the SPs the identity
of the resource owners, and they do not necessarily need to know it. Indeed, the RPs could
be even shielded from providing information regarding their identity to the intermediaries, as
the only information VNBs need from the pool is the type of resources and their advertised
price. In this light, the only information that is known by all participants is the final market
clearing price. The rest of the information necessary for the different sets of transactions is
either private (i.e, only known by the entity) or public within the transaction domain (i.e.,
known only by the transacting parties).
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Table 23: Division of SPs and VNBs into experimental groups according to weights assigned
Demand / Reputation Fees to Charge / Pay
Group 1 L L
Group 2 L H
Group 3 H L
Group 4 H H
8.3.6 Experiments
In order to evaluate the model developed for Stage III, we have designed an experiment that
aims at testing the influence of a set of factors in the market outcome. To this end, we
divide the entire set of SPs and VNBs (i.e., the experiment subjects) in four experimental
groups. Each experimental group assigns a different weight to the matching parameters (i.e.,
experiment factors) relevant to SPs and VNBs. More precisely, SPs consider two main factors
for their matching: fee to pay to the VNB and VNBs’ reputation. Similarly, VNBs consider
the fee to receive from SPs and the level of SP demand. Given these four parameters, we
consider that each VNB/SP can assign a low or high weight to the parameters relevant to
them. As a result, we have four different combinations of values, which we translate into
four experimental groups, as presented in Table 23.
In the model, low and high weights are defined as a uniformly distributed random num-
bers. The range for low weights is [0.1 - 0.5] and the range for high weights is [0.6 - 1.0].
SPs and VNBs are randomly assigned to each group at the beginning of the simulation
and, at the preference forming stage, the weights appropriate to their group are utilized.
Figure 6 shows an scheme of the experiment design and how it was applied to the model at
hand.
RPs are not subjects of this experiment as they are not involved in the matching process.
Nevertheless, the factors and weights considered in the experiment do influence the market
transactions as these will dictate which SPs participate in the market; hence, the market
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Figure 6: Experiment design for the third stage of market analysis
demand.
In addition to the workings of this experiment design, we have tested our model according
to different configurations of the SP, VNB and RP market. These variations allow us to
consider different levels of resource supply and demand, in addition to competition levels of
VNBs. The factors that we have considered are included in Table 24.
In general terms, this approach permits us to evaluate how heterogeneous users interact
with each other. In consequence, the results to obtain from this stage are divided into two
sets: results that show how experimental groups perform in selected areas, and a general
overview of the model performance taking into account all groups.
8.3.6.1 Overall Model Performance For the overall model performance, we focus on
several parameters that we consider key for the success of a market, and which are congruent
with the workings of our model. These parameters are the following:
• SP - VNB Matching performance
Percentage of matched SPs
Average number of SP customers per VNB
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Table 24: Parameter Values for simulation of Stage III model
Parameter Values
Number of VNBs Test monopoly and oligopoly condi-
tions V NBs = {1, 2, 3, 4}
Number of SPs Test different levels of market demand,
consistent with Stage I and II configu-
rations SPs = {4, 5, 6, 10, 20, 50}
Number of RPs Test different levels of market supply
and RPs participation in the market
RPs = {5, 10, 15}
• Percentage of satisfied demand
• Percentage of resources assigned by RPs
• Payment received by RPs and VNBs
• Market participants’ surplus
VNBs’ surplus from payments received.
SPs’ surplus from VNB payment and resource payment.
RPs’ surplus from resource payment received.
8.3.6.2 Experimental Group Performance The objective in this set of results is to
define whether there is one group that outperforms the rest. We measure this performance
in terms of a specific set of factors:
• Percentage of matched SPs
• SPs’ served demand
• SPs’ surplus from VNB fees
• Percentage of matched VNBs
• VNBs’ payment received
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• VNBs’ surplus from SP payment
These factors are associated with the matching process, where we expect the experiment
to have a larger effect. We have also included surplus as an indicator of the performance of
the overall system.
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9.0 RESULTS
9.1 STAGE I RESULTS
In this section, we present the results from the experiments described in section 8.1.
9.1.1 Fungibility Scores
Our analysis starts by calculating the fungibility scores that will be applied to the market
model. As detailed in 8.1, we focus on the calculation of capacity fungibility scores. In this
light, we present the fungibility scores resulting form comparing the difference in capacity (in
Mbps) that can be achieved with the available frequency, operating at varying bandwidths,
and the preferred one, operating at a fixed bandwidth. Table 25 and Figure 7 show the
resulting levels of fungibility when comparing 1900 MHz (i.e., the available frequency) to
various preferred frequency bands.
In figure 7, we show the bandwidth required to match the performance of a preferred
frequency with the available band. When we compare 1900 MHz to lower frequencies, such
as 700 MHz, the maximum capacity score obtained is approximately 0.8 with the maximum
bandwidth explored. However, as we explore higher frequencies, we can indeed reach the
maximum fungibility score of 1. In this light, the closer the preferred-available frequencies
are to one another, lower the bandwidth required to obtain similar performance.
Including a measure of bandwidth that further explains how and when to reach perfect
fungibility conditions, allows users to better assess whether the available frequency adjusts
to their needs, and thus place a better valuation on the available commodities.
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Table 25: Resulting capacity fungibility scores at 1 Km distance from the transmitter.
Capacity Fungibility Score at 1 Km
Preferred Frequency
[MHz]
Bandwidth of
Available Freq.
[MHz]
Distance
Score
Probabilistic
Score
700
0.2 0.6552 0.3448
1 0.3856 0.6144
20 0.1968 0.8032
1000
0.2 0.5649 0.4351
1 0.2246 0.7754
11.22 0 1
1500
0.2 0.3085 0.6915
0.483 0 1
1700
0.2 0.1686 0.8314
0.3 0 1
1900 0.2 0 1
2000 0.2 0 1
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Figure 7: Capacity fungibility score calculated at 1Km from the transmitter.
9.1.2 Market Viability Results
We have adapted the fungibility scores to the Exchange-based Band Manager model of
SPECTRAD. The focus of this analysis has been a worst-case scenario, where all market
participants, i.e., SLRs, have a low valuation of the available resources. Indeed, the frequency
available in the market is 1900 MHz and the SLRs’ preferred band is 700 MHz. Considering
that the available BBUs have a fixed bandwidth of 200 KHz, we utilize the probabilistic
fungibility score of 0.3448, as presented in Table 25. Nevertheless, we include in our analysis
additional, lower fungibility scores as a means to account for further costs that the SLRs
may incur in order to adapt their systems to the available frequency band. In total, we
consider four fungibility scenarios for our analysis:
• Perfect fungibility
• Calculated fungibility = 0.3448
• Fungibility Score = 0.25
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Table 26: Viability Criteria and Market Scores
Viability Criteria
Criteria Pass Value Fail Value Score Pass / Fail
P1 - Bid List Empty <1% ≥ 1% 1 / -1
P2 - Demand Greater than Supply ≥ 10% <1% 1 / -1
P3 - Cutoff Price N/A <31 0 / -1
P4 - Percentage of Assigned BBUs ≥ 62% <62% 1 / -1
P5 - Number of ATs per User N/A ≥ 3 0 / -1
• Fungibility Score = 0.15
As included in Table 6, we analyze multiple scenarios of spectrum undersupply and
oversupply, which attend to the various combinations of spectrum requesters, numSLRs,
and available resources, numBBUs, given by the parameter R. The results included in
this section stem from the analysis of one hundred simulation runs of each of these market
scenarios, which were active for 5000 simulation time units. The first 3000 time units were
considered as a warm up period and the data utilized for our results corresponds to the last
2000 time units.
Observing the aggregate data gathered from the multiple simulation runs, we could obtain
the average values of each of the five viability criteria included in section 8.1. Nevertheless, in
order to assess the overall viability of markets, we followed the process developed in [1, 87],
and hence, we empirically defined pass/fail market viability thresholds that could permit
us to define a quantitative measure of market viability. These thresholds stem from the
observation of the average values of each viability criteria that are associated with positive
outcomes. In fact, we observed the trends in the results and the breaking points where the
majority of the criteria shift from positive to negative market characteristics. In this way,
we defined the threshold values presented in Table 26. Each of the pass/fail values included
in this table is associated with the pass/fail scores already presented in Table 4.
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We contrast the simulation results that each individual market scenario presents for each
viability criterion to the thresholds in Table 26 and determine the corresponding score. By
adding all five scores, we obtain a final, market viability score. When the latter is greater
than zero, we consider the conditions of the corresponding scenario as viable. In this way,
we find the combination of fungibility level, number of SLRs and resource supply conditions
that yield market liquidity. In the next subsection, we include the viability results for each
fungibility level and the corresponding market scenarios.
9.1.3 Viability scores for different Fungibility levels
In this section we present the viability scores for each scenario that presented positive results
in our analysis. For each fungibility case, we present the combination of R and numSLRs
associated with market viability and the number of positive outcomes that this represents.
9.1.3.1 Perfect Fungibility When fungibility is perfect, we assume a fungibility score
of 1. This corresponds to the market scenario studied in [87] and we consider this case as a
basis to evaluate the results that we obtain in imperfect fungibility cases. Table 27 presents
the individual results for each viability criteria for all the markets with positive final scores.
We find nine viable market outcomes corresponding to the following scenarios:
• R = 5 and 6 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
• R = 10 and 5 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
9.1.3.2 Calculated Capacity Fungibility Score In this fungibility case, as presented
in Table 28, we find 8 positive market viability outcomes, which correspond to the following
scenarios:
• R = 5 and 10 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
• R = 10 and 5 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
Compared to the perfect fungibility case, we lose one positive outcome in spectrum
undersupply conditions.
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Table 27: Market viability score results for the perfect fungibility scenario
Perfect Fungibility
NumSLRs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
6 30 5 1 0 0 1 -1 1
10 50 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
20 100 5 1 1 0 1 0 3
50 250 5 1 1 0 1 0 3
5 50 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
6 60 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
10 100 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
20 200 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
50 500 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
Table 28: Market Viability Scores obtained for capacity probabilistic fungibility score
Fungibility Score equal to Capacity Probabilistic Score
NumSLRs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
10 50 5 1 0 0 1 -1 1
20 100 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
50 250 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
5 50 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
6 60 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
10 100 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
20 200 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
50 500 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
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Table 29: Market Viability Score obtained when the fungibility score is 0.25
Fungibility Score equal to 0.25
NumSLRs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
10 50 5 1 0 0 1 -1 1
20 100 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
50 250 5 1 1 0 1 -1 2
6 60 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
10 100 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
20 200 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
50 500 10 1 0 0 1 0 2
9.1.3.3 Fungibility score equal to 0.25 As presented in Table 29, this lower fungibility
scenario yields seven positive market outcomes. In fact, we find viability when:
• R = 5 and 10 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
• R = 10 and 6 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
9.1.3.4 Fungibility Score equal to 0.15 In the lowest fungibility level studied, we
find yet an additional decrease in the number of viability outcomes. Table 30 includes the
particular values, which show that viability is achieved when:
• R = 5 and 20 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
• R = 10 and 6 ≤ numSLRs ≤ 50
9.1.4 Summary of Results
Figure 8 presents a summary of the market viability scores resulting from our analysis.
For ease of representation, we have included results for R = 5, 10, 15 only, as we have not
found any viable market configurations under spectrum oversupply conditions (i.e., R ≥ 15).
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Table 30: Market Viability Scores obtained when the fungibility score is 0.15
Fungibility Score equal to 0.15
NumSLRs NumBBUs R P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 Score
20 100 5 1 1 -1 1 -1 1
50 250 5 1 1 -1 1 -1 1
6 60 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
10 100 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
20 200 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
50 500 10 1 0 -1 1 0 1
As presented in the analysis of each fungibility case, we find that as the fungibility score
decreases, so do the number of liquid markets. Additionally, the markets that remain liquid
are those that require a larger number of market participants or SLRs. In this light, it is
important to note that none of the spectrum fungibility levels analyzed presented viable
outcomes when numSLRs = 4 or R ≥ 15 (i.e., spectrum oversupply conditions).
Where market viability is present, we highlight the following characteristics:
• When there is no spectrum oversupply, the probability of demand being greater than the
supply rises and hence a higher percentage of spectrum is assigned at prices determined
by the market transactions.
• When demand is greater than the supply, the cutoff price lies above the BM’s reserve
price.
• When R = 5, the number of AT units per SLR tends to compare to the fail threshold
• When R = 10, the AT holdings of the SLRs fall within the pass threshold.
In cases where markets are not viable and there are spectrum oversupply conditions, we
observe the following:
• A low percentage of BBUs is assigned in each bidding round and the cutoff price remains
close to the BM’s reserve price.
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Figure 8: Market viability results contrasting perfect fungibility conditions to three addi-
tional fungibility levels.
• The probability of having an empty bid list is significantly low
• The SLRs have nearly null AT holdings
• Even if the two last characteristics are positive for market viability, these do not overcome
the effects of the BBUs assignment percentage and the cutoff price. Hence, markets under
these circumstances are still not viable.
In the overall market analysis, we found that the cutoff price falls as the fungibility level
decreases, as presented in Figures 9, 10 and 11. We expect this to be the case as the SLRs’
valuation of resources is proportional to the fungibility score of the available frequency. These
results are relevant for hypothesis H1.
In terms of the percentage of resources assigned in the market, we still find that this is
consistent with the demand and supply levels rather than the actual fungibility level. This
can be observed in Figures 12, 13 and 14 where the overall percentage of assigned BBUs
drops as the level of supply increases; however, it remains relatively constant despite changes
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Figure 9: Cutoff Price with R = 5
Figure 10: Cutoff Price with R = 10
Figure 11: Cutoff Price with R = 15
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Figure 12: % BBUs Assigned, R= 5
in fungibility. These results are relevant for testing hypothesis H2.
Regarding the AT holdings of each SLR, as presented in Figures 15, 16 and 17, these are
lower as the fungibility level decreases from perfect to the calculated fungibility score. As
the fungibility score decreases even further, there is not a significant change in the average
number of AT units per user. Indeed, the changes we observe are consistent with the spec-
trum demand and supply levels in the market. Indeed, as spectrum supply increases, the
actual difference in AT holdings across fungibility levels starts to fade. For instance, in the
case of 50 SLRs and R = 15, the AT holdings value remains at zero.
In light of these results, it is important to note that our study contemplates AT units
that are perfectly fungible with the preferred frequency of the SLRs. In this way, the price
to pay for these AT units is proportional to high resource valuation and, evidently, higher
than the price to pay for less fungible spectrum.
It is important to note that even if we found different market configurations that lead
to viable outcomes, these configurations do not resemble the current configuration of the
telecommunications market. In fact, in current practical scenarios, we find a limited number
of market participants (or incumbents) capturing the majority of the market, under spectrum
scarcity conditions. This is an additional motivation for the incorporation of a different
technical framework to our market model, which could permit us to find market liquidity in
scenarios that adjust to the existing situation.
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Figure 13: % BBUs Assigned, R = 10
Figure 14: % BBUs Assigned,R = 15
Figure 15: Avg.ATs per SLR, R= 5
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Figure 16: Avg.ATs per SLR, R = 10
Figure 17: Avg.ATs per SLR, R = 15
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9.2 STAGE II RESULTS
The research work presented in [3] focuses on defining a tradeable, spectrum-related com-
modity that could add thickness to the market while avoiding the significant constraints
inherent to the physical characteristics of electromagnetic spectrum. In section 8.2 we re-
port the results obtained in that work, which portray the experiments presented in section
8.2.
The results presented in this section correspond to the average values of one hundred
simulation runs, for each combination of parameters applicable to our model. Note that since
we have considered that the available LTE bands are three 10 MHz bands in the 700 MHz
frequency range, we are able to obtain a spectrum pool with a minimum of 18 PRBs and a
maximum of 150 PRBs. The actual simulation scenario is constructed following the same
approach of [87]. In this way, we utilized the variable R in order to determine the number
of PRBs available in the market. This availability is given by the expression in (9.1).
number of PRBs = number of SLRs×R (9.1)
For each simulation scenario we considered different combinations of users and available
PRBs given by R = {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}.
It is important to note that for the availability of PRBs, we utilized values that could
be aggregated through the addition of allowable quantities of PRBs from the three 700 MHz
bands (see Table 3)1. In case the exact value, given by (9.1) was not consistent with the
standard, we considered the closest (allowed and higher) amount of PRBs. For example, in
the case of 4 SLRs and R = 5, we would form a pool of 20 PRBs in our simulation. We could
not use a standard-compliant amount of PRBs from the three bands to obtain this value.
Instead, we used a pool of 21 PRBs, which results from aggregating 15 PRBs from one band
and 6 PRBs from another. In the same way, we have limited our simulated combinations to
1The current LTE standard contemplates the association of only certain bands for intra-band and inter-
band carrier aggregation. However, for ease of implementation, we have assumed that the bands chosen for
our model can be associated with each other for carrier aggregation purposes, even if this is not supported
by the standard yet. As the LTE standard has been continuously evolving, we expect carrier aggregation to
expand to additional bands. In this way, our assumption does not limit the applicability of our model.
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Table 31: Viability Criteria and Market Scores
Viability Criteria
Criteria Pass Value Fail Value
Score
Pass / Fail
P1 - Bid List Empty = 0 > 0 1 / -1
P2 - Demand greater than Supply ≥ 10% < 1% 1 / -1
P3 - Cutoff Price N/A < 51 0 / -1
P4 - Percentage of Assigned BBUs
≥ Average
all scenarios
< Average
all scenarios
1 / -1
P5 - Number of ATs per User N/A ≥ 4 0 / -1
those resulting in values ≤ 150; hence, our simulated scenarios for 10 SLRs end at R = 15,
in the case of 20 SLRs, we consider only R = 5 and we have not tested the case of 50 SLRs.
In what follows, we present the results obtained for each scenario, regarding the five
different viability criteria. In the same manner as in Stage 1, we utilize the values obtained
across the simulation runs in order to define pass/fail thresholds that would allow us to
provide an overall (quantitative) assessment of market viability. In this way, Table 31 shows
the values that we utilized for the evaluation of our results.
9.2.1 Scenario 1
The first scenario we tested was a rather conservative approach, as we tried to remain as
close as possible to the original SPECTRAD model, while still being able to incorporate
the virtualization notions for the definition of the traded commodity. In this manner, the
duration of the AT units’ usage is the same as those from the original model: uniformly
distributed between 90 and 110 simulation time units.
118
Figure 18: Probability of having an empty bid list in Scenario 1.
9.2.1.1 Probability of Empty Bid List When spectrum is scarce, it is rather difficult
for an SLR to obtain spectrum from the market. Hence, SLRs begin to increase their AT
holdings, which in turn reduces their bidding activity. In this way, as each SLR accumulates
AT units, the probability of having an empty bid list is higher. In Figure 18, we can observe
how this probability varies depending on the number of SLRs and the existing spectrum
supply (given by R).
9.2.1.2 Probability of Demand being greater than Supply As spectrum availabil-
ity grows in the market (higher values of R), the probability that the demand is greater than
the supply decreases. Conversely, as the number of SLRs grows in the market, greater is
the probability that the market demand will surpass the BM spectrum inventory. Figure
19 presents the results we obtained regarding this criterion. As it can be observed, this
probability is at its highest when R = 5 and there are 20 SLRs in the market, which is a
clear condition of spectrum undersupply. The lowest value of this probability is observed in
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Figure 19: Probability of demand being greater than supply in Scenario 1.
spectrum oversupply conditions (i.e., R = 25 and numSLRs = 4).
9.2.1.3 Average cutoff price We utilized this criterion as a means to evaluate the val-
uation of the spectrum-related resources in the market. In spectrum undersupply conditions,
we can expect SLRs to pay higher prices for spectrum than in spectrum oversupply condi-
tions. This trend is corroborated in Figure 20, where we find an average cutoff price as high
as 101.8 monetary units when R = 5 and numSLRs = 20, and as low as 57.6 monetary units,
when R = 25 and numSLRs = 4.
9.2.1.4 Percentage of assigned spectrum When the spectrum supply increases, we
find less efficiency in spectrum assignment. Regarding this criterion, the highest efficiency,
85.7%, is achieved when R = 5 and there are 20 SLRs participating in the market i.e.,
spectrum oversupply conditions. The worst case corresponds to the scenario given by R
= 25 and numSLRs = 4, where only 43.4% of resources are assigned. When analyzing
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Figure 20: Average cutoff price in Scenario 1
the results from our simulation, the average percentage of assigned resources is 62%. In
consequence, this is the value that we utilized for the market viability evaluation of this
scenario (see Table 31).
It should be noted that given the specific LTE requirements for resource assignment,
when there is spectrum undersupply we can observe that the resulting assignment is not
completely smooth across the distribution of spectrum users. As the spectrum availability
increases in the market, this irregularity disappears.
9.2.1.5 Average number of Unlicensed spectrum units per SLR It is expected
that as spectrum supply increases, SLRs will have more opportunities to obtain licensed
PRBs from the market, and hence they will seek less unlicensed spectrum units. This is
portrayed in Figure 22, where we show the results we obtained in our simulations regarding
the average number of unlicensed spectrum units per SLR.
Given the characteristics of our model, each SLR requires four unlicensed spectrum units,
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Figure 21: Percentage of assigned spectrum in Scenario 1
on average, to fulfill their traffic requirements. In this way, any value below this threshold
is considered positive for market viability. Observing the results in Figure 22, we find find
users with an average of ∼ 1 unlicensed spectrum unit when there is spectrum oversupply,
while SLRs accumulate more than 4 unlicensed spectrum units in undersupply scenarios.
9.2.1.6 Viability Score for Scenario 1 The values obtained for each viability criteria
were evaluated using the pass/fail thresholds, and the corresponding scores, included in Table
31. In this way, Figure 23 includes the final market viability scores obtained for the market
scenarios simulated in this stage.
It is important to point out that the goal of this scenario is to determine the feasibility
(or viability) of markets designed for trading virtualized commodities. We also contrast this
results with those obtained with the original version of SPECTRAD, in order to determine
whether there are improvements regarding market liquidity conditions. In this way, con-
trasting our results with those of the original SPECTRAD model, we find one additional
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Figure 22: Average number of unlicensed spectrum units per SLR in Scenario 1
scenario where markets are viable, which is the case where R = 10 and there are 4 partic-
ipating SLRs. The remaining viable scenarios coincide with the original model, and all of
them belong to cases where R = {5, 10, 15}. We do not find viable markets in situations of
spectrum oversupply i.e., R = {20, 25}.
9.2.2 Scenario 2
In this scenario we study the impact of the duration of the unlicensed spectrum usage in
the final market viability outcome. Our objective is to map the duration of this alternate
technology to that of the lease of a licensed PRB from the market. This permits us to
account for possible degradation of service while using unlicensed spectrum, in addition to
providing the SLRs with the opportunity to cease the utilization of unlicensed spectrum and
participate in a new bidding round when it is available.
In the following sections, we present the results obtained for each viability criterion
under these new model characteristics. We also evaluate how this impacts the overall market
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Figure 23: Market Viability Score for Scenario 1
viability score.
9.2.2.1 Probability of Empty Bid List In all the market configurations that we tested
in this scenario, we obtained a zero probability of empty bid list. This results from the
duration of unlicensed spectrum units usage, which allows the SLRs to bid for licensed
spectrum in every bidding round.
9.2.2.2 Probability of Demand greater than Supply Given the shorter duration
of unlicensed spectrum usage, SLRs are significantly more active in the market. This is
reflected in Figure 24. In fact, when R = 5, we find 100% probability of demand being
greater than supply. The worst case we find is that of R = 25 and numSLRs = 4, i.e.,
spectrum oversupply, where the analyzed probability drops to 18.3%. It is important to
point out that even in the spectrum oversupply conditions, this probability does not reach
levels as low as those of the original SPECTRAD model.
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Figure 24: Probability of demand greater than supply results for Scenario 2
9.2.2.3 Average cutoff price The higher number of market participants also has an
effect on the average auction cutoff price. In this scenario, the highest cutoff price rises to
161.8 monetary units in cases of spectrum scarcity (R = 5 and numSLRs = 20). The lowest
cutoff price is obtained in spectrum oversupply conditions (R = 25 and numSLRs = 4),
where it falls to 66.5 monetary units. Nevertheless, this lower value is still above the reserve
price of the Band Manager (i.e., 50 monetary units). Figure 25 shows the results obtained
for this criterion.
9.2.2.4 Percentage of assigned spectrum As evidenced in our previous simulation
scenario, the resource assignment results are not entirely smooth under spectrum scarcity
conditions. This is due to the constraints we face in order to follow the resource assignment
rules of the LTE standard. We can observe in Figure 26 that the highest percentage of
resources assigned corresponds to the case where R = 5 and numSLRs = 6, while the
lowest efficiency appears when R = 25 and numSLRs = 4.
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Figure 25: Average cutoff price for Scenario 2
When analyzing our aggregate simulation data, we find that the average percentage across
all simulation runs is 76%. Consequently, this value becomes the threshold for evaluation of
the market viability score in the second simulation scenario.
9.2.2.5 Average number of Unlicensed Spectrum units per SLR Given that the
major change in our simulation scenario affected the duration of the unlicensed spectrum
usage, we expect to see a significant change in the results of the evaluation of this criterion.
In fact, as shown in Figure 27, the maximum amount of unlicensed bandwidth units per user
is approximately 2 in spectrum undersupply conditions. This value decreases until it reaches
0.37 when there is spectrum over supply. It should be noted that even the highest values we
obtain are below the average number of bandwidth units that the SLRs need to satisfy their
traffic requirements.
126
Figure 26: Percentage of assigned resource blocks in Scenario 2
Figure 27: Percentage of assigned resource blocks in Scenario 2
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Figure 28: Market viability scores for Scenario 2
9.2.2.6 Viability Score for Scenario 2 The individual criteria showed significant im-
provements in the second simulated scenario. Figure 28 shows how these individual im-
provements impact the overall market viability score. As it can be observed, in this new
scenario we find that each market configuration tested yields viable outcomes. Additionally,
these favorable results can be evidenced even in situations where there are only a few market
participants.
9.2.3 Summary of Results
The main objective of the second stage of this research work is to find whether a technical
approach such as virtualization and the incorporation of a standard such as LTE-A would
permit us to develop a new spectrum–related commodity that would add thickness to the
market and hence improve the overall market liquidity outcome.
When comparing the results of our first scenario with those of the original SPECTRAD
model, we could evidence only a slight improvement in terms of viable configurations. Never-
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theless, we shall remember that in this new scenario our assumption of “perfect fungibility”
is framed within an existing, and mature, technology: LTE-A. Further, if we focus on par-
ticular results such as those of the probability of demand being greater than supply, we
find significant improvements which can be attributed to the implementation of the resource
pool, and the carrier aggregation capabilities of our model.
The second simulation scenario presents individual improvements for the market viability
criteria and an enhancement of the overall viability conditions. One of the main factors that
contributes to this positive results is the null probability of having an empty bid list in
all scenarios. This translates in the high level of SLR participation in the market, hence
supporting our third hypothesis H3.
It is important to point out that when resources are homogeneous, the availability of al-
ternative resources positively impacts the market outcome. This is particularly salient in the
case of resource valuation (average cutoff price) and willingness to participate in the market
(probability of empty bid lists and demand / supply conditions). These factors also support
our hypotheses H3 and H4. Indeed, in the absence of resource compatibility issues, the
resulting cutoff price is well above the minimum accepted by the BM. Additionally, having
null empty bid list incidences points to higher levels of market demand for all bidding op-
portunities. Evidently, this homogeneous case is suitable for alternate technology units such
as unlicensed spectrum, which can be easily accessed and do not represent high investment
costs (e.g., acquisition of equipment, building infrastructure, among others).
The positive results we have obtained, especially in the second simulation scenario have
shed light on the opportunities that we can derive from the incorporation of a flexible tech-
nical framework to the definition and design of spectrum markets. Indeed, these results
lead to the third research stage of this dissertation, which aims at applying the notions of
virtualization to a wider network and resource scope.
Figure 29 compares the viability scores obtained in the two scenarios pertaining to this
stage (right-most figures) to the results of the original SPECTRAD model (left-most figure).
The positive results shown in the right-most figure stem from positive market scores obtained
throughout the viability criteria that we have considered. This includes the factors associated
with our hypotheses H3 and H4.
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Figure 29: Comparison of the viability scores for different versions of the SPECTRAD market
model
9.3 STAGE III RESULTS
In this section, we present the results from the experiment setting described in section 8.3.6.
The complexity of the system modeled in this stage is significantly higher than that of the
previous stages. We now deal with three different types of participants, whose characteristics
and relevant parameters can vary, thus yielding interesting analysis settings. The results
stemming from our simulation data are divided into: overall model performance assessment
and experimental groups performance assessment. We expect these analyses to permit us
to explore favorable conditions for market viability, as well as the issues that need to be
addressed to achieve successful outcomes.
To determine an appropriate number of simulation runs for this stage, we assume we are
dealing with a daily market. In this manner, we run the model for the equivalent of one
year (360 simulation runs) and we replicate this process 10 times for consistency and error
avoidance. To include a training period in our system, we divide our simulation runs into
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monthly interactions. In this way, we run the model 50 times and for our monthly data, we
gather the results pertaining to the last 30 iterations.
9.3.1 Overall Model Performance
A global perspective on how the proposed model functions allows us to investigate details
that are not always available, individually, from market mechanisms. Our overall model
assessment is composed by the perspective of all participants, what they seek, and how they
perform. For this purpose, in this subsection we focus on the results from the different parts
of our model and study what are the outcomes perceived by SPs, VNBs and RPs. This can
be captured through specific parameters from the VNB–SP matching process, the VNB–RPs
negotiations, and the subsequent payments and price adjustment process.
9.3.1.1 SP - VNB Matching Performance To evaluate the SP–VNB matching mar-
ket performance, we have obtained data regarding the percentage of matched SPs and the
number of SPs with whom each VNB is matched. We have aggregated this data in terms of
the average and these results are shown in what follows.
Given that RPs do not intervene directly in the matching process, the results do not
change according to this factor. Consequently, we only include data from our scenarios with
10 RPs.
Percentage of Matched SPs: Figure 30 shows the results for the average percentage
of matched SPs throughout our simulation (one year data). Each line corresponds to the
relevant scenario regarding the total number of VNBs in the system. Indeed, we find that
as the number of VNBs in the market increases, the percentage of matched SPs increases as
well.
Average number of SP Customers per Virtual Network Builder: Figures 31,
32, 33 and 34 show the results for this parameter, considering the four different VNB market
configurations. Reputation is a key factor for VNBs; hence, we differentiate the VNBs’ per-
formance according to their reputation. In each graph, reputation is referred to as “quality”
and the numbers (0 - 2) are consistent with the reputation level (i.e., 0 corresponds to low,
131
Figure 30: Percentage of Matched SPs with 10 RPs in the market
1 to medium and 2 corresponds to high).
The results show that VNBs with higher reputation are, on average, matched to a greater
number of SPs. The difference between reputation levels becomes less evident as the number
of VNBs increases. VNBs with higher reputation outperforming those with lower levels
is somewhat expected, as this is an indicator of a VNB’s trustworthiness and how well it
performs in the system. Nevertheless, this preference may come at a higher cost to the SPs.
9.3.1.2 Percentage of demand satisfied in the market This is an important measure
to explore, as it allows us to merge the results from both negotiation instances and assess
the core requirement of this system: share spectrum resources and allow SPs to satisfy the
demand of their customers. In this light, we have approached this parameter in terms of the
average percentage of SPs that have been able to obtain resources in the market after they
have been matched. Figures 35, 36 and 37 show the results for scenarios with 5, 10 and 15
RPs, respectively.
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Figure 31: Average number of partners per VNB according to its reputation. Scenario with
1 VNB and 10 RPs
Figure 37: Percentage of SPs whose demand has been satisfied when there are 15 RPs in the
system
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Figure 32: Average number of partners per VNB according to its reputation. Scenario with
2 VNBs and 10 RPs
There are several factors that are important to note in these figures. First, the difference
between VNB market scenarios is not entirely clear when there are only 5 RPs in the system.
This is especially the case when we are considering scenarios with less than 6 SPs (see figure
35). Scenarios with higher number of SPs and RPs show that the tendency is for VNB
monopolies to perform better, although with approximately 20% difference, between the
best and worst performances, at most. It is important to point out; however, that from
the results presented in 9.3.1.1, in monopoly cases, VNBs were matched with less SPs than
duopoly or oligopoly cases. This suggests that the positive performance of VNB monopolies
is based on the fact that they initially had fewer SPs to serve. Evidently, a higher percentage
of a small number of SPs may be comparable to a lower percentage of a greater number of
SPs (as is the case of VNBs > 1). This reduces the performance breach among different
numbers of VNBs, thus suggesting that their performance is rather consistent throughout
our simulation scenarios.
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Figure 33: Average number of partners per VNB according to its reputation. Scenario with
3 VNBs and 10 RPs
9.3.1.3 Percentage of resources assigned by the Resource Providers In the fig-
ures to follow, we delve into the performance of RPs. For this purpose, we analyze the
percentage of resources that they have successfully assigned in the market, on average. Fig-
ures 38, 39 and 40 show the scenarios with RPs = 5, 10 and 15, respectively.
In these figures we can observe that there is a significant performance improvement when
we shift from 5 to 10 or 15 RPs. Indeed, scenarios with 10 and 15 RPs show only very slight
differences. Note, however, that these figures show the percentage of resources assigned by
each RP. Hence, the overall amount of resources assigned in the scenario with 15 RPs is
higher.
Regarding the performance of the VNB market configuration, in the majority of cases,
scenarios with a higher number of VNBs show a higher percentage of resources assigned.
This trend is clearer in the case of 15 RPs (figure 40) where markets with 4 VNBs perform
better for all SP configurations.
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Figure 34: Average number of partners per VNB according to its reputation. Scenario with
4 VNBs and 10 RPs
Figure 35: Percentage of SPs whose demand has been satisfied when there are 5 RPs in the
system
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Figure 36: Percentage of SPs whose demand has been satisfied when there are 10 RPs in the
system
Figure 38: Percentage of resources assigned by each Resource Provider (in average), when
there are 5 RPs in the system.
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Figure 39: Percentage of resources assigned by each Resource Provider (in average), when
there are 10 RPs in the system.
Figure 40: Percentage of resources assigned by each Resource Provider (in average), when
there are 15 RPs in the system.
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Figure 41: Average payment received by each RP when there are 5 RPs in the system.
9.3.1.4 Payments We now analyze the monetary remuneration received by the two
profit-seeking entities in our market model: RPs and VNBs.
Payment Received by RPs: RPs receive a payment for the resources they assign in
the market. Note that this payment is calculated with the market clearing price. Figures
41,42 and 43 show the results for scenarios with 5, 10 and 15 RPs, respectively.
The results shown in these figures are consistent with the amount of resources assigned
in the system, shown in subsection 9.3.1.3. In consequence, scenarios with a larger number
of RPs show higher revenue per RP especially when we shift from 5 to 10 or 15 RPs. It is
important to note that the peak of performance in this analysis stems from the scenarios
with 6 - 10 SPs. After this point, the revenue of RPs (as well as the amount of resources
assigned) starts to decrease. This reduction can be associated with various factors: 1) market
demand is the matched SPs’ demand, not the entire SP population’s demand , which extends
to the amount of resources assigned and subsequent payment ; 2) given the market we have
modeled for VNB–RP transactions, as there are more SPs in the system, more bids enter
the market, hence increasing the opportunities for the market clearing price to be lower.
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Figure 42: Average payment received by each RP when there are 10 RPs in the system.
Figure 43: Average payment received by each RP when there are 15 RPs in the system.
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Figure 44: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 1 VNB and 10 RPs.
Payment Received by VNBs: VNBs receive a payment only when they have been
able to obtain resources for their SP customers. For this purpose, we present payment data
regarding the VNBs that were successful in the resource assignment process. In figures 44,
45, 46, and 47 we explore the payment received by each VNB while also differentiating these
entities according to their reputation. The figures represent a scenario with 10 RPs. Other
RP configurations are included in Appendix B.
In our model, VNBs with a higher reputation are allowed to charge higher fees for their
services. This is reflected in our results, as in all cases, VNBs with a higher reputation
(quality = 2) receive a higher remuneration.
9.3.1.5 Surplus This is an indicator of the profit each participant obtains in the market.
Note that for all advertised prices, SPs, VNBs and RPs have the option of shading their real
value. The surplus hence represents the difference between their real valuation for resources
and services and the amount they received.
In the figures that follow, we present box plots showing the distribution of the surplus
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Figure 45: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 2 VNBs and 10 RPs.
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Figure 46: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 3 VNBs and 10 RPs.
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Figure 47: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 4 VNBs and 10 RPs.
values relevant to each entity.
RPs’ surplus: After receiving a payment from the resources assigned, each RP can
calculate the resulting surplus from its market negotiations. Figures 48, 49 and 50 show the
surplus distribution for scenarios with varying RP and VNB configurations.
In the market setting we have modeled, the market clearing price should always be
greater than or equal to the price advertised by the RPs. It follows that the minimum
surplus perceived by each RP is zero, as shown in the figures above. Having a minimum
surplus of zero indicates that even in the worst case scenario, RPs are not incurring in losses.
This could result in a significant incentive for RPs to participate in the market.
The upper-limit value in the inter-quartile range increases with the number of RPs;
however, in all scenarios it decreases as the number of SPs increases. This shows that the
surplus distribution is consistent with the average payment, as it is lower for higher number
of SPs.
SPs’ surplus from resource payment: We now analyze the other side of resource
payment. This results from the SPs’ perspective and how the amount they pay for resources
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Figure 48: Box plot of the surplus perceived by each RP in a 5 RP scenario. This includes
results form different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs,
bottom left: 3 VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 49: Box plot of the surplus perceived by each RP in a 10 RP scenario. This includes
results form different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs,
bottom left: 3 VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 50: Box plot of the surplus perceived by each RP in a 15 RP scenario. This includes
results form different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs,
bottom left: 3 VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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compares to their real resource valuation.
Figures 51, 52 and 53 show the resulting surplus for scenarios with the available RP and
VNB configurations.
The figures above show that in the majority of cases the SPs’ surplus is zero. Only in
the scenario with 15 RPs, we observe the interquartile range showing values above zero for
large numbers of SPs (e.g., 10, 20 and 50). These results suggest that in the majority of
cases, the SPs’ payments match their real resource valuation.
SPs’ surplus from VNB payment: SPs receiving resources need to make an addi-
tional payment. Indeed, they need to pay the convened fee to their VNB partners. In figures
54, 55 and 56, we show the distribution of the SPs’ surplus stemming from the final fee they
pay to the VNBs in scenarios with 5, 10 and 15 RPs, respectively.
The results presented in these figures show that there is a fraction of negative surplus
values, which indicates that SPs incur in losses from their transactions with VNBs. Com-
paring all results, we observe that as the number of RPs increases, the surplus distribution
becomes more stable. Particularly, for 10 and 15 RP scenarios, the 75% of surplus values
(for 7 out of 8 cases) are positive. This indicates that in its majority, the SPs match with
VNBs and the payment arrangement results in a profit for the SPs.
VNBs’ surplus: This value stems from the payment received from the SPs. It should
be emphasized that a VNB receives a payment only when it assigns resources. Hence, the
figures we include in this section reflect the surplus of the VNBs who assigned resources to
their customers.
The inter-quartile range of the box plots indicates that the surplus values in the analyzed
scenarios follow a normal distribution. We find very low variability in the surplus values in
scenarios with 5 RPs, and scenarios with 10 and 15 RPs where the number of SPs is lower
than 10. In the case of 5 RPs, the surplus distribution is consistent, irrespective of the
number of SPs considered. In the case of 10 and 15 RPs, the distribution is consistent for
scenarios with less than 10 SPs. In the latter cases, as the number of SPs increases, there is
a higher variability in the surplus values, which represents a higher probability of negative
surplus. Nevertheless, results also show that the median surplus value, in the majority of
cases, is zero.
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Figure 51: SPs’ surplus from resource payment in a 5 RP scenario. This includes results
form different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left:
3 VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 52: SPs’ surplus from resource payment in a 10 RP scenario. This includes results
form different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left:
3 VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 53: SPs’ surplus from resource payment in a 15 RP scenario. This includes results
form different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left:
3 VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 54: SPs’ surplus from VNB payment in a 5 RP scenario. This includes results form
different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left: 3
VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 55: SPs’ surplus from VNB payment in a 10 RP scenario. This includes results form
different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left: 3
VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 56: SPs’ surplus from VNB payment in a 15 RP scenario. This includes results form
different VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left: 3
VNBs and bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 57: VNBs’ surplus in a scenario with 5 RPs. This includes results form different
VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left: 3 VNBs and
bottom right: 4 VNBs.
154
Figure 58: VNBs’ surplus in a scenario with 10 RPs. This includes results form different
VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left: 3 VNBs and
bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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Figure 59: VNBs’ surplus in a scenario with 15 RPs. This includes results form different
VNB market configurations: top left: 1 VNB, top right: 2 VNBs, bottom left: 3 VNBs and
bottom right: 4 VNBs.
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9.3.2 Experimental Group Performance
In this subsection, we explore stage 3 results from an experimental group perspective. As
such, we show which experimental group outperforms the rest according to a set of factors
relevant to SPs and VNBs. To this end, we have processed simulation results relevant to the
factors included in section 8.3.6, calculated the average values throughout all the scenarios
analyzed, and chosen the group with the best performance. In what follows, we present the
aggregate results showing the groups performing best for each factor.
In terms of the parameters we have chosen, best performance for SPs means:
• Highest percentage of matched SPs
• Highest percentage of served demand (i.e., percentage of matched SPs that received
resources)
• Highest surplus from fees paid to VNBs
Similarly, best performance for VNBs means:
• Highest percentage of matched VNBs
• Highest payment received by VNBs
• Highest surplus from SP payment.
In figures 60, 61 and 62, we can observe that a higher percentage of SPs belonging to
experimental group 4 are matched in all scenarios (i.e., all VNB, SP and RP combinations).
Regarding the percentage of SPs’ demand satisfied, in figures 63, 64 and 65 we show that
matched SPs belonging to experimental group 4 obtain the best results in the system.
Figures 66, 67 and 68 show the results for the group performance in terms of surplus.
Group 4 members no longer outperform the rest. In fact, group 1 performs better in scenarios
with 5 and 10 RPs, while group 2 performs better in the 15 RP case.
On the VNB side, we explore the group yielding the highest percentage of matched VNBs.
Figures 69, 70 and 71 show that in the majority of scenarios, group 4 outperforms the rest.
Exceptions are a few instances where group 2 performs better than the rest.
In figures 72, 73 and 74, we present the results regarding the payment received by VNBs
in scenarios with different RP configurations. It can be observed that in cases with 10 and
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Figure 60: Groups with highest percentage of matched SPs in scenarios with 5 RPs.
Figure 61: Groups with highest percentage of matched SPs in scenarios with 10 RPs.
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Figure 62: Groups with highest percentage of matched SPs in scenarios with 15 RPs.
Figure 63: Groups with highest percentage of matched SPs receiving resources from the
market. Scenario with 5 RPs
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Figure 64: Groups with highest percentage of matched SPs receiving resources from the
market. Scenario with 10 RPs
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Figure 65: Groups with highest percentage of matched SPs receiving resources from the
market. Scenario with 15 RPs
15 RPs, in the majority of scenarios, group 4 performs best. Nevertheless, it is hard to
establish a solid conclusion in the case of 5 RPs, although there is a greater number of
instances where group 3 outperforms the rest. Note that VNBs’ payment depends on their
ability to obtain resources in the market. In cases where supply is low (RPs = 5), this task
is more complicated, hence a higher variability on the results.
Regarding VNBs’ surplus, we find a similar outcome as that of the SPs. Figures 75, 76
and 77 show the variability in these results. In the scenario with 5 RPs, group 3 has the
best performance; in the scenario with 10 RPs, group 4 performs best, and in the 15 RP
scenario group 1 obtains the best performance. Nevertheless, the difference among groups
is not significant.
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Figure 66: Groups where SPs obtain the highest surplus from VNB payment. Scenario with
5 RPs
9.3.3 Summary of Results
Through the analysis of the simulation results in this section, we have been able to draw im-
portant conclusions regarding the proposed market structure and its viability. The different
combinations of market participants that we have tested, have allowed us to explore what
market configurations become stable and which provide us with positive results. We highlight
some important conclusions that may point to general spectrum market recommendations
as well as future improvements of the current model.
Considering different RP configurations (i.e., 5, 10 and 15 RP scenarios) allows us to test
different levels of RP investments. This has an evident impact on the amount of supply in
the market, which is supported by figures 78, 79 and 80. Further, these results are relevant
for hypothesis H7. Note that the VNB market configuration does not have a significant
impact on the market supply. Indeed, this value remains rather constant in spite of changes
in the number of VNBs.
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Figure 67: Groups where SPs obtain the highest surplus from VNB payment. Scenario with
10 RPs
In general, we find that market scenarios with only 5 RPs show less stable results.
This is particularly the case when we explore them in combination with a small number
of SPs participating in the market. As the number of RPs and SPs increases, we find
repeating trends in the number of matched SPs and VNBs, the payments made and received,
the amount of resources assigned, to mention a few factors. A small number of RPs in
combination with a small number of SPs may be suggestive of initial market scenarios, as
such, we can infer that external incentives may be necessary for these situations to work.
For example, these incentives may target RPs and prompt them to share their resources in
the market.
Regarding the matching process, the method we propose considers the joint utility de-
rived from an spi–vnbj match. Hence, each SP’s and VNB’s preference vector is built in
terms of this utility. For this to be possible, we require the sum of the utilities of spi and
vnbj to be greater than the threshold that we have set for allowable matches. In this way,
we have two different possibilities for vnbj(spi) to enter spi’s(vnbj’s) preference vector: 1)
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Figure 68: Groups where SPs obtain the highest surplus from VNB payment. Scenario with
15 RPs
Figure 69: Groups with a higher percentage of matched VNBs. Scenario with 5 RPs
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Figure 70: Groups with a higher percentage of matched VNBs. Scenario with 10 RPs
Figure 71: Groups with a higher percentage of matched VNBs. Scenario with 15 RPs
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Figure 72: Groups where VNBs receive a higher payment. Scenario with 5 RPs
Figure 73: Groups where VNBs receive a higher payment. Scenario with 10 RPs
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Figure 74: Groups where VNBs receive a higher payment. Scenario with 15 RPs
Figure 75: Groups with the highest average VNB surplus. Scenario with 5 RPs
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Figure 76: Groups with the highest average VNB surplus. Scenario with 10 RPs
Figure 77: Groups with the highest average VNB surplus. Scenario with 15 RPs
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Figure 78: Average supply per resource provider in a scenario with 5 RPs.
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Figure 79: Average supply per resource provider in a scenario with 10 RPs.
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Figure 80: Average supply per resource provider in a scenario with 15 RPs.
vnbj’s utility is greater than the threshold minus spi’s utility or 2) spi’s utility is greater
than the threshold minus vnbj’s utility. If we were to create preference vectors based on
SPs’ and VNBs’ individual utilities, only one condition would lead to an allowable match:
spi’s utility and vnbj’s utility are both higher than the preset threshold. Evidently, the joint
utility approach gives us additional flexibility for the definition of allowable matches, thus
increasing their amount. This supports hypothesis H9. Defining matches in terms of joint
utility has additional implications, which are later discussed.
The surplus results for SPs and RPs are very positive in general, which shows that their
market participation is profitable. The situation of the VNBs is different. We showed that, in
general, 50% of VNBs will have a profit. The losses associated with the other half stem from
the pricing configuration and what leads to a positive surplus. As a reminder, the surplus
stems from comparing the price VNBs expect to be paid, or their advertised fee, with the
fee they receive if they assign resources. Given that our matching process is currently based
on the joint surplus between SPs and VNBs, there may a disparity between prices. We
have adjusted the fee that SPs pay to be the average between SPs’ and VNBs’ advertised
fees. This improved our results; however, this does not completely turn all VNBs’ profit into
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positive values.
Delving deeper into the factors leading to these circumstances, we found that VNBs
with a higher reputation incur in higher losses than those with a lower reputation. This
is directly associated with the prices these entities charge. Higher reputation VNBs are in
average matched with a larger number of SPs (see figure 31) and hence, receive a higher
payment for their service. This supports our hypothesis H13; nevertheless, high reputation
VNBs also experience a larger disparity between the price they expect and the payment they
receive. In consequence, VNBs with higher reputation incur in higher losses. What we need
in the system to reduce VNBs’ losses is for them to advertise lower fees and for SPs to be
willing to pay higher prices for the VNB services. We could expect this to happen when the
system we propose becomes common place and SPs highly value their participation in it.
It is also important to note that even if scenarios with a higher number of SPs result
in VNBs’ obtaining a higher overall payment, VNBs’ positive surplus is more evident in
scenarios with a lower number of SPs. This stems from the fact that small disparities in
individual payments received by the VNBs are more evident as the number of customers
increases (e.g., a small loss incurred in 50 individual payments is higher than that incurred
with only 4 individual payments). In this light, the number of SP customers does influence
the losses incurred by VNBs, hence suggesting that it is key for VNBs to define an appropriate
set of partners with whom to interact.
From the surplus analysis, we find that VNBs are capturing the risk in the system,
while SPs’ and RPs’ risk is minimized. This is a monetary risk; however, a deeper cost
analysis may direct us in more specific types of risk and methods to handle it that may
advance the system we propose. For instance, an alternative is for the VNB to charge an
additional risk premium in addition to its service fee. This would resemble an insurance type
of arrangement, which could account for the losses incurred by the VNBs. An additional
approach is for the VNB to operate as a non-profit entity. We believe that VNBs would seek
a payment to cover the cost associated with their duties; nevertheless, these costs could be
covered with non-monetary payments. One example includes the potential profits stemming
from data and information access.
Regarding the amount of resources assigned in the market, we can interpret this factor as
171
a proxy for the success rate of VNBs. In the case of 5 RPs, given that supply levels are low,
the performance of VNBs is affected. As supply increases, the effectiveness of VNBs increases
as well. We find that the performance of different VNB market structures is fairly stable.
As previously mentioned, it appears as VNB monopolies perform better than oligopolies,
however, this is only the case because the number of matched SPs in a VNB monopoly is
lower. Hence, when we take this factor into account, the actual difference in performance
is slim. From a market perspective and future implications this may have, we would prefer
there to be competition among VNBs, which could drive their pricing scheme towards market
indicators rather than monopolistic practices.
From our experimental group analysis, we find that factors that more clearly depend
on the matching process show that group 4 performs best for the factors explored. In this
way, we find that when both characteristics (reputation and price for SPs and demand and
price for VNBs) are given a higher weight, group 4 performance in the matching process is
better. Nevertheless, when analyzing parameters that involve factors outside the matching
scope (i.e., resource prices and RPs availability), there is not a definite trend on which group
performs best. This provides us with information for testing hypothesis H14. It should be
noted; however, that the matching process is what transforms geographical demand into
market demand, hence group 4 does have an important impact on the overall process.
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10.0 ANALYSIS
In the previous chapter we exposed the results obtained in the different market stages. In this
chapter, we take a step further to present what these results imply in the general spectrum
markets context, what they signify in terms of our research hypotheses and questions and
how they account towards formulating recommendations and guidelines for future markets
work.
10.1 HYPOTHESES TESTING AND STATISTICAL VALIDATION
In this section, we present the factors that we have explored in order to test the hypotheses
relevant to the different stages of this work. In order to reject the null hypothesis, we have
performed a paired or unpaired t-test with the available data. The results that we present in
what follows correspond to a 95% confidence interval on the difference between the factors
compared for each hypotheses. Note that this test has been applied for the factors that rely
on aggregate measures.
In table 32 we show our analysis for hypothesis H1. We have compared the auction cutoff
price under perfect and low fungibility conditions for different levels of resource supply. Our
results show that for a given set of users, the cutoff price is higher under perfect fungibility
conditions. This allows us to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., lower fungibility levels do not
affect the auction cutoff price).
Table 33 shows the t-test for hypothesis H2. For testing this hypothesis, we compare
the number of bandwidth units assigned under perfect and low fungibility conditions, taking
also into account undersupply and oversupply scenarios.
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Table 32: T-test results and analysis for hypothesis H1
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
Average cutoff
price under perfect
fungibility with R
= 5 and SUs = 20
Average cutoff
price under lowest
fungibility with R
= 5 and SUs = 20
15.67681±0.04376 The average cutoff price
is higher under per-
fect fungibility condi-
tions, when R = 5 and
SUs=20
Average cutoff
price under perfect
fungibility with
R=10 and SUs=20
Average cutoff
price under lowest
fungibility with
R=10 and SUs=20
4.18864± 0.01804 The average cutoff price
is higher under per-
fect fungibility condi-
tions, when R = 10 and
SUs=20
Average cutoff
price under perfect
fungibility with
R=15 and SUs=20
Average cutoff
price under lowest
fungibility R=15
and SUs=20
0.11331±0.004602 The average cutoff price
is slightly higher under
perfect fungibility con-
ditions, when R = 15
and SUs=20
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The results show that in scenarios where the supply is low or normal, more BBUs are
assigned when resources are perfectly fungible. In oversupply conditions, more BBUs are
assigned in lower fungibility scenarios. However, it is important to note that the difference
between perfect and low fungibility cases is small.
A larger difference between factors results when comparing supply conditions under a
fixed fungibility setting. In these cases, we find that the assignment of spectrum units attends
to supply and demand conditions, i.e., more BBUs are assigned when supply is larger (e.g.,
R = 15) and when demand increases (e.g., SUs = 20).
With these results, we can conclude that the resource assignment process responds in a
larger degree to demand and supply conditions, rather than fungibility levels.
Table 33: T-test results and analysis for hypothesis H2
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs=20
1.2119± 0.06919 More BBUs are as-
signed under perfect
fungibility than lower
fungibility conditions
when R = 5 and SUs =
20
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 10 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 10 and
SUs = 20
0.829985± 0.1240 More BBUs are as-
signed under perfect
fungibility than lower
fungibility conditions
when R = 10 and
SUs=20
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Table 33: (continued)
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs = 20
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs = 20
−1.62911 ±
0.239154
More BBUs are as-
signed under lowest
fungibility than perfect
fungibility conditions
when R = 15 and SUs
= 20
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs=20
101.59935±0.1945 In perfect fungibility
conditions for 20SUs,
more BBUs are assigned
with R = 15 than with
R = 5 (i.e., spectrum
oversupply)
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs = 20
104.44035±0.1554 In the lowest fungibil-
ity scenario for 20SUs,
more BBUs are assigned
with R = 15 than with
R = 5 (i.e., spectrum
oversupply)
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity R = 15, SUs =
4
157.63888 ±
0.15764
In the lowest fungibility
scenario and with R =
15, more BBUs are as-
signed with 20SUs than
with 4 SUs (i.e., higher
spectrum demand)
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Table 33: (continued)
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 15 and
SUs = 4
156.62044 ±
0.19483
In the perfect fun-
gibility scenario and
with R = 15, more
BBUs are assigned with
20SUs than with 4SUs
(i.e., higher spectrum
demand)
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs = 20
BBUs assigned un-
der lowest fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs = 4
72.57979±0.06402 In lowest fungibility
conditions and with R
= 5, more BBUs are as-
signed with 20SUs than
with 4SUs (i.e, higher
spectrum demand)
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs=20
BBUs assigned un-
der perfect fungibil-
ity with R = 5 and
SUs = 4
73.29465±0.05326 In perfect fungibility
conditions for R = 5,
more BBUs are assigned
with 20SUs than with 4
SUs (i.e., higher spec-
trum demand)
For hypothesis H4 we have compared the average number of BBUs and AT units assigned
under different levels of demand and supply. In the scenario we analyze, AT units correspond
to TVWS spectrum in a similar frequency band as BBUs. Our t-test shows that BBUs
oversupply results in more BBUs assigned, and BBUs undersupply results in more AT units
assigned, irrespective of the demand level. There is correspondence between supply and the
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price of resources. Indeed, in spectrum oversupply conditions, the price of resources tends
to be low, whereas in undersupply conditions, the BBU price is significantly higher.
It should be noted that in our model, we consider users with different levels of valuation
for BBUs in the market. Additionally, users’ valuation for BBUs is inversely proportional to
that of AT units. In this manner, our results also suggest that in cases where the price of
spectrum is too high, users with a lower (available) spectrum valuation opt for their higher
priced AT units. This shows that resource assignment, whether it is BBUs or AT units,
depends on BBUs availability and users’ resource valuation.
The specific t-test for hypothesis H4 is included in Table 34.
The t-test for hypothesis H7 is presented in Table 35. In this case, we compare the level
of resource supply in the market in scenarios with different levels of RPs’ participation. Our
results show that a higher number of RPs in the market represents a larger market supply.
In our model, RPs decide on what percentage of their available resources to make available
in the market. Irrespective of the actual percentage, our results of this test show that higher
RP participation is linked to a higher amount of resources available in the market, which
allows us to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the investment level of RPs is not proportional
to the amount of resources available in the market.)
For hypothesis H13 we explore the effect of VNBs’ reputation on the number of SP
customers that each VNB has and the payment VNBs receive. Our results show that both
parameters are larger for VNBs with a higher reputation. These results, which are included
in Table 36 permit us to reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the reputation of middlemen is not
proportional to the total number of matches of a VNB, and to the payment obtained from
resource aggregation services).
In hypothesis H14 we explore results relevant to the groups defined in our experiment
for the third market stage. In the case of VNBs, we find that the average payment received
by Group 4 VNBs is higher than the payment received by Group 1 VNBs. However, in the
case of surplus, Group 1 VNBs perform better than Group 4 VNBs. In the case of SPs,
their average surplus stemming from resource and VNB payments is slightly higher for the
members of group 4. These results are included in Table 37.
In the particular case of surplus, there are additional factors that influence its calculation,
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Table 34: T-test results and analysis for hypothesis H4
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
Average BBUs as-
signed with R=15
and SUs=4 (lower
cutoff price)
Average BBUs as-
signed with R=5
and SUs=4 (higher
cutoff price)
23.00453±0.04868 In a 4SUs scenario,
more BBUs are assigned
(in average) with R =
15 than with R = 5 (i.e.,
lower cutoff price condi-
tions)
Average AT units
assigned with R =
15 and SUs = 4
(lower cutoff price)
Average AT units
assigned with R
= 5 and SUs =
4 (higher cutoff
price)
−1.30349 ±
0.0074316
In a 4SUs scenario,
more AT units are as-
signed (in average) with
R = 5 than with R = 15
(i.e., higher cutoff price
conditions)
Average BBUs as-
signed with R =
15 and SUs = 10
(lower cutoff price)
Average BBUs
assigned with
R=5 and SUs=10
(higher cutoff
price)
76.6528± 0.10531 In a 10SUs scenario,
more BBUs are assigned
(in average) with R =
15 than with R = 5 (i.e.,
lower cutoff price condi-
tions)
Average AT units
assigned with
R=15 and SUs=10
(lower cutoff price)
Average AT units
assigned with R
= 5 and SUs =
10 (higher cutoff
price)
−1.3926± 0.00653 In a 10SUs scenario,
more AT units are as-
signed (in average) with
R=5 than with R = 15
(i.e., higher cutoff price
conditions)
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Table 35: T-test results and analysis for hypothesis H7
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
Average supply
with 15 RPs
Average supply
with 5 RPs
20.76535±0.18857 The average supply
with 15 RPs is greater
than the supply with 5
RPs
Average supply
with 10 RPs
Average supply
with 5 RPs
11.83847±0.19433 The average supply
with 10 RPs is greater
than the supply with 5
RPs
Table 36: T-test results and analysis for hypothesis H13
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
Average number of
customers of VNBs
with high reputa-
tion
Average number of
customers of VNBs
with low reputation
8.02057± 0.35153 The average number of
customers of high repu-
tation VNBs is greater
than that of low reputa-
tion VNBs
Average payment
received by high
reputation VNBs
Average payment
received by low
reputation VNBs
299.95348 ±
19.0905
The average payment
received by high repu-
tation VNBs is greater
than the payment re-
ceived by low reputa-
tion VNBs
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which are not related to the weights assigned to matching parameters. This justifies the
fact that surplus-related outcomes do not allow us to completely reject the null hypothesis.
Nevertheless, for all other parameters, including those that do not correspond to aggregate
measures, group 4 members outperform those of group 1.
10.2 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The models defined for the different stages account for vast possibilities in terms of parameter
combinations. The combination that we have deemed essential has been to vary the number
of market participants and resource availability. This permitted us to explore how supply
and demand variations influence the market results. The results stemming from this analysis
have already been explored through our hypotheses and presented in our results section.
To account for further parameters that may influence the outcome of our model, we
performed an additional sensitivity analysis, regarding the threshold utilized for establishing
acceptable matches. As presented in section 8.3.1.9, the joint utility threshold, which defines
acceptable matches was set as the middle point in the utility range: [0.4− 4], or 1.8. In this
section, we explore the results obtained when considering two additional thresholds given by
(10.1) and (10.2).
Lower threshold = 0.25× utility range = 0.9 (10.1)
Higher threshold = 0.75× utility range = 2.7 (10.2)
10.2.1 SP - VNB Matching Performance
In this subsection we explore the results obtained regarding the percentage of matched SPs
and the average number of customers per VNB.
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Table 37: T-test results and analysis for hypothesis H14
Relevant Factors T-test Result Conclusion
Average payment
received by Group
4 VNBs - 15 RPs
Average payment
received by Group
1 VNBs - 15 RPs
537.3233±23.5892 The average payment
received by Group 4
VNBs is greater than
the payment received by
Group 1 VNBs
Average Group 4
VNBs’ Surplus - 15
RPs
Average Group
1VNBs’ Surplus -
15 RPs
−14.3487± 4.7907 The average surplus
of Group 1 VNBs is
greater than the surplus
of Group 4 VNBs
Average Group 4
SPs’ surplus (from
VNB payment)
Average Group 1
SPs’ surplus (from
VNB payment)
0.66187± 0.08282 The average surplus
(from VNB payment) of
Group 4 SPs is greater
than the surplus of
Group 1 SPs
Average Group 4
SPs’ surplus (from
resource payment)
Average Group 1
SPs’ surplus (from
resource payment)
0.79646± 0.0035 The average surplus
(from resource pay-
ment) of Group 4 SPs is
greater than the surplus
of Group 1 SPs
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10.2.1.1 Percentage of matched SPs: Lower thresholds imply a larger range of al-
lowable matches. In other words, the matching process is less strict and permits matches
between VNBs and SPs whose utilities are fairly low. In this manner, as it is presented in
figure 81, the number of SPs that are matched is significantly higher when we utilize a lower
threshold.
10.2.1.2 Average number of customers per VNB: Since there is a larger number of
matched SPs in scenarios with lower thresholds, it follows that, on average, each VNB forms
partnerships with a larger number of SPs. As expected, when we consider a higher utility
threshold, we can observe lower number of partners per VNB. These results can be observed
in figures 82, 83, 84 and 85, where we consider scenarios with different VNB configurations.
10.2.2 Percentage of demand satisfied in the market
In this section, we present the percentage of matched SPs that have obtained resources
from the market when considering different RP configurations (i.e., 5, 10 and 15 RPs), and
the aforementioned lower and higher thresholds. As shown in figures 86, 87 and 88, lower
thresholds signify lower levels of demand satisfaction. Note that lower thresholds result in
higher market demand, hence, if we keep the supply levels constant, an increase in demand
implies that a larger number of SPs may not obtain resources in the market. In other words,
lower thresholds generate undersupply conditions. Additionally, it is important to point out
that the percentage shown for each threshold is calculated over the entire set of matched SPs
for each threshold level. In this way, the percentage of demand satisfied in the market for the
lower threshold is calculated over a larger SP population than that of the higher threshold.
10.2.3 Percentage of resources assigned by RPs
The results presented in figures 89, 90 and 91, show how the percentage of resources assigned
by the RPs varies according to the utility threshold. As expected, in scenarios with lower
demand (i.e., higher thresholds), RPs assign a lower percentage of their resources.
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Figure 81: Percentage of matched SPs in the entire simulation with varying number of VNBs
and 10 RPs
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 82: Average number of SP customers per VNB in a scenario with 1 VNB and 10 RPs
185
4 5 6 10 20 50
Number of SPs
0
10
20
30
40
50
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f P
ar
tn
er
s
Average number of SP Partners per Matched VNB according to Reputation- 2 VNBs
quality
0
1
2
(a) Results with lower threshold
4 5 6 10 20 50
Number of SPs
0
10
20
30
40
50
A
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f P
ar
tn
er
s
Average number of SP Partners per Matched VNB according to Reputation- 2 VNBs
quality
0
1
2
(b) Results with higher threshold
Figure 83: Average number of SP customers per VNB in a scenario with 2 VNBs and 10
RPs
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 84: Average number of SP customers per VNB in a scenario with 3 VNBs and 10
RPs.
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 85: Average number of SP customers per VNB in a scenario with 4 VNBs and 10
RPs
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Figure 86: Percentage of matched SPs that obtained resources from the market. Scenario
with 5 RPs
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Figure 87: Percentage of matched SPs that obtained resources from the market. Scenario
with 10 RPs
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(b) Higher threshold
Figure 88: Percentage of matched SPs that obtained resources from the market. Scenario
with 15 RPs
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(b) Higher threshold
Figure 89: Percentage of resources assigned by each RP. Scenario with 5 RPs
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Figure 90: Percentage of resources assigned by each RP. Scenario with 10 RPs
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Figure 91: Percentage of resources assigned by each RP. Scenario with 15 RPs
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10.2.4 Payments
In this section we explore how the payments received by RPs and VNBs change with the
threshold variation.
10.2.4.1 Payments received by RPs The payments received by the RPs are consistent
with the market demand. In this way, in scenarios with a larger number of matched SPs
(i.e., lower utility threshold), RPs’ opportunities to assign resources increase, and hence the
payments they receive. Figures 92, 93 and 94 show the average payment received by the
resource providers in scenarios with 5, 10 and 15 RPs, respectively.
10.2.4.2 Payments received by VNBs From a VNB perspective, more partners rep-
resent higher revenue opportunities. In figures 95, 96, 97 and 98, we show that under lower
threshold configurations (i.e., more partners per VNB), VNBs’ aggregate payments increase.
Note that these figures reflect the average payment received by each VNB that has assigned
resources to its customers in a scenario with 10 RPs.
10.2.5 Surplus
In this section we analyze the variations on the surplus perceived by each entity from the
payments it makes or receives.
10.2.5.1 RPs’ Surplus To illustrate how our sensitivity analysis impacts the RPs’ sur-
plus, in figures 99, 100, 101 and 102, we show the results obtained for a scenario with 10 RPs
and each of the VNB market configurations that we have considered. As it can be observed,
there is not a significant difference between these results and those presented in section 9.3.
Indeed, the RPs’ surplus remains positive for all the cases we have analyzed.
10.2.5.2 VNBs’ Surplus In figures 103, 104, 105 and 106, we present how varying the
utility thresholds impact the VNBs’ surplus. In the same manner as presented in section 9.3,
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Figure 92: Average payment received by the resource providers. Scenario with 5 RPs
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Figure 93: Average payment received by the resource providers. Scenario with 10 RPs
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Figure 94: Average payment received by the resource providers. Scenario with 15 RPs
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 95: Average payment received by VNBs in a scenario with 1 VNB and 10 RPs
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(b) Results with higher threshold
Figure 96: Average payment received by VNBs in a scenario with 2 VNBs and 10 RPs
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 97: Average payment received by VNBs in a scenario with 3 VNBs and 10 RPs.
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 98: Average payment received by VNBs in a scenario with 4 VNBs and 10 RPs
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Figure 99: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 1 VNB and 10 RPs
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(b) Results with higher threshold
Figure 100: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 2 VNBs and 10 RPs
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Figure 101: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 3 VNBs and 10 RPs.
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Figure 102: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 4 VNBs and 10 RPs
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a larger number of SP customers implies greater gains, but given our joint utility configu-
ration, this may also increase losses. This is corroborated with the results presented herein.
Indeed, higher thresholds, i.e., less SP customers or partners, positively impacts the surplus
distribution. These results suggests that, in terms of surplus, it is more profitable for VNBs
to place more stringent conditions for their partner selection process.
10.2.5.3 SPs’ Surplus There are two instances where SPs should calculate their surplus
1) from the amount they pay for resources, and 2) from the fee they pay for the VNB services.
Figures 107, 108, 109 and 110 show the surplus distribution that stems from the SPs’
resource payment. These figures represent a scenario with 10 RPs and different VNB con-
figurations. As it can be observed, SPs generally do not make a profit from their resource
payment, nor do they incur in losses. This is consistent with the results presented in section
9.3.
In figures 111, 112, 113 and 114, we present the surplus resulting from the VNB fee
payment of those SPs who did obtain resources in the market. As it can be observed, the
distribution in the two threshold levels are fairly similar between them, and they are also
similar to the results presented in section 9.3.
10.3 THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
The work presented in this dissertation has been designed with the objective of determining
what we need in order to deploy successful spectrum markets. Nevertheless, it is also im-
portant to explore other axes of applicability of the model we propose, especially targeting
areas of current technical interest.
At this moment, efforts are focused on the implementation of 5G technologies and the
Internet of Things, which has found as one of its broader-impact applications the develop-
ment of Smart Cities. In these technical settings, we may significantly benefit from sharing
resources in smaller areas, as the frequencies of interest seem to be in the GHz range. In this
manner, we may find 5G or IoT infrastructure owned by multiple parties, located in close
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Figure 103: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 1 VNB and 10 RPs
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(b) Results with higher threshold
Figure 104: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 2 VNBs and 10 RPs
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Figure 105: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 3 VNBs and 10 RPs.
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(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 106: RPs’ surplus in a scenario with 4 VNBs and 10 RPs
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Figure 107: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their resource payment, in a scenario with 1 VNB
and 10 RPs
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Figure 108: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their resource payment, in a scenario with 2 VNBs
and 10 RPs
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Figure 109: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their resource payment, in a scenario with 3 VNBs
and 10 RPs.
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Figure 110: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their resource payment, in a scenario with 4 VNBs
and 10 RPs
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Figure 111: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their VNB fee payment, in a scenario with 1 VNB
and 10 RPs
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Figure 112: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their VNB fee payment, in a scenario with 2 VNBs
and 10 RPs
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Figure 113: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their VNB fee payment, in a scenario with 3 VNBs
and 10 RPs.
218
4 5 6 10 20 50
Number of SPs
30
20
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
S
ur
pl
us
 ($
)
SP surplus from VNB payment - 4 VNB
(a) Lower threshold results
4 5 6 10 20 50
Number of SPs
30
20
10
0
10
20
30
40
50
S
ur
pl
us
 ($
)
SP surplus from VNB payment - 4 VNB
(b) Higher threshold results
Figure 114: SPs’ surplus, obtained from their VNB fee payment, in a scenario with 4 VNBs
and 10 RPs
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proximity. Along these lines, the VNBs’ functions may go well beyond the distribution of
unused capacity of large Resource Providers. Indeed, we could now refer as RPs to all entities
that have deployed local networks. VNBs can fulfill resource aggregating functions, which
may allow for more efficient uses of resources and the creation of larger scale networks, that
result from the combination of small- and micro-cell configurations. Looking at the Smart
Cities example, we can think of further applications1 that may rely on a VNB for on-demand
access to resources, as needed, in order to fulfill the demand specific to each area.
Exploring the cloud markets literature, we found that an important obstacle in resource
access is defining an entity’s appropriate needs and matching them with the available market
offers. In the case of IoT and smart cities, and new service providers in general, a VNB could
be also the entity that solves this problem. In this manner, a VNB could extend resource
access to parties that could not do so individually.
From an enforcement perspective, thinking specifically of the Spectrum Access System
(SAS), VNBs could make it easier for these entities to populate the databases. In fact,
VNBs can keep track of areas where resources are being utilized, and the entities utilizing
them. A report from the VNB to the SAS would permit the access system to maintain its
databases up-to-date, while minimizing the amount of queries required in order to gather all
the information.
Given the path that wireless communications services seem to be taking: reducing the
scope and area of networks, our VNB market configuration may prove useful. Indeed, it
could permit to bridge the gaps that slow-down the development of much needed spectrum
(and resource) sharing schemes.
1The Smart Dublin project, which aims at converting Dublin, Ireland in a smart city, presents in the form
of challenges, different aspects that need to be addressed. Some of these challenges include flooding alerts
and monitoring (see https://connectcentre.ie/news/connect-offers-smart-solution-flooding/),
indoor and outdoor wayfinding solutions, among others. For a full description of these challenges, see:
http://smartdublin.ie/challenges/
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11.0 CONCLUSIONS
The work that we have presented aims at providing a comprehensive view on the different
aspects that influence the development of viable spectrum markets. We begin by exploring
markets as stand-alone institutions where new entrants can access the spectrum holdings of
a Band Manager via auction mechanisms. With the evolution of our study, we addressed
technical characteristics of spectrum, which led us to find a new commodity to trade in
the market. This new commodity relies on technical features and flexibility opportunities
provided by resource virtualization. In the final stage of this dissertation, we adopted a
new market perspective, by studying new market entities, their characteristics, the rules
they follow, and their behavior. This was possible by placing our model within a broader
framework which has also permitted us to set the stage for future analysis.
Throughout this three-stage study, we have been able to define what are the effects of the
lack of spectrum fungibility in the market; to explore what are the consequences of defining
more flexible tradeable commodities, and how a resource sharing environment that relies
on market mechanisms may be deployed. In each stage results section, we have included
the values and interpretation of the parameters of interest. Nevertheless, in what follows,
we point out how our analysis addresses the successful market design guidelines defined by
Alvin Roth in [7]: thickness, congestion and safety.
• Thickness: One of the main objectives in this work has been to define a commodity
that can attract more participants to the marketplace. We have found that trading
naked spectrum poses important limitations which impact resource valuation, and hence
market success. By adopting a more technical definition of spectrum, we find that it is
possible to offer resources that may be compatible with a wider range of services and
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devices, thus becoming more appealing to a wider set of buyers. Additionally, in our third
stage, we include an additional entity, the virtual network builder, which is in charge of
bridging additional differences between buyers and sellers. In absence of a VNB, these
differences may ultimately restrict the amount of transactions that take place in the
market.
• Congestion: Just as the VNBs bridge differences between SPs and RPs, the operations
of these middlemen also reduce the amount of transactions that would be required if
buyers and sellers were left to transact on their own. In other words, the final market
transactions are performed with a reduced number of entities (VNBs), which represent
the available buyers (i.e., SPs). In this manner, an additional function of the VNB is
to reduce the congestion resulting from an increased number of market participants and
possible transactions.
• Safety: Limiting the flow of information between transacting parties can be a source
of safety for market participants. In this manner, buyers and/or sellers may not know
what the business model of other participants is, hence avoiding restrictions on resource
use. Additionally, the different market participants can base their future interactions
on previous market outcomes. This allows them to place more competitive bids, avoid
losses and choose the most suitable VNB for their needs.
Our study relies on the development of models that fit our scenarios of interest. For this
purpose, we have utilized agent-based modeling (ABM) and its agent-based computational
economics (ACE) branch to design and test models that best adapt to each of the stages
described in this dissertation. Given the difference of scope between the first two stages
and the third, the respective models show different levels of complexity. Nevertheless, the
added complexity of our third stage model does not impact its stability, scalability and
flexibility. In this manner, we are presenting a market analysis tool that can be adapted to
fit further aspects of interest, i.e., upcoming technologies, more complex auction mechanisms
and governance schemes.
Combining our modeling tools and the analysis that can emerge from them, we expect this
work to elucidate how we can incorporate pragmatic market approaches into the academic
study of spectrum markets. Indeed, we consider that our approach on matching market
222
participants with brokers permits us to develop a more expressive resource access mechanism
that can shed light on the incentives required and shortcomings to address, as we move
towards adopting markets as feasible spectrum sharing alternatives.
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12.0 FUTURE WORK
Forthcoming studies and analyses in spectrum markets are mainly related to our third stage
model. As mentioned throughout this work, the model developed for Stage III constitutes
a mechanism to bootstrap the market in more complex settings. In this manner, future
work associated with this approach includes the development of a more complex market
mechanism between RPs and VNBs (e.g., auction model or matching market) that would
allow our agents to place more expressive bids. In turn, this would permit us to create a
more refined service-driven network.
As a means to mimic market approaches that are successful in industries like electricity,
we plan to implement additional transaction capabilities for the virtual network builders. In
our future view of the model, VNBs will be capable of managing futures transactions as well
as spot markets. This would permit us to capture different degrees of risk in the market
transactions, thus making our VNBs’ risk profiles richer and more pragmatic.
An important aspect of VNBs as middlemen is their reputation. In this light, we are
interested in exploring different reputation building mechanisms that could adapt to our
settings. Currently, there are myriad approaches that have been implemented for rating
real-world middlemen (e.g., Amazon, OpenTable, Airbnb) that can shed light on features
that would be applicable to our model.
Regarding the matching process, we aim at exploring different factors that may guide
the preferences of SPs and VNBs. This would also lead us to study scenarios where SPs
may be interested in matching with more than one VNB. On the resource provider side, RPs
currently do not play a role in VNB–SP matching. Nevertheless, it is important to address
how feedback from past transactions may incorporate parameters relevant to RPs into the
matching process.
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To date, our market model has been developed in such a manner that it allows for a deep
analysis of governance mechanisms and the role these may play as the market evolves. In
this way, our future work involves embedding specific polycentric governance considerations
and applicable enforcement mechanisms in our market model. This would permit us to
emphasize on the safety aspect of our market approach.
Finally, we aim at placing our market model within technical scenarios of interest. For
instance, we aim at adapting our model to the spectrum requirements and market setup
for 5G technologies and the Internet of Things. Throughout the different extensions of the
work presented herein, our focus on studying factors from multiple disciplines remains, as
we consider it important to advance spectrum sharing research from different perspectives
and levels of abstraction.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENT RESULTS FROM STAGE III
A.1 SPS’ GROUP PERFORMANCE
In this section we include an additional representation of SPs’ group performance. In each of
these graphs, we include the percentage of tested scenarios in which each group led to the best
results for each criterion. The results presented in what follows correspond to scenarios with
10 RPs, given that the number of RPs does not influence the matching-related parameters.
A.1.1 Demand
As presented in section 9.3, SPs belonging to group 4 outperformed the rest of the groups
in terms of demand. This is also illustrated in figures 115, 116, 117 and 118. Indeed, we
observe that in all the scenarios we tested, members of group 4 had a higher percentage of
the geographical demand converted into market demand.
The results regarding other criteria, such as the percentage of matched SPs and the
percentage of SPs that obtained resources show an identical distribution as that of the
demand graphs. In other words, for all these criteria, group 4 SPs outperform the members
of other groups in all the tested scenarios. The parameter for which we find distinct results
is that of the SPs’ surplus stemming from the fees paid to the VNBs. We include these
distributions in what follows.
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Figure 115: Group distribution of geographical demand that became market demand. Sce-
nario with 1 VNB
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Figure 116: Group distribution of geographical demand that became market demand. Sce-
nario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 117: Group distribution of geographical demand that became market demand. Sce-
nario with 3 VNBs
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Figure 118: Group distribution of geographical demand that became market demand. Sce-
nario with 4 VNBs
228
67% 
16% 
17% 
0% 
SPs'	Surplus	from	VNB	Fee	- 1	VNB
1 2 3 4
Figure 119: Group distribution of SPs’ surplus from VNB fees Scenario with 1 VNB
A.1.2 SPs’ surplus from VNB fees
A.2 VNBS’ GROUP PERFORMANCE
In this section we present the percentage of the tested scenarios in which a given VNB group
outperformed the rest regarding the parameters specified in each subsection. These graphs
support the results presented in section 9.3, which show that contrary to the case of SPs,
group 4 VNBs do not outperform the rest in every scenario.
A.2.1 Customers per VNB
A.2.2 Percentage of Matched VNBs
A.2.3 Payment Received by VNBs
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Figure 120: Group distribution of SPs’ surplus from VNB fees Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 121: Group distribution of SPs’ surplus from VNB fees Scenario with 3 VNBs
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Figure 122: Group distribution of SPs’ surplus from VNB fees Scenario with 4 VNBs
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Figure 123: Group performance distribution regarding the average number of partners per
VNB. Scenario with 1 VNB
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Figure 124: Group performance distribution regarding the average number of partners per
VNB. Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 125: Group performance distribution regarding the average number of partners per
VNB. Scenario with 3 VNBs
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Figure 126: Group performance distribution regarding the average number of partners per
VNB. Scenario with 4 VNBs
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Figure 127: Group performance distribution regarding the percentage of matched VNBs (on
average). Scenario with 1 VNB
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Figure 128: Group performance distribution regarding the percentage of matched VNBs (on
average). Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 129: Group performance distribution regarding the percentage of matched VNBs (on
average). Scenario with 3 VNBs
234
0% 
100% 
Average	Percentage	of	Matched	VNBs	- 4	VNBs
1 2 3 4
Figure 130: Group performance distribution regarding the percentage of matched VNBs (on
average). Scenario with 4 VNBs
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Figure 131: Group performance distribution regarding the average payment received by
VNBs. Scenario with 1 VNB
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Figure 132: Group performance distribution regarding the average payment received by
VNBs. Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 133: Group performance distribution regarding the average payment received by
VNBs. Scenario with 3 VNBs
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Figure 134: Group performance distribution regarding the average payment received by
VNBs. Scenario with 4 VNBs
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL RESULTS FROM STAGE III
B.1 PAYMENTS RECEIVED BY VNBS
In this section we include results for the average payment received by VNBs in scenarios
with 5 and 10 RPs.
B.1.1 Scenario with 5 RPs
B.1.2 Scenario with 15 RPs
B.2 VNBS’ SURPLUS ACCORDING TO REPUTATION
In what follows, we include figures that illustrate the surplus distribution of VNBs according
to their reputation. We present scenarios with 5, 10 and 15 RPs.
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Figure 135: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 1 VNB and 5 RPs.
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Figure 136: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 2 VNBs and 5 RPs.
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Figure 137: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 3 VNBs and 5 RPs.
4 5 6 10 20 50
Number of SPs
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
A
ve
ra
ge
 P
ay
m
en
t (
$)
Average Payment Received by each Serving VNB according to Reputation - 5 RPs and 4 VNB
quality
0
1
2
Figure 138: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 4 VNBs and 5 RPs.
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Figure 139: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 1 VNB and 15 RPs.
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Figure 140: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 2 VNBs and 15 RPs.
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Figure 141: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 3 VNBs and 15 RPs.
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Figure 142: Average payment received by each VNB, according to its reputation. Scenario
with 4 VNBs and 15 RPs.
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Figure 143: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 1 VNB
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Figure 144: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 145: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 3 VNBs
4 5 6 10 20 50
Number of SPs
600
400
200
0
200
400
600
S
ur
pl
us
 ($
)
4 VNB Surplus Boxplot
quality
0
1
2
Figure 146: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 4 VNBs
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Figure 147: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 1 VNB
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Figure 148: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 149: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 3 VNBs
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B.3 SCENARIO WITH 5 RPS
B.4 SCENARIO WITH 10 RPS
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Figure 150: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 4 VNBs
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B.5 SCENARIO WITH 15 RPS
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Figure 151: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 1 VNB
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Figure 152: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 2 VNBs
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Figure 153: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 3 VNBs
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Figure 154: VNBs surplus distribution according to their reputation. Scenario with 4 VNBs
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